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Abstract 
This thesis consists of eight chapters. It focuses on Chinese household behaviour with 
regard to return to health, resource allocation within the family and inter-household risk 
sharing. Chapter 1 is an introduction. Chapter 2 uses the famine as a natural experiment 
to estimate the return to attained height of individuals. In this study, we find that annual 
income increases by 2.5 percent if attained height is increased by 1 cm. 
To further investigate the linkage between health status and labour market productivity, 
we examine the calorie intake elasticity with respect to individual health endowments for 
males and females (Chapter 3). We find that the health endowment affects the allocation 
of food among family members of the Chinese rural economy. This elasticity is greater 
for women than for men. Chapter 4 assesses the effect of the location of the husband's 
mother-in-law on the allocation of resources between husband and wife. We find that the 
relative share of the husband's nutrient intake, relative to his wife's intake, decreases 
when his mother-in-law lives in the same village or neighbourhood, but increases if his 
mother-in-law lives outside the county in which the husband's family is located. We 
reject the hypothesis that a multi-person household can be treated as single decision-
maker and this chapter sheds light on the degree of intra-family discrimination against 
wives. 
Chapter 5 moves to the problem of risk sharing between households. The full 
consumption insurance hypothesis is tested. The full consumption insurance hypothesis is 
rejected for rural areas, but not urban. Furthermore, full insurance cannot be rejected 
V 
within villages, but is completely rejected across villages. Our results suggest that to 
some extent the degree of insurance deteriorates with distance. 
Chapter 6 examines the response of consumption to major illness shocks. The results 
suggest that households without medical insurance are able to insure their consumption 
against minor illness shocks but not major ones. Chapter 7 provides an explicit estimate 
of the parameters in the utility function that reflect the strength of the precautionary 
saving motive. Our results produced a significant relative prudent coefficient, which is 
about 4 (hence the risk aversion is about 3 for the Constant Relative Risk A version 
(CRRA) utility function) for village representative consumers based on the assumption of 
complete risk sharing within a village. Our findings suggest that the village unit approach 
"works" in estimation of precautionary saving model, and this approach may be a 
possible way to solve Dynan's puzzle. 
Vl 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Questions and motivation 
The last twenty years has seen remarkable changes in economic performance in China. 
China has been fairly successful in its transition from a planned economy to a market 
oriented economy: from an agricultural dominated society to a more modem 
industiialised society. It is very impressive that China enjoys a very high private savings 
rate, a high investment rate and high economic growth. During this period of economic 
reform, the living standard has increased dramatically. Many studies have been conducted 
which have tried to understand this success story, however, very few have used micro 
data to understand decision making at the household level on a variety of economic 
. l issues . 
This thesis looks at three impo1iant research areas, the relationship between health and 
the labour market, the sha1ing of food within households and the extent of insurance 
-
1 Recently, the number of empirical studies based on micro data has been increased. Meng ( 1999) 
includes sound empirical research on various labour issues in China. 
1 
across households. It asks questions such as: " What is the economic return to health in 
the rural labour market? How does food allocation within the family take into 
consideration the links between health and labour market productivity? Does the informal 
insurance mechanism between households shield a household's consumption from 
income fluctuations? What are the policy implications of incomplete consumption 
insurance?" 
If these questions can be answered empirically, the findings will have important policy 
implications and methodology issues will be raised which will require further analysis of 
the Chinese economy. 
It is believed that the accumulation of human capital is associated with economic growth. 
Recently, a number of studies have indicated that better health is associated with better 
labour market outcomes (Strauss and Thomas 1998). Is this true in rural China? This is 
completely an empirical problem. Indeed, if health is rewarded in the labour market, we 
may need to take this factor into consideration when we evaluate the effects of 
government health expenditure. In recognition of this, the Chinese government is 
increasing health expenditure in order to improve people's health. For instance, an 
intense program has been launched to supply all rural residents with clean drinking water. 
During this period of rapid economic growth, inequality has increased dramatically. To 
better understand the issue of inequality, it is necessary to examine inequality within the 
family. When the presence of a linkage between health and labour market productivity 
affects the distribution of household food, policy makers need to shape their welfare 
policy to better target the needs of vulnerable individuals such as unhealthy females and 
2 
children. These are the individuals who are most likely to be discriminated against in 
respect to household food distribution. 
Many studies (among others, World Bank 1997) suggest that the most challenging issue 
facing China today is the lack of a sound social security system. China is making efforts 
to establish medical insurance, unemployment insurance and pension systems. However, 
these newly established systems only cover urban residents. This is because (1) the 
government lack resources to establish systems that will cover the entire population; (2) 
policy makers assume (presumably) that informal insurance mechanisms in rural areas 
may already work well enough to shield the consumption of households from various 
shocks. Therefore, we need to test how, and to what extent, households can smooth their 
consumption against various income shocks, is the key to making decisions concerning 
the establishment of social security systems in rural areas. For instance, if it can be 
determined that households in China are capable of smoothing their consumption against 
small shocks, but fail in smoothing consumption against greater shocks (such as major 
illness), it would be better for policy makers to use their limited resources to insure 
catastrophic events for both rural and urban residents. 
The event of catastrophic illness is believed to be the major reason for the emergence of a 
new segment of the rural population living in acute poverty, since the 1980s. This may be 
due primarily to the fact that the cooperative medical insurance system, established under 
the planned economy, was completely destroyed in the 1980s, after the introduction of 
the family based agriculture system. We test whether households are now able to insure 
their consumption against illness. Our findings suggest that households cannot insure 
themselves against major illness and there would be substantial benefits from the 
3 
introduction of a medical insurance scheme, for rural residents, that would cover major 
illness. 
Savings issues in China have been discussed substantially, however, the purpose of 
family savings is far from being fully understood. Obviously, Chinese households face 
substantial risks and uncertainty during the transition period. But how strong is the 
precautionary saving motivation amongst consumers? If policy makers are able to 
directly estimate the prudence coefficient of consumers, they can design their policies to 
be more effective. For example, how much would the incentive to save be reduced if 
policies that reduced the risk and uncertainty facing consumers were introduced? By how 
much would the welfare of individuals be improved? To answer these questions require 
know ledge of structural parameters such as the prudence coefficient. 
1.2 Outline of the thesis 
This thesis consists of eight chapters. Chapter 2 examines the return to health in rural 
areas in China. We proxy health by individual height. A basic concern for the 
development economist is whether an increase in investment in health results in an 
increase in income. Estimating the return to health is the first step in understanding the 
complex interrelationship between health and economic development. Height reflects 
investment in human capital made on the individual during childhood. It might be 
thought of as a predetermined variable in a regression of an earning equation. We argue 
that many factors such as family background characteristics and liquidity constraints are 
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likely to influence both height and earnings, so the Ordinary Least Squared estimation of 
the return to health may be biased. 
We estimate the returns to height by using, as a natural experiment, the great Chinese 
famine of 1959-1961. The great famine created exogenous variations in nutrition 
investment on height across regions and cohorts. These exogenous variations can be used 
to identify the changes of height that were caused by the famine. This exogenous change 
of height is then used in the earning equation to identify the return to height in rural areas. 
This identification strategy overcomes the omitted variable bias problem and a consistent 
estimate of return to height can be achieved. In addition, our strategy also allows us to 
establish a causal relationship between health and labour market outcomes. 
Chapter 3 investigates how resources are allocated within the family, taking into 
consideration the links between health and productivity in the labour market. Chapter 2 
offers us some evidence that health (strength) is indeed rewarded in the rural labour 
market. The links between health and productivity may have a substantial effect on food 
allocation within poor families. 
The idea of food allocation within the family, taking into account links between 
productivity and health, is quite simple. Given a limited quantity of food, the family 
planner may allocate more food to the individual with higher health status because that 
individual can earn more if they are involved in an activity where good health strongly 
augments productivity, and where effort depletes health status. In this case, increased 
food consumption both compensates for, and enhances , the return from increased effort. 
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To examine the rel~tionship between household distribution of food and activities, we 
first estimate a health production function where nutrition intake and labour market 
activity variables have been instrumented. Secondly, we calculate the health endowment 
of the individual from the health production function. Finally, the effects of health 
endowment on calorie consumption, income and activity choice are examined. 
Chapter 4 moves to gender bias issues within the family. In Chapter 3, we found that food 
distribution within the family is associated with activity distribution within a common 
preference model. In the common preference model, a family is treated as a homogenous 
entity. The other leading model (the bargaining model) regards the household as a group 
of individuals who bargain with each other over available resources. Chapter 4 tries to 
test which model most correctly describes the household decision making process i.e. 
common preference model or bargaining model. 
Our concept is simple. For the common preference model, income is assumed to be 
pooled within the family. Individual consumption is determined by the total pool of 
family resources and the price of commodities, and will not respond to individual social 
economic characteristics that do not shift with taste. In contrast, the bargaining model 
assumes that the social-economic characteristics associated with bargaining power will 
alter the patterns of household consumption distribution. We examine if relative 
consumption between husband and wife depends on the location of the mother-in-law. 
We argue that the wife's bargaining power might be enhanced when her natal family 
lives near her married home and that she may receive relatively more consumption 
compared to her husband when this is the case. This test suggests that the common 
preference model might be more realistic in describing resource allocation within the 
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family. The policy implications of this study are really interesting and important. If the 
target of family income support programs were to be changed, from the husband of the 
household to the wife, this may increase the wife's bargaining power and significantly 
reduce gender bias within the family. 
Chapter 2, 3 and 4 focus on household decisions concerning resource allocation within 
the family. Chapter 5 onwards considers risk sharing behaviour among households. 
In Chapter 5, we conduct a full consumption insurance test in the context of the Chinese 
economy. Hall's paper (1978) derives an implication of consumption smoothing over 
time, called the Martingale hypothesis. Many studies have been done to test the 
Martingale hypothesis. However, this landscape was altered by Cochrane (1991), Mace 
(1991) and Townsend (1994), who derived an implication of consumption smoothing 
across different states of nature. Hall's model is really a model of self-insurance. The 
representative agent in Hall's model can only shield consumption from income 
fluctuation through savings and investment in safe assets. The agent is cut off from all the 
other forms of insurance mechanisms. The full consumption insurance hypothesis 
suggests that individual consumption will co-move with aggregate consumption, and will 
not respond to idiosyncratic shocks. 
We test the extent of full consumption insurance in the context of China, where the 
degree of consumption insurance has impo1iant policy implications due to the fact that 
China is beginning to establish a new social security system that will include medical and 
unemployment insurance and a pension system. We also compare the degree of 
consumption smoothing, against income shocks , for residents living in rural areas and 
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urban areas. This test allows us to understand the effectiveness of existing formal and 
informal insurance mechanisms that help households protect consumption from income 
shocks. 
Chapter 6 continues to test the full consumption insurance model. The weakness of 
studies of full consumption insurance, using income shocks, is that: (1) income shocks 
may be measured with serious errors and we may overstate the degree of insurance; (2) 
households may insure themselves from risks by choosing safe but low productive 
production methods before income is realised and we may overstate the efficacy of 
existing insurance mechanisms. · In this chapter, the full consumption insurance 
hypothesis is tested using illness shocks. The rich data that is available on symptoms and 
their effects on individual work performance and daily activities allows us to better 
estimate the degree of consumption insurance. In addition, since only urban residents are 
able to access formal medical insurance, we can also compare the effectiveness of formal 
and informal medical insurance systems on consumption insurance, against illness risks. 
As argued above, contrary to Hall's formulation of the Life Cycle-Permanent Income 
hypothesis, the empirical evidence suggests that households do combine self-insurance 
with inter-household transfers to protect consumption from income shocks. This fact is 
extremely important in the analysis of consumption decisions and has significant policy 
implications for governments. 
Chapter 7 estimates the prudence coefficient which measures how prudent consumers are, 
by following Dynan' s ( 1993) methodology. Our focus is to incorporate risk sharing 
considerations into the specification. We argue that the prudence coefficient in Dynan ' s 
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specification will not be identified when the agents, in the economy, share risk 
completely. We assume the existence of full consumption insurance within the village or 
neighbourhood, then estimate the village representative consumer's prudence coefficient 
at the level of villages. The measurement error of consumption has been reduced 
dramatically through averaging over all individuals within the village. However, the 
variation of consumption growth across villages still allows us to estimate the prudence 
coefficient. Our estimated prudence coefficient is consistent with that widely accepted by 
economists. Our methodology suggests a possible way of solving Dynan's puzzle. 
Chapter 8 presents a short conclusion. The main results of the thesis have been 
summarised. The potential weakness of this thesis and possible further research are 
discussed. 
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Chapter 2 
Health Consequences of the 1959-1961 Fallline in 
China and an Estilllate of the Return to Health 
2.1 Introduction 
The question of whether an increased investment in health causes an increase in income 
is a basic concern for development economics. Over the past 20 years, investment in 
human resources has taken centre stage in the study of developing economies. Numerous 
sets of wage equation estimates provide the basis for calculating market returns to 
education for almost every economy in the world. However, the link between health and 
labour market outcomes has received far less attention in the empirical literature. 
Recently, however, considerable attention has been directed toward understanding the 
complex inte1Telationships that exist between health and economic development (see the 
interesting survey by Strauss and Thomas 1998). 
This chapter attempts to estimate the retu111 to height, which reflects the accumulation of 
human capital early in life, by using as a natural experiment the Chinese famine of 1959-
1961. The great famine in China between 1959-1961 resulted in an exogenous source of 
variation in nut1ition investment, which impacted significantly on the height of 
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individuals. This fact allows us to estimate the impact of nutrition as an investment on 
height. 
The height of a person embodies substantial information about their health. It has been 
widely used as an indicator of wellbeing in both economic theory and in the development 
literature. Robert Fogel (1992,1994) linked aggregate movements in adult height to long 
run changes in standards of living by drawing on historical series on the stature of adults 
in the US and Europe. Strauss and Thomas (1998) documented the link between attained 
height at maturity and economic development in the last century in the US, Brazil, Cote 
Di voire and Vietnam. Strauss established links between a substantial increase in attained 
height at maturity and increases in living standards. In household data, there is a good 
deal of direct evidence indicating that income and health are correlated. For example, the 
height of children tends to increase with income in many low-income level countries. 
Above all, although height is influenced by the genes inherited from parents, it also 
reflects investments made in the individual during childhood. We might interpret height 
as an indicator of human capital much along the lines of education. Height affects labour 
outcomes because it reflects a return to investment in human capital made during early 
childhood. Research has found that taller men earn higher wages (Haddad and Bouis 
1991; Foster and Rosenzweig 1993; Thomas and Strauss 1997). The link between height 
and wages has also been noted in some historic literature. 
One weakness of previous literature attempting to establish a link b~tween height and 
income, was that height was treated as exogenous. Actually, Financial liquidity 
constraints, parent income and family background are likely to influence both height and 
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earnings. In the literature that has estimated the return from years of schooling, 
economists have long realised that treating an endogenous factor as exogenous is a source 
of bias2. In developing economies this bias could be more important due to the fact that 
liquidity constraints are more serious than in developed economies because of the total 
absence of a credit market ( or the existence of a poor one) and the very low level of 
income. However, it is difficult to find an exogenous variation in either education or 
height. Most factors that affect education (height) are also likely to affect income. For 
instance, the education of parents (height) and family assets, often used as instruments for 
education (height), are obviously correlated with earnings as well as being good 
predictors of education (height). 
Angrist and Krueger ( 1991) proposed quarter of birth as an instrumental variable for 
education. Quarter of birth is arguably independent of unobserved factors such as ability 
or family background that affect income 3. Other instrumental variables that have been 
introduced in literature include the Vietnam War lotteries (Angrist 1990) and the 
proximity of parents' residence to educational facilities (Card 1995). Duflo (2001) 
estimated the return to education using the variation in schooling generated by the school 
construction program in Indonesia. 
2 Whether the returns to education in developing economies are over or under estimated is 
inconclusive and deserves further study Strauss, J. and D. Thomas (1995). 
3 There is some disagreement on the independence of quarter of birth from unobserved factors , 
see Bound, J., D.A. Jaeger and Baker. (1995). 
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This chapter exploits the exogenous variation in height created by the great famine of 
China in 1959-1961 to construct instrumental variable estimates of the effect of height on 
income. During 1959-1961, there was a large-scale famine in China resulting from the 
drop in food availability and different arrangements regulating rights to food (Lin and 
Yang 2000). Grain output dropped by 15% in 1959 and, in 1960 and 1961, output only 
reached about 70 percent of the 1958 level. Studies indicate that this crisis resulted in 
widespread famine and caused between 23-30 million excess deaths. Surprisingly, 
although there has been a great deal of research on the causes of the famine and the 
extent of excess deaths caused by this catastrophe, very little research has been done to 
evaluate health consequences for survivors of the great famine. It is obvious that the 
famine injured the health of the surviving population due to the lack of adequate nutrition. 
This had particular consequences for children who survived the famine because the 
famine directly affected children's height attainment. This health consequence affected 
their whole life if it can be determined that health and strength are rewarded in the labour 
market. 
The identification strategy we have used to evaluate the effect of famine on height is that 
exposure to the famine varied between regions of birth and dates of birth. Since the 
causes of the1959-1961 famine i.e. bad weather, bad policies and bad management in the 
communes, incentive problems due to the large size of the commune and arrangements 
regulating rights to access food, are quite different from region to region. Substantial 
vaiiations existed in the degree of famine across regions. This variation in the degree of 
famine can be measured by comparing regional excess death rates. This study proposes 
that the height of individuals, who were very young or reached puberty during the famine, 
should be less than that of other coho1is in regions that were not affected so severely by 
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the famine. The difference-in-difference estimator 1s used to control for systematic 
variations of height both across regions and across cohorts. The combination of the two 
sources of variation of height is treated as exogenous. Similar strategies are often used in 
the evaluation of the effects of social programs. Duflo (2001) used a similar strategy to 
evaluate the effect of the school construction program on education. 
In this chapter, the effects of the 1959-1961 famine on height, has been estimated using a 
large cross section of rural people born between 1945 and 1970 from the 1991 China 
Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS). The exogenous variables are the interactions 
between dummy variables indicating the age of the individual in 1961 and the excess 
death rate in his/her region in 1960. The exogenous variation of height resulting from the 
famine is used as the first stage result in estimating returns to height. 
We summa1ise the motivations underlying this research as follows: 
Firstly, famine dramatically affects the health of people who survive it. Some effects last 
the whole of life. Life cycle health consequences have been ignored by previous research 
on the 1959-1961 famine in China. 
Secondly, using va1iations in height created by the famine allows us to estimate returns to 
height more precisely. The findings of a causal link between income and height, which 
reflects the human capital accumulated during childhood, would provide evidence for 
models of a nutrition-based efficiency wage in the development literature (Stiglitz 1976, 
Dasgupta and Ray 1986). 
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Thirdly, knowledge of the nature and extent of the link between health and labour market 
outcomes is important for developmental policy. For example, agricultural development 
may be deemed more important if the development of human capital is directly linked to 
the potential for economic growth. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. In section 2.2 we describe the 
1959-1961 famine in China and the data. Section 2.3 discusses the identification strategy 
used to evaluate the effect of the famine on height. Section 2.4 estimates the effect of the 
famine on height. Section 2.5 estimates the returns to height. The final section briefly 
discusses the conclusions of this research. 
2.2 Background and Data 
Famine and food sho1iages have received substantial attention from economists. However 
comparatively few studies have examined the long-term health consequences for the 
survivors of famine. Poor nutrition du1ing periods of famine causes a large number of 
individuals to die, however, at the same time, it also dramatically damages the health of 
the survivors. Some of this damage is likely to be permanent. To better understand the 
costs off amine, we need to estimate its health consequences. 
Economists have realised that there are links between health and productivity, an 
example of this is the nutrition based efficiency wage model (Stiglitz 1976, Dasgupta and 
Ray 1986). However, questions such as: "Is human capital, measured as multi-
dimensional health indicators such as height, weight and calorie intake, rewarded in the 
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labour market?" and "What are the returns to these health investments?" have not been 
answered. These questions are of interest not only for the theorist but also for policy 
makers. However, until very recently, development economists have typically concluded 
that there is little reliable empirical evidence indicating that health has an impact on 
labour productivity. 
In this chapter, we are interested in estimating the impact on attained height of the 1959-
1960 famine in China and the returns to height in Chinese rural areas 
Height reflects the human investment made in individuals during childhood by their 
parents. Human capital accumulation, such as height in early life, has a permanent 
physical effect. Therefore, the famine may have created a life-long cost since it may have 
dramatically reduced the accumulation of health capital for those who were in their 
childhood when the famine occurred. 
2.2.1 The 1959-1961 Famine 
China initiated an agricultural collectivisation program in 1952. In 1958, as a 
consequence of collectivisation, large-scale communes were formed as part of a nation-
wide "Great Leap Forward" movement. During the following three years, agricultural 
production dropped considerably and the great famine ensued. 
During the period 1959-1961 , the death rate (per thousand people) increased dramatically. 
The national death rates were 14, 25 and 14 per thousand for the years 1959, 1960, and 
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1961 respectively. The average death rate for 1956-1958 was about 11 per thousand and 
it is estimated that the famine caused about 23-30 million excess deaths (Ashton, Hill , 
Piazza and Zeitz 1984, Xizhe 1987). 
The famine also created a large undernourished population during the three-year period. 
Malnutrition, resulting from the famine, severely affected the health of children. It caused 
muscle wastage and retarded growth (thus future capability). There is also evidence that 
malnutrition can affect brain growth and development (Dasgupta and Ray 1986). In 
addition, psychological changes, manifested by mental apathy, depression and lower 
intellectual capacity are associated with malnutrition. In this chapter, we are interested in 
the total effect of famine on children's development. We try to estimate precisely to what 
extent the attained height of Chinese rural people was reduced by the famine. 
Figure 2.1: Death Rates in the Chinese Provinces 
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Firstly we notice that the famine was dist1ibuted unevenly across regions. Figure 2.1 
shows the death rate in eight Chinese provinces for different years. During the period of 
the famine (1959-61), the death rate varied across regions, particularly in 1960. The death 
rate ranged from 11 per thousand in Liaoning to 45 per thousand in Guizhou. In the 
periods 1956-1958 and 1962-1964, the death rate lay on the normal level, and variations 
across regions were very small. Table 2.1 presents the death rate data for eight provinces 
between 1956 to 1964. 
Table 2.1: Death Rates in the Chinese Provinces (per 1000) 
1956 1957 1958 1962 
Liaoning 6.6 9.4 6.6 8.5 
Jiangsu 13 10.3 9.4 10.4 
Shandong 12.1 12.1 12.8 12.4 
Henan 14 11.8 12.7 8 
Hubei 10.8 9.6 9.6 8.8 
Hunan 11.5 10.4 11.7 10.2 
Guangxi 12.5 12.4 11.7 10.3 
Guizhou 7.5 8.8 13.7 10.4 
Source: State Statistical Bureau (adapted from Lin and Yang 
(2000) pp147) 
1963 1964 
7.9 9.3 
9 10.1 
11.8 12 
9.4 10.6 
9.8 10.9 
10.3 12.9 
10.1 10.6 
9.4 10.5 
The fact that exposure to famine (resulting in starvation) varied by region is a key 
component used to identify the effects of the famine on the health of individuals. The 
other fact exploited is that because different cohorts were affected differently by the 
famine, we can then follow through the proposition that the height of individuals who 
were babies or reached puberty during this period would be more seriously affected by 
19 
the famine. Combining these variations across regions and cohorts, we can use the 
difference-in-differences estimator to identify the effect of famine on height. 
The variation in attained height created by the famine can then be used to estimate the 
return to height in an earning equation. This natural experiment method is used as a 
control for any omitted variable bias in the earning equation. 
4 2.2.2 Data 
The data used in this study is drawn from panel data of the China Health and Nutrition 
Surveys (CHNS) of 1989, 1991 and 1993. These surveys were conducted by the Carolina 
Population Center at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, The Institute of 
Nutrition and Food Hygiene, and the Chinese Academy of Preventive Medicine. The data 
information can be found on the web site: www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/china. 
The CHNS was designed to examine the effects of health, nutrition, and family planning 
policies in China. The survey focuses on issues related to social economic change in 
China and the effect that these changes have on the health and nut1itional status of its 
population. The survey collects detailed information about households and individual 
economic, demographic and social characteristics, community organisations, individual 
food consumption, nutrition intake and health status . 
4 Most of the work in this thesis is based on the data set of the China Health a~d Nutrition 
Survey (CHNS). We give a detailed overview of this survey in this chapter. In the following 
chapters, details of the data set will be described, as necessary. 
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The 1989 survey included 3,795 households and, in 1991 and 1993, 3,616 and 3,441 
households respectively, attended the survey. In 1989, health and nutritional data was 
collected only from preschoolers and adults aged 20-45. The 1989 survey covered 15,917 
individuals. All individuals in each household were surveyed in 1991 and 1993 for all 
data. 
A multistage, random cluster process was used to draw the sample survey in each of the 
provinces5. The 190 primary sampling units consisted of 32 urban neighbourhoods, 30 
suburban neighbourhoods, 32 towns and 96 villages. In the context of China, suburban is 
usually still thought of as rural areas in terms of administration. A town is an urban area. 
The data consists of surveys of households, health and nutrition, community, food 
markets and health and family planning facilities. The household surveys contain detailed 
information about individual and household characteristics, time allocation at home and 
economic activities and income from various sources. 
Individual dietary intake for three consecutive days was recorded for every family 
member. Health status measurements such as height, weight, arm and head circumference 
and mid-arm skin fold measurements were collected for all individuals. 
5 The data released does not include weight for each observation. In most of our studies, this 
might not be a serious problem because we won't try to derive the estimations for the whole 
population in most of our studies. 
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The information on community infrastructure and services has been collected from a 
knowledgeable respondent. Food market surveys cover information about prices for a 
representative basket of commodities from state and free market stores. 
Figure 2.2: Map of Survey Regions 
Note: The darker shaded regions in the map above are the provinces in which the survey 
was conducted. 
The CHNS data used covers 8 provinces , namely: Guangxi , Guizhou, Henan, Hunan, 
Jiangsu, Liaoning and Shandong. This sample is diverse in many dimensions , for instance, 
social economic factors, health and demographic measures. 
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The locations of the eight provinces are shown in the Figure 2.2. Heilongjiang province 
was added after 1993. 
In this chapter we focus on a sub-sample of adult rural residents born between 1943 and 
1970. Figures 2.3-2.6 shows the kernel Nearest Neighbour (kNN) regression estimates for 
attained height in 1991, by regions and gender. kNN calculates non-parametric regression 
estimates by means of the k-Nearest Neighbour estimator. We have drawn a scatter plot 
of the original observations overlaid with the estimated conditional mean represented as a 
continuous line without any symbols. 
Through careful observation of the figures, it can be seen that the mean height of the 
cohort born in 1959-1961 is slightly lower than that of the nearest cohorts. This offers us 
a rough picture of the effect of the famine on height attainment. 
2.3 Econometric Issues and the Model 
2.3.1 The Identification 
Here, we attempt to estimate the effect of famine on height using a difference-in-
difference method. This estimate is based on the fact that exposure to famine varied by 
regions of birth and date of birth. The combination of the effect of these two variations in 
height is treated as the effect of the famine. 
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Exposure to famine is different for cohorts. A person's height should not be affected by 
the famine if they were born after the famine period. Similarly, people who were over 18 
years of age during the famine had already attained their adult height. At the same time, 
for the cohort that was O to 18 years old in 1961, there is a high probability that their 
height attainment could have been affected by the famine. Furthermore, the height 
attainment of two particular age groups is generally believed to have been affected to a 
greater extent than others. These groups are (a) children who were under 3 years old in 
1961 and (b) those who were 12 to 14 (i.e. those adolescents reaching puberty in 1961). 
The height attainment of individuals in these two vulnerable groups might be affected to 
a greater extent than other age groups exposed to famine. Within the first group, the 
effect of the famine on height attainment is also different across the 1-3 age cohorts. For 
instance, a child born in 1959, the start of the famine, may have suffered much more than 
a child born in 1961, the year the famine ended. 
Another key component for our estimate is the variation across regions. As documented 
in section 2.2, the severity of the 1959-1961 famine varied across regions. The excess 
death rate in Henan in 1960 was 37 per thousand, but almost zero in Liaoning province. 
Figure 2.1 compares death rates in eight Chinese provinces during the period of the great 
famine. This figure shows an obvious variation in death rate across regions in China. The 
variation of the seriousness of the famine would have created different effects on the 
height attainment of treated individuals. 
It is worth noting that our estimate of the effect of famine on height attainment requires 
that the region of birth is highly correlated with the region of growing up. This 
correlation is very strong for rural people in China. Many researches have documented 
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the fact that there was very little rural migration across provinces before the 1990s (Meng 
1999). For reasons of political and economic development strategy, the Chinese 
government severely restricted migration between regions through a resident registration 
policy, called the "Hukou" system. Migration under the planned economy needed to be 
approved by authorities on a case by case basis. In this chapter, we only use rural 
residents because it is more likely that the region of birth would be the same as the region 
of growing up for the majority of rural people during the period covered by the study. 
The 1959-1961 famine went unnoticed outside of China until the release of important 
demographic data by the Chinese government in the early 1980s. The 1959-1961 famine 
did not result in a flood of migration, the usual indicator of famine observed during 
famine in other countries. This is because all rural residents were organised into hundreds 
of thousands of Communes that were managed in a quasi-military fashion and free 
migration was completely prohibited. As a result, the region of birth is highly correlated 
with the region of growing up. Furthermore, the region of birth is not endogenous in 
respect to the famine. 
Our identification strategies for the effect of the famine on height attainment are 
illustrated in Table 2.1. This · illustration does not precisely estimate the effect of the 
famine on height as only a small part of the available information is used. However, it is 
through this simple example that we wish to demonstrate the idea of difference-in-
difference estimation. 
In this example, we categorise provinces into two groups according to the severity of the 
famine. High excess death rate regions include the provinces of Hen an and Guizhou. In 
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1960, the excess death rates in Henan and Guizhou were 29 per thousand and 35 per 
thousand, respectively. The other six provinces can be considered regions of low excess 
death rate because, in 1960, their excess death rates each averaged approximately 13 per 
thousand. 
This study uses two cohorts of people for comparison. The treated group is comprised of 
those individuals, who were born between 1959 and 1961, because the attained height of 
these individuals is likely to be affected by the famine. The control group is made up of 
those individuals who were born just after the famine (i.e. from 1964 to 1970), because 
the control group was not directly affected by the famine6. 
We compare the mean of attained height, by maturity (measured in 1991), of the treated 
group and the control group in both types of regions. The experimental results are 
presented in Table 2.2.1. The difference of height between low and high excess death rate 
regions for the treated group is -4.99 cm. This is much greater than the difference 
between the two regions for the control group (i.e. -1.85 cm). The difference in these 
differences is -3.14 cm, which can be interpreted as the causal effect of the famine on 
attained height. The underlying assumption is that the increase in attained height would 
not have resulted in systematic differences between the two region types. 
6 There is still some indirect effect of the famine on height attainment for individuals in the 
control group due to the fact that the mothers of individuals in the control group suffered from 
the famine. The poor health status of these mothers would also affect their children's height. 
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Table 2.2.1: Means of Height by Cohort and Degree of the Famine 
Excess death rate 
Low regions High Difference 
regions 
Born during 160.84 155.85 -4.99 
1959 to 1961 (8.20) (6.12) 
Born du1ing 160.70 158.85 -1.85 
1964 to 1970 (7.84) (7.64) 
Difference -0.13 3.0 -3.14 
(1.21) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses 
In this simple illustrative example, the estimate of the effect of famine is -3.14 cm (the 
standard error is 1.21 cm). This suggests that the famine in Henan and Guizhou province 
dramatically damaged the health of individuals, hence reducing their attained height by 
maturity. The validity of this difference-in-difference estimate depends on the assumption 
that changes in attained height by maturity do not vary systematically across regions. In 
other words, if the change in attained height was negatively correlated with initial levels, 
the difference-in-difference estimate will be significant even if famine does not affect an 
individual's height (Meyer 1995). 
Therefore, we need to test this identification assumption. In order to do this, we consider 
two groups of people, both of whom were not exposed to the famine. Groups chosen for 
the controls are those individuals born between 1964 and 1967, and those born between 
1968 and 1970. Similarly, we compare the mean of height for these groups in both types 
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of regions. By doing this, we wish to demonstrate that the changes in height attainment 
between these two cohorts do not differ systematically across regions. 
Table 2.2.2 presents the result of this experiment. The estimated difference-in-differences 
is 0.97 cm. This is not a significant variation from zero (the standard error is 1.1 cm). 
These experiments suggest that difference-in-difference is an appropriate approach by 
which to estimate the effect of the famine on height attainment. In this chapter, we will 
elaborate on this strategy to produce a more precise result. 
Table 2.2.2: (Experiment) Means of Height by Cohort and Degree of the Famine 
Excess death rate 
Low High Difference 
Born during 160.84 158.54 -1.3 
1964 to 1967 (7.69) (8.02) 
Born during 160.51 159.18 -0.33 
1968 to 1970 (8.05) (7.24) 
Difference -0.33 0.64 -0.97 
(1.10) 
Note: Standard errors are in the parentheses 
2.3.2 The Model 
Attained height reflects human investment during childhood. To discuss this concept, it is 
useful to begin with a simple household production-function model. For convenience, 
assume a single pe.rson household that maximises utility over two periods. Period zero is 
childhood, from age 0 to about age 20. Period one is the rest of life. Since our focus is on 
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the estimate of the return to height and the cost to health of the famine, we assume that 
there exists a generic health production function for an individual: 
H = H(N0 ,B,µ,00 ) (2-1) 
where H represents height, it depends on a vector of health input N0 in period zero. The 
technology underlying the height production is also affected by the individual's family 
background B , such as parental health, education, liquidity constraints and 
environmental factors. µ refers to the measurement errors or other unobserved factors. 
0 0 in the health production function refers to other related variables. 
When a child arrives in period one of the life cycle, he/she enters the labour market. The 
real wage received is assumed to equal the worker's marginal product. His/her wage 
varies with health outputs, such as H . Wages also depend on other traits such as 
education (S), family background (B), ability ( a) and many other variables ( 0 1 ). Wage 
function in period one may be written as: 
W =W(H,S,B,a,01 ) (2-2) 
This function is a standard earnings equation that is widely used in labour economics. We 
use this equation to estimate the return to height, an indicator of health output in the early 
stage of life. Labour economists have recognised for a long time that estimated returns to 
education are biased because of omitted variables such as unobservable individual ability 
and some family background factors that can affect both education and wages (Griliches 
1977). The same problem arises when we try to estimate the return to height. Some 
omitted unobservable variables such as liquidity constraints and inherent health factors 
may be correlated with both wages and height. For example, a person from a rich family 
is not only likely to earn more money because of his/her background and the business 
29 
experience of the family, but also to be taller since he/she has been be well nourished 
during childhood. 
To close the model, assuming that people's welfare depends on current consumption (C), 
health output (H), family background factors (B) and tastes ( g, we may write the utility 
maximization problem as follows: 
Max U = U (Co , H, B, t) + U ( cl , H, B, t) , (2-3) 
subject to the above health production function, earning equation and budget constraints: 
C0 +P0 N 0 +A=V0 
c1 +PrN1 =A+WL, 
(2-4) 
where C is non-nutrition consumption, its pnce is normalised as one, P is pnce of 
nutrition input, A is savings. We assume labour supply (L) is given. To simplify the 
equation, we have assumed that there is no discount and no interest. Solving this equation, 
we can obtain the optimal consumption of N , which is a function of its price. By 
substituting the result into the health function, the height becomes a function of the price 
of health input and the other exogenous variables. 
Optimal height is determined through equating the marginal benefit and marginal cost of 
height. To capture the effects of the famine, we can write the marginal cost of height as a 
function of the excess death rate and other regional characteristics. In fact, the price of 
health input increased dramatically du1ing the famine period. Therefore we may write our 
statistical equation as follow: 
(2-5) 
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where H iJk is attained height by maturity in 1991 for individual i, born in region j, in 
cohort k. a 1 is the region fixed effect, /3k is the cohort fixed effect, edr1 is the excess 
death rate of region j in 1961, ~ is a treatment dummy indicating whether the individual 
was exposed to the famine in the sample, C represents the other control variables, <;ifk 1s 
the error i tern. 
Equation (2-5) is our basic estimated equation. The coefficient of the interaction between 
the excess death rate and the treatment dummy shows the causal effect of the famine on 
height attainment. 
The predicted value of height from the estimated equation (2-5) can act as the first stage 
in estimating the earning equation (2-2) by using the Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) 
method. In this case, as Imbens and Angrist (1994) argue, the instrumental method 
allows us to interpret a causal link between height and income. 
2.4 The Health Consequences of the Famine 
To estimate the health consequences of the famine, we estimate (2-5). The dummy for 
treatment in (2-5) can be replaced with T it, which is a dummy indicating whether 
individual i was of age l in 1961. This year of birth dummy may offer us more detailed 
information in the estimation than if the estimation was made using only a simple dummy 
for the whole treatment cohort. 
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HiJk = con+ a1 + /3k + L Yt ( edr1 * ~t) + CJ+ <;iJk . (2-6) 
l=O 
We expect that the effect of the famine on a baby should be greater than on any other age 
cohort. Knowledge of physiology tells us that lack of nutrition for an individual in 
babyhood may result in serious permanent damage to his/her health. Some of this damage 
affects his/her attained height. In addition, the length of exposure to the famine was 
different for the cohort born between 1959 and 1961. A baby born in 1959 may have 
suffered more than the baby born in 1961 since the famine lasted about three years. 
Moreover, we expect to observe that the effect of the famine on height should also be 
greater for the cohort aged 13 to 14 in comparison to other treatment cohorts. An 
individual of 13 to 14 years old is in puberty. This is an important period in the human 
lifecycle, particularly in aspects of physical development and growth. 
Table 2.3 presents the estimated results for equation (2-6). Our sample includes 3,435 
observations from rural areas in China. People born before 1943 or after 1970 are 
excluded. The reason for dropping observations relating to people born after 1970 is that 
they were less than 20 years old when the data was collected and some may argue they 
were still growing in 1991. Individuals born before 1943 may have shrunk as a result of 
ageing. Individuals born in 1962-1964, are also excluded as this was a transition period 
following the famine. In summation, our sample includes those individuals born between 
1943 and 1961 , and individuals born between 1965 and 1970. 
The excess death rate data for the eight provinces used in the estimation come from 
Table 2.1. The excess death rate in 1960 is calculated as the gap between the death rate in 
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1960 and the three years average death rate before 1959. We use excess death rate to 
proxy the severity of the famine. The seriousness of the famine was closely correlated 
with food prices and other costs of health input. 
The complete results can be found in Table A2.1 of the Appendix. Table 2.3 only 
presents the coefficient of interactions of individual ages in 1961 and excess death rates. 
As discussed in section 2.3, these coefficients are the estimated effects of the famine on 
height attainment. From the results, the cohorts of children aged 1, 2, 4 and the cohort of 
adolescents aged 13-14 were significantly affected by the famine. These results are as 
expected7. The fact that the attained height of children who reached puberty during the 
famine was affected much more than younger cohorts, with the exception of cohorts of 
age 1 to 4, is consistent with physiological theory. This suggests that our estimates are 
fairly accurate. 
7 We do not have satisfying explanations for why the coefficient is not significant for the cohort 
aged 3 in 1961. 
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Table 2.3: Estimated Coefficients of Interaction of Age in 1961 and Excess Death 
Rate during the Famine 
Coef. t 
edr*age18 0.108 1.30 
edr*agel 7 
-0.061 
-0.68 
edr*age16 0.008 0.09 
edr*age15 
-0.034 -0.47 
edr*age14 -0.153 -2.21 
edr*age13 -0.163 -2.19 
edr*age12 
-0.084 
-1.08 
edr*agel 1 
-0.019 
-0.28 
edr*agel0 0.078 1.14 
edr*age9 0.016 0.19 
edr*age8 
-0.056 
-0.80 
edr*age7 
-0.109 
-1.58 
edr*age6 
-0.133 
-1.90 
edr*age5 0.070 0.99 
edr*age4 
-0.186 -2.71 
edr*age3 
-0.010 
-0.13 
edr*age2 
-0.223 -2.62 
edr*agel 
-0.265 
-2.53 
edr*age0 
-0.004 
-0.04 
cons 162.538 325.2 -
N 3435 
R sq 0.0682 
Note: the dependent is attained height (cm). 
We have drawn the results from Table 2.3 in Figure 2.7. Each dot on the solid line 
represents the coefficient of the interaction between age in 1961 and the excess death rate. 
A ninety-five percent confidence interval is plotted in dotted lines. For instance, an 
individual of age 1 in 1961 was 0.265 cm shorter if he/she was born in a region whose 
excess death rate increased by one per thousand. The national average excess rate was 
about 18 per thousand in 1960. Therefore, on average, individuals of age 1 in 1961 would 
otherwise have grown 4. 77 cm taller in the absence of the famine. Likewise, children 
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reaching puberty during the famine period would otherwise have grown 2. 8 cm taller if 
the famine had not occurred. 
Figure 2. 7: Coefficients of the Interactions of Age in 1961 * Excess Death Rate in 
1960 
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We also estimate a restricted version of equation (2-6), the results of which are presented 
in Table 2.4. In this instance, only the coho1is for ages 13-14 and 0-4, and their 
interaction with the excess death rate, are included in the estimation. The results are 
similar to that presented in Table 2.3. 
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Table 2.4: Restricted Estimate of Effect of Famine on Attained Height (cm) 
Coef. t 
age 14 2.161 1.59 
age 13 2.063 1.45 
age 4 2.004 1.63 
age 3 0.186 0.15 
age 2 2.736 2.02 
age 1 3.743 2.48 
age 0 
-0.596 
-0.34 
ddeath60 -0.150 
-9.62 
edr*age 14 -0.137 
-2.05 
edr*age 13 -0.147 
-2.04 
edr*age4 -0.170 
-2.57 
edr*age3 0.006 0.09 
edr*age2 
-0.207 
-2.49 
edr*agel 
-0.249 
-2.41 
edr*age 0 0.012 0.12 
cons 162.015 521.2 -
N 3435 
R sq 0.554 
In order for the difference-in-difference estimator to remain free from bias, changes in the 
excess death rate are not systematically related to other omitted factors that affect height. 
In Table 2.5, we show the results of the control experiment. Here, we compare the 
cohorts of individuals who were bo111e between 1965 and 1970. None of these cohorts 
were ever exposed to the famine. In this sample, the effects of the famine are very small 
and none of any statistical significance. This experiment suggests that the difference-in-
difference estimator may work well in this case. 
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Table 2.5 Test of the Assumption of Difference-in-Difference Estimate of Effect of 
the Famine 
h91 Coef. t 
bl965 0.421 0.25 
bl966 -0.516 
-0.31 
b1967 2.357 1.23 
bl968 
-2.462 
-1.38 
b1969 0.065 0.04 
b1970 1.001 0.58 
ddeath60 
-0.165 
-2.80 
edr*b1965 0.023 0.26 
edr*b1966 0.065 0.75 
edr*b1967 -0.092 
-0.94 
edr*b1968 0.148 1.67 
edr*b1969 0.018 0.22 
edr*b1970 0.020 0.24 
cons 162.481 145.82 -
N 986 
R sq 0.041 
In order to explore the gender related differences of the health consequences of the 
famine, we have also estimated equation (2-6) by gender. However, we did not find a 
significant gap between genders. This may come from the fact that it is the mother who 
takes care of the baby and in Chinese society mothers may not discriminate against their 
daughters. 
2.5 Estimating the Returns to Height 
We have estimated the impact on height of the famine in 1959-1961 in the above section. 
The reason for our concern about the health consequences of the famine is that we 
believe that health, as a dimension of human capital, will be rewarded in the labour 
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market, particularly in developing countries. In this section we are concerned with the 
retu111 to height. Attained height, which is a less subjective indicator of health status, may 
be directly related to productivity. Height reflects a previous investment in health that 
manifests itself as added strength and energy and can contribute to cognitive ability. 8 
The problem of estimating the return to height is similar to that ans1ng from the 
estimation of return to education. OLS estimates suffer from the omitted variable bias 
problem, that is, height may be correlated with some omitted unobservable variables such 
as: liquidity constraint, genetic factors or other background factors. In the research on 
return to health, height is usually considered to be predetermined by the time an 
individual reaches adulthood (Thomas and Strauss 1997). The correlation between height 
and omitted unobservable variables, or measurement errors in height, result in a biased 
estimate of return to height. The direction of such bias is not always easy to identify. 
We estimated the effect of the famine on height based on the assumption that the changes 
in height across cohorts would not have varied systematically between regions in the 
absence of the famine. The effect estimated from this method can be thought of as a 
causal effect of the famine. Furthermore, if we assume that the famine has no effect on 
earnings , other than through affecting people's accumulation of human capital , then we 
can estimate the return to height, using the famine to construct the instrumental variable. 
8 Following the widely cited paper (Strauss and Tho1nas 1998), we estimate the return to height 
and interpret our results as a return to health status. There 1night be other reasons why labour 
1narket rewards are related to height. For instance, an individual may get higher payment because 
he/she is tall and looks charnling. We can't distinguish these effects in this research. ~ ,.__ 
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Therefore, equation (2-6) can be used as the first stage estimate of a two stage least 
squared estimation of the impact of height on income. 
Before presenting the results of our calculations, I will first describe the variables and the 
data used. The sample used in estimating return to height is the same as the one used in 
our previous estimation of the effect on height. Since we lack income information for 
some individuals, 3,312 observations from rural areas in China in 1991 are used. Since 
the majority of rural Chinese people are self-employed, wage data cannot be obtained. 
Also, since the beginning of 1980, China has conducted a system based on family 
responsibility in the agriculture sector. This system makes it is difficult to distinguish the 
contribution of individual members since family members work together on their allotted 
farms. In our estimation, we have used the per capita annual income of families as the 
dependent variable. The weakness of using annual income is that the income is the result 
of the combination of wages and work hours. Lack of control over labour supply will 
result in an inefficient estimate. We have assumed that work time (whether market or 
non-market) is the same for all farmers (there are few idle persons in low-income 
countries). 
Based on these assumptions, we estimate the following equation: 
ln(income) = a+ /Jheight + ycontrols + E , (2-7) 
where the unit of height is measured in centimetres. controls is a vector of control 
variables , including years of schooling, age, age squared, a gender dummy, employment 
status , thirteen occupation dummy va1iables and five maniage status dummy variables. 
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The empirical results are presented in Table 2.6. Model 1 is an OLS estimation without 
height. The coefficient for education is 1.8% in Chinese rural areas. This means that the 
individual's annual per capita family income increases by 1.8 percent if years of 
schooling increase by one year. This estimate for education is possibly contaminated by 
the endogeneity problem. Model 2 includes height and the OLS was used again. The 
coefficient to education was reduce slightly from 1.8% to 1.7%, and the coefficient on 
height was very small, only 0.4% and not statistically significant. 
In model 3, we have used the interaction between age in 1961 and the regional excess 
death rate to instrument the attained height measured in 1991. The height coefficient now 
is 3%, and the education coefficient is about 1.1 %. Section 2.4 demonstrates that the 
famine, on average, reduced the attained height of an individual who was born in 1960 by 
4.7 cm. As a consequence, his/her annual per capita family income decreased by 14% 
compared with what it otherwise would have been. For those who reached puberty during 
the famine, income is about 8% lower than it would be otherwise. This suggests that the 
famine had a huge impact on lifetime earnings through the damage to the health status of 
individuals. Meanwhile the coefficient of education fell from 1.7% to 1.1 %. This change 
can be interpreted in terms of the effect of education on earnings operating through health. 
In rural China, agricultural mechanisation has not been realised and the majority of farm 
work still depends on a farmers' physical strength, energy and work endurance. 
Table 2.6: Impacts of Height on log of Annual Per Capita Family Income 
Model 1: No height Model 2: Include height Model 3: Include height 
(OLS) (TSLS) 
line Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
height 0.004 1.62 0.030 3.35 
(cm) 
edu 0.018 4.02 0.017 3.80 0.011 2.25 
unemp -0.14 -1.2 -0.139 -1.20 
-0.137 -1.15 
occupl 0.326 0.85 0.343 0.90 0.458 1.17 
occup2 0.226 0.63 0.241 0.67 0.348 0.94 
occup3 0.318 0.88 0.330 0.91 0.416 1.120 
occup4 0.350 0.96 0.365 1.00 0.469 1.26 
occup5 -0.46 -1.34 -0.442 -1.26 
-0.260 -0.72 
occup6 0.339 0.96 0.355 1.00 0.468 1.29 
occup7 0.277 0.78 0.296 0.84 0.429 1.18 
occupl0 0.551 1.43 0.566 1.47 0.675 1.71 
occupl 1 0.158 0.43 0.180 0.49 0.331 0.88 
occup12 0.323 0.90 0.347 0.97 0.511 1.39 
occupl3 0.190 0.47 0.223 0.56 0.451 1.09 
mary2 -0.92 -1.16 -0.915 -1.16 
-0.910 -1.13 
mary3 -0.99 -1.26 
-0.999 -1.27 
-1.026 -1.28 
mary4 -0.96 -1.15 
-0.956 -1.14 
-0.906 -1.06 
mary5 -1.18 -1.47 
-1.170 -1.46 -1.132 -1.39 
mary6 -0.79 -0.94 
-0.803 -0.95 
-0.851 -0.98 
age91yrs -0.05 -2.54 
-0.045 -2.58 
-0.050 -2.77 
agesq 0.001 2.96 0.001 3.01 0.001 3.30 
gender 0.158 5.48 0.196 5.26 0.463 4.84 
cons 8.312 9.19 
- 7.634 7.66 2.902 1.56 
N 3312 3312 3312 
R sq(%) 17.65 17.16 14.53 
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Table 2.6 (continued): Impacts of Height on log Annual Per Capita Family Income 
Model 4: education is Model 5: both height and 
instrumented education is instrumented 
line Coef. t Coef. t 
height 0.036 2.75 
(cm) 
edu 0.073 2.54 -0.014 -0.32 
unemp -0.114 -0.95 -0.147 -1.21 
occupl 0.091 0.22 0.581 1.29 
occup2 0.068 0.18 0.436 1.08 
occup3 0.252 0.68 0.461 1.20 
occup4 0.254 0.67 0.531 1.35 
occup5 -0.328 -0.90 
-0.283 -0.77 
occup6 0.350 0.97 0.486 1.32 
occup7 0.346 0.95 0.426 1.16 
occupl0 0.607 1.54 0.673 1.69 
occupl 1 0.153 0.41 0.364 0.95 
occup12 0.370 1.01 0.524 1.40 
occupl3 0.249 0.61 0.472 1.12 
maryl 0.713 0.82 0.897 1.02 
mary2 -0.170 -0.51 
-0.027 -0.08 
mary3 -0.277 -0.84 
-0.137 -0.41 
mary4 -0.141 -0.32 
-0.046 -0.10 
mary5 -0.454 -1.27 
-0.232 -0.63 
age91yrs -0.042 -2.30 
-0.052 -2.80 
agesq 0.001 3.10 0.001 3.23 
gender 0.258 4.35 0.474 4.81 
cons 6.789 9.87 1.405 0.68 -
N 3312 3312 
R sq(%) 13.18 12.43 
Why are the instrumental estimated returns to height much higher than that from the OLS ? 
The general belief, in the development literature, is that OLS estimates are likely to be 
biased upward due to omitted variables (Strauss and Thomas 1995). However, many 
researches in developed economies find that instrumental variable estimates are higher 
than OLS estimates (Card 1995,1999). There are several reasons for this. The first 
explanation is that the OLS estimates may be biased downward due to measurement error. 
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The attenuation effects of measurement error may dominate the upward omitted variable 
bias . 
The second reason, according to Card (1995), is that the 2SLS estimate might not be 
estimating the average returns to height. People affected by the instruments might be 
people who have a higher marginal return to height. This implies that the return to height 
1s a concave curve. 
In Model 3, only height is treated as endogenous, but a similar argument applies to the 
variable for education. Accordingly, in model 5, we have treated both height and 
education as endogenous. The instrumental variables are still the interaction between age 
in 1961 and the excess death rate. In this calculation, the estimated effect of height on log 
income increased slightly, from 3% to 3.6%. However, the coefficient of education 
becomes statistically insignificant. This suggests three things. Firstly, height (hence 
strength and energy) is significantly rewarded in the labour market. Secondly, a 
substantial part of the effect of education on income operates through health. Thirdly, the 
natural experiment may not provide a good instrumental variable for education. If famine 
has a weak effect on years of schooling, this may lead to incorrect inferences (Bound, 
Jaeger and Baker 1995). The first stage result shows that the famine has a weak effect on 
years of schooling and the correlation between the famine and years of schooling is quite 
low9. According to Bound et. al. (1995), the 2SLS estimate of return to education will be 
biased. We guess that the famine may significantly affect the education quality rather 
9 The results have not been reported here. 
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than years of schooling. So we need data for education quality to examine this issue in 
future. 
In Model 4, we only estimate the earning equation without height. The coefficient of 
education becomes 7%. We argue that this coefficient also captures the effect of health . 
Therefore, we may overstate the return to education without controlling health status. 
In order to examine the correlation between education and height, we ran a regression of 
years of schooling on height and the other control variables. The results are reported in 
Table 2.7. The coefficient of height from the OLS is 0.06, which means that years of 
schooling will increase by 0.3 years if height increases by 5cm. It is difficult to explain 
this coefficient as a causal effect linking height to education. Although it may be true that 
taller individuals are healthy and have better cognitive ability, they also tend to have 
more years of schooling. In general, both education and height may be affected by other 
common factors such as family income. However, this high correlation is consistent with 
our results that show, conditional on height, the return to education was reduced. 
Table 2. 7: Relationship between Education and Height (Dependent Variable is 
Education) 
OLS 
Coef. t 
height 0.061 6.70 
unemp -0.449 
-0.99 
occupl 4.458 2.99 
occup2 3.065 2.18 
occup3 1.364 0.96 
occup4 1.962 1.38 
occup5 -2.083 
-1.52 
occup6 0.056 0.04 
occup7 -0.926 
-0.67 
occupl0 -0.745 
-0.49 
occupl l 0.450 0.32 
occup12 -0.463 
-0.33 
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occupl3 -0.519 -0.33 
maryl 
mary2 -0.568 -0.18 
mary3 -0.150 -0.05 
mary4 -1.847 
-0.56 
mary5 -0.074 
-0.02 
mary6 -1.597 
-0.48 
age91yrs -0.066 
-0.96 
agesq -0.001 -0.87 
gender -1.166 
-8.07 
cons 3.526 0.90 
-
We also estimated equation (2-7) separately by categories of education. We classified 
education into four groups: no education, primary school, junior middle school and high 
school. It is obvious that instrumental estimates of return to height by education category 
are consistent but not efficient. The results are presented in the Table A2.2. The 
coefficient of height is 1.1 %, 2.7%, 3.2% and 2.4% for groups with no education, 
primary school, junior middle school and high school, respectively. 
From our empirical results, we reached the conclusion that height, which may measure 
the individual's strength and endurance at work, was indeed rewarded in the labour 
market in rural China10. The natural experiment method allows us to establish a causal 
effect between health and income. Combining the results from section 2.4, we conclude 
that the 1959-1961 famine in China had huge health consequences on the treated 
population, and this health effect resulted in significant reductions in earnings over the 
rest of life for those who survived the famine. As shown above, the annual income of 
10 It is said that height and occupation and height and marital status are potentially interrelated. 
In our regression, these variables have been controlled. The return to height is just a partial 
coefficient. 
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those who were born during the period of the famine is over 10 percent lower than it 
would otherwise have been if the famine had not occurred. 
The Sample Selection 
In this part we will discuss the sample selection problem. There are two sources of 
selection bias that may also influence the relationships between the intensity of the 
famine and subsequent height. 
First, there was likely a substantial change in the composition of birth cohorts during the 
famine. The birth rate dropped by a third between 1958 and 1961 and then rose 
considerably in the years after the famine (Ashton et al. (1984)). The births that would 
otherwise have occurred between 1958 and 1961, but because of the famine did not occur, 
account for a larger proportion of population decline during the period than do death. 
Such a reduction is suggested by Figure 2.3 to 2.6, which indicate a smaller sample for 
people born in the famine years. If the parents who did not have children during the 
famine tended to be taller, then the average child born during the famine will tend to be 
shorter than the average child who would have been born in the absence of the famine. 
To address this selection issue~ we need other data with information on the characteristics 
of parents who gave birth to children in each of these cohorts. 
Second, there was substantial change in the composition of children conceived during the 
famine. The children who survived were likely to be the most healthy o_r those who came 
from better-off families. In addition, people affected by the famine are more likely to die 
in addition to being less healthy. The people who died during the famine leave the 
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sample and can not be observed by the econometrician. This source of selection would 
tend to make the average surviving child taller than the average child who would have 
been born in the absence of the famine. 
The bias from these kinds of sample selection could not be solved in our research 11 . But 
we can examine the direction of the bias. For the first selection, we tend to believe that 
the relatively wealthier people or physically stronger people are more likely to have child. 
According to the well established fact that there are close relationship between height and 
nut1ition, we may conclude that the average child during the famine will tend to be taller 
than the average child who would have been born in the absence of the famine. 
For the second selection bias, it is reasonable to believe that sample selection leaves only 
the most robust individuals in the sample. The estimate of effect of health is likely to be 
biased downward. It should be borne in mind that our method is likely to underestimate 
the effect of the famine. 
2.6 Conclusion 
The famine of 1959-1961 in China not only killed over twenty million people, but also 
dramatically damaged the health of survivors. We have estimated the impact on attained 
height by matu1ity, of cohorts of the population who survived the famine, using the 
difference-in-differences estimator. The result shows that the famine in China played a 
ti Gorgens et. al (2002) has tried to overcome the problem fron1 sample selection to estin1ate the 
effect on height of the fan1ine. 
<.._; 
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significant role in reducing the attained height of individuals in certain cohorts , 
particularly in children aged 0-4 and adolescents in the 12-14 age group. 
We then estimated the return to height using the famine as a natural experiment to deal 
with the omitted unobservable variable problem. The exogenous variation created by the 
famine allowed us to build a causal link between health and income. In the labour market 
in Chinese rural areas, height is clearly an important determinant of earnings. For each 
1cm increase in attained height, the annual per capita family income will increase by 
about 3%. 
If the assumptions underlying the empirical model are correct, our results suggest that 
health (as measured by height) yield a substantial return in rural China, and that a 
significant pa1i of the effect of education on income appears to operate through health. 
The famine of 1959-1961 had a huge economic cost since health, in Chinese society, is 
substantially rewarded in the labour market. Our research suggests the following policy 
implications: (a) the famine may have imposed a huge life-cycle economic cost through 
its effect on the income of health; (b) health is a important element of human capital in 
the area of economic development. Therefore, societies would derive benefit from 
investing in the health of peopie, particularly in that of children. 
In addition, our results potentially suffer from sample selection problems. If the sample 
selection leaves the most robust individuals in the sample, the estimates of the effect of 
health on labour market returns may be underestimated. The true effect_ of the famine for 
the whole population could be bigger. 
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Figure 2.3: Attained Height in 1991 for the Total Sample 
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Figure 2.4: Attained Height in 1991 in Henan and Guizhou 
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Figure 2.5: Attained Height in 1991 for Males in Henan and Guizhou 
k-NN regression, k = 150 
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Figure 2.6: Attained Height in 1991 for Females in Henan and Guizhou 
k-NN regression, k = 80 
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2.8 Appendix 
Table A2.1: Estimated Coefficient of Interaction of Age in 1961 and Excess Death 
Rate during the Famine 
height in 91 Coef. t 
age 18 
-4.107 
-2.37 
age 17 
-0.421 
-0.24 
age 16 
-2.738 
-1.42 
age 15 
-1.335 
-0.81 
age 14 1.639 1.16 
age 13 1.540 1.05 
age 12 
-1.092 
-0.70 
age 11 
-0.381 
-0.28 
age 10 
-2.911 
-2.08 
age 9 
-1.962 
-1.31 
age 8 
-0.059 
-0.05 
age 7 1.242 0.89 
age 6 1.367 1.06 
age 5 
-0.842 
-0.66 
age 4 1.482 1.15 
age 3 
-0.336 
-0.26 
age 2 2.214 1.57 
age 1 3.221 2.07 
age 0 
-1.118 
-0.63 
ddeath60 
-0.134 
-5.47 
edr*agel8 0.108 1.30 
edr*agel7 -0.061 . 
-0.68 
edr*agel6 0.008 0.09 
edr*agel5 
-0.034 
-0.47 
edr*aoel4 b -0.153 -2.21 
edr*aoel3 b -0.163 -2.19 
edr*aoel2 b -0.084 -1.08 
edr*aoel 1 b -0.019 -0.28 
edr*aoel0 b 0.078 1.14 
edr*aoe9 b 0.016 0.19 
edr*age8 
-0.056 -0.80 
edr*aoe7 b -0.1 09 -1.58 
edr*aoe6 b -0.133 -1.90 
edr*age5 0.070 0.99 
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edr*age4 
-0.186 
-2.71 
edr*age3 
-0.010 
-0.13 
edr*age2 
-0.223 
-2.62 
edr*agel 
-0.265 
-2.53 
edr*age0 
-0.004 
-0.04 
cons 162.538 325.17 -
N 3435 
R sq 0.0682 
Table A2.2: Impact of Height on Income by Education Categories 
No education Primary school Junior middle school High school 
line Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
height 0.011 0.57 0.027 1.79 0.032 2.15 0.024 1.55 
unemploy -0.159 -0.46 -0.184 -0.81 -0.234 -1.40 0.938 2.58 
occupl 0.695 1.29 
occup2 0.149 0.20 0.410 0.70 0.576 1.13 
occup3 
-0.042 -0.06 0.638 1.10 0.619 1.20 
occup4 
-0.005 -0.01 0.744 1.28 0.593 1.14 
occup5 -0.797 -1.01 -0.849 -1.42 -0.050 -0.09 -0.070 -0.14 
occup6 -0.255 -0.27 -0.119 -0.19 0.683 1.21 0.684 1.33 
occup7 0.060 0.08 -0.112 -0.18 0.587 1.04 0.590 1.14 
occup8 
occup9 
-0.089 -0.12 0.767 1.05 
occupl0 0.208 0.31 0.844 1.39 0.778 1.20 
occupl 1 
-0.270 -0.43 0.506 0.87 0.567 1.01 
occup12 -0.267 -0.29 -0.028 -0.05 0.789 1.38 0.530 1.01 
occupl3 
-0.005 -0.01 0.681 1.06 
mary l 0.909 0.81 
mary2 0.170 0.18 -0.015 -0.03 0.094 0.12 1.295 1.74 
mary3 0.268 0.30 -0.110 -0.23 -0.013 -0.02 1.160 1.60 
mary4 0.113 0.18 
mary5 0.716 0.77 -0.094 -0.18 -1.095 -1.26 
mary6 0.346 0.33 0.287 0.26 
age9lyrs 0.003 0.07 -0.011 -0.38 -0.088 -2.72 -0.081 -1.41 
agesq 0.000 0.20 0.000 0.66 0.001 2.93 0.001 1.67 
gender 0.132 0.82 0.374 2.28 0.573 3.55 0.435 2.55 
cons 4.884 1.46 2.733 1.01 2.156 0.76 1.035 0.31 -
N 482 1321 1098 380 
R sq 6.6 9.16 13.49 28.04 
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Table A2.3: Regression of Annual Per Capita Family Income 
no height height (OLS) Height (TSLS) 
line Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
height 0.004 1.73 0.031 3.52 
dpedu 0.090 2.09 0.087 2.03 0.069 1.56 
djedu 0.145 3.08 0.139 2.95 0.100 2.00 
dhedu 0.136 2.27 0.128 2.13 0.074 1.16 
dcoedu 0.407 2.49 0.385 2.35 0.237 1.37 
unemploy -0.137 -1.10 
-0.136 -1.17 
-0.134 -1.13 
occupl 0.276 0.71 0.297 0.77 0.440 1.11 
occup2 0.214 0.59 0.231 0.64 0.349 0.94 
occup3 0.311 0.86 0.324 0.89 0.415 1.12 
occup4 0.346 0.95 0.362 0.99 0.471 1.26 
occup5 -0.495 -1.41 
-0.467 -1.33 
-0.276 -0.76 
occup6 0.324 0.91 0.341 0.96 0.458 1.26 
occup7 0.255 0.72 0.276 0.78 0.415 1.14 
occupl0 0.537 1.39 0.554 1.44 0.664 1.68 
occupl 1 0.145 0.40 0.168 0.46 0.321 0.85 
occupl2 0.305 0.85 0.330 0.92 0.500 1.35 
occupl3 0.162 0.40 0.197 0.49 0.435 1.04 
mary2 -0.915 -1.10 
-0.914 -1.16 
-0.909 -1.13 
mary3 -0.993 -1.26 
-0.997 -1.26 -1.026 -1.28 
mary4 -0.978 -1.16 
-0.969 -1.15 
-0.915 -1.07 
mary5 -1.174 -1.47 
-1.168 -1.46 
-1.130 -1.38 
mary6 -0.794 -0.93 
-0.801 -0.94 
-0.851 -0.98 
age9lyrs -0.043 -2.45 
-0.044 -2.48 
-0.048 -2.65 
agesq 0.001 2.82 0.001 2.87 0.001 3.15 
gender 0.152 5.26 0.1 94 5.16 0.471 4.94 
cons 8.335 9.19 7.604 7.60 2.715 1.47 -
N 3312 3312 3312 
R sq 17.56 17.64 14.27 
Note: in this table, the categories of education are used rather than years of schooling as independent 
variables. 
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Chapter 3 
Eating Your Way up the Food Chain: Felllale 
Health, Productivity and Food Allocation • Ill 
China 
3.1 Introduction 
The rate of agricultural output in China grew very rapidly during the 1980s due to the 
introduction of a new family based production system (Lin 1992). With development of 
the ag1icultural sector, living standards of rural residents improved dramatically. Since 
wellbeing or living standards are characteristics of individuals, not households , we need 
to understand how resources are allocated within families in order to measure wellbeing. 
Do women benefit from economic development to the same extent as men? Are 
resources, such as food, distributed equally amongst family members, taking individual 
needs into consideration? Is resource allocation within family affected by the relative 
bargaining power of each family member? Furthermore, under a family based agricultural 
production system, if labour market productivity positively correlates to health status , 
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does this linkage affect the allocation of food within the family? Is it true that individual 
health contributes to productivity? 
The conventional literature on food allocation within the family postulates that the family 
planner will allocate resources such that the marginal utility of health amongst individual 
members will be equal (taking into account the family's preferences). In this kind of 
model, available food will be allocated to achieve equal marginal utility of individual 
health. The food allocation pattern implied in this model suggests that a member with a 
better health endowment might receive less food since the marginal utility of health, from 
this member, is comparatively lower than the marginal utility of health from one with 
worse health status. 
Increasingly, empirical evidence indicates that the allocation mechanism within the 
family may be a very complex process. A large number of studies (Dreze and Sen 1989; 
Harriss 1990; Dasgupta 1993), are concerned that the allocation of household resources 
favours males over females. Thomas (1994) documents a positive association between a 
mother's education and her daughters' height and a father's education and his sons' 
heights. Alternatively, the household might be thought of as a group of individuals who 
bargain with each other over resources. The consequences of this assumption have been 
examined in the literature by (Manser and Brown 1980; McElroy and Homey 1981; 
Lundberg and Pollak 1993). 
In this chapter, we focus on food (nutrition) allocation within the family in the framework 
of the common preference model. We consider the assumption that a linkage exists 
between individual productivity and individual health status within the framework of the 
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common preference model. In this type of model, the family planner attempts to allocate 
food among individual members to achieve equal marginal utility from food for the 
individual member with the shadow price of the food. The most important feature of the 
model which considers the link between productivity and health is that the shadow price 
of food is reduced through the mechanism that health augments work efficiency. In this 
model, the family planner considers two possibilities when allocation decisions are made. 
The first possibility is that the planner tries to equalise marginal utility amongst family 
members. Under the second possibility, food is allocated in relative quantities so that 
more food is made available to those members whose health augments work efficiency. 
The first choice suggests allocating less food to those members with better health 
endowment. The alternative choice suggests allocating more foods to those persons with 
better health endowment "because food increases health, which increases the return to 
effort and, because effort depletes health status, increased food consumption both 
compensates for and enhances the return from increased effort"(Pitt, Rosenzweig and 
Hassanl990). 
Economists and policy makers may be interested in the disparity between the quantity of 
nutrients received by women compared to men. Some research suggests that the return, to 
a household, from the allocation of food to women is less than that for men. This gender 
biased nutrient inequality reflects disparities in labour market oppo1iunities between men 
and women. Pitt et al. (1990) pointed out that if the relationship between healthiness and 
productivity differs across activities, the distribution of activities across individuals 
within gender classes should also be related to the intra-household distribution of food. 
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Basically, those individuals exerting greater effort or engaged in effort intensive activities 
will be allocated more food. Pitt, Rosenzweig and Hassan found that the elasticity of 
nutrition demand, with respect to individual health endowment, is lower (insignificant 
from zero) for women in Bangladesh than that for men because women are usually barred 
from participating in activities in which health status strongly affects productivity. 
In this chapter, we will examine the above issues in the context of China. Firstly, we 
estimate the health production function. And the effects of nutrient intake and work effort 
on health status are examined. Nutrient intake is believed to improve one ' s health status 
and work effo1i to deplete health. Then these estimated health production are used to 
derive the health endowment. The health endowment is defined as the component of 
health status that is influenced neither by calorie intake nor by work effort. 
Using the derived health endowment, we estimate the calorie consumption equation. And 
we try to examine the effect of health endowment on individual calorie consumption. 
This allows us to understand how the food is allocated within the family. We finally 
examine the relation between health endowment, work effort and the wage. 
Table 3.2 describes the distribution of activities by sex in China. Activity is categorised 
into five groups. We found no great differences between man and woman in the 
distribution of activities except for the category "very heavy physical activity" . It is worth 
noting that the proportion of women participating in heavy activity is slightly greater than 
that of men. This distribution pattern of activities reflects the fact that women have 
played an increasingly more important role in agricultural production in rural areas of 
China since the 1980s. 
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Table 3.3 describes the distribution of health status and energy requirements by activity 
and sex. This table suggests that the heavier the activity, the more energy is required, 
both for man and woman 12. Obviously, the Body Mass Index (weight divided by height 
squared), which is thought of as a good health status indicator, is not increased with the 
consumption of energy. This suggests that the combinations of activity and food 
consumption determine health status. 
This also suggests that there is a relationship between activity and intra-household 
allocation of nutrients. We will examine intra-household food allocation considering the 
linkage between productivity and health and individual heterogeneity in endowed 
healthiness, following the framework of Pitt et al. 
Why this research? 
Firstly, since health, like schooling, is a form of human capital, we can expect it to 
con·elate to labour market success. Although there have been substantial advances in our 
understanding of the interrelationships between health, food consumption and economic 
performance, this issue has received much less attention in the empirical literature. To the 
best of my knowledge, there is no research on this issue related to China. 
Secondly, resource distribution within the family is ignored by most research concerned 
with inequality. If there indeed exists a compensated effect of food allocation among 
12The question designer expects Activity 3 to require more energy than activity 2. However, the 
data suggests that this order may be reversed. 
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family members, woman and children, who are usually physically weaker than adult 
males, will suffered more from any inadequacy in food supply in a low income economy. 
Some government and planning policies are needed to protect these vulnerable groups 
from starvation. 
Thirdly, knowledge of the link between health and labour market outcomes is also 
important for policy makers. The evaluation of health sector investment needs to consider 
the direct benefits of increased investment in health in terms of higher productivity. 
Finally, It seems that the wellbeing of the poorest members of the community is enhanced 
more by some health sector investments than others. Women and children may benefit 
more from government health policy when they are discriminated against within the 
family (because of the reinforcement effect). 
This chapter includes five parts. Section 3.2 is a literature review. Section 3.3 documents 
the institutional background in China and the data used in this chapter. Section 3.4 is the 
model. Section 3.5 reports the estimation of the health production function. The effect of 
health status on calorie consumption is discussed in section 3.6. Section 3.7 examines the 
links between health status and labour market productivity. A brief conclusion makes up 
section 3.8 , 
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3.2 Literature Review 
We draw two threads from the literature i.e links between productivity and health and 
intra-family resource allocation. It has been a long time since the potential relationship 
between nutritional intake and labour effort per unit of time attracted the interest of 
economists and nutritionists. Economists have been interested in how labour markets 
might adapt to the relationship that spawned the efficiency wages hypothesis. Many 
theoretical works have been developed on this topic (Stiglitz 1976; Gersovitz 1983; 
Dasgupta and Ray 1986; Dasgupta and Ray 1987 and Strauss 1986). An important issue 
taken up in this research, is the direction of causation, that is the attempt to answer the 
question of whether the link runs not only from income to nutrition but also from 
nutrition to income. A number of works have attempted to test the relationship between 
nutrition and productivity. Amongst these, most notably a study of Sri Lanka by Strauss 
(1986), found a highly significant correlation between calorie intake and labour 
productivity. Behrman and Deolaliker (1989) also noted the significant effect of nutrition 
on productivity. Strauss and Duncan (1998) give a wonderful review in this field. 
The other thread in the literature relates to resources allocation within the family. How 
are resources allocated within the family? Recently, this question has attracted much 
attention from economists and in the literature two types of models are considered. The 
first is the common preference model (Becker 1981), in which resource allocation is 
treated as the outcome of maximizing a well-behaved household welfare function. In this 
model, the mechanism underlying the resource allocation process is ignored. 
65 
McElroy and Homey (1981) propose alternative models of household decision making. 
The resource allocation process is specified as the equilibrium of a Nash bargaining game. 
The weighting of allocation within the household will then depend on variables reflecting 
the outside option. 
Recently there has been a resurgence of interest in these models (Chiappari 1988; 
Chiappari 1992; Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappari and Valerie Lechene1994; 
Browning and Chiappari 1998) with researchers using a series of testable restrictions 
derived from the general collective model. In this type of model, only the assumption of 
Pareto efficiency is imposed. No restrictions are imposed on the underlying decision 
process. 
Economists are interested in whether there is evidence of gender bias. It has been 
determined that infant and child mortality in India is lower among boys (Rosenzweig and 
Schultz 1982) and there are many studies indicating that boys may be favoured in the 
allocation of resources within the family (Behrman and Deolalikar 1989). Duncan 
Thomas found that there are differences in the allocation of household resources 
depending on a child's gender and these differences vary with the gender of the parent 
(Thomas 1994). 
Recognising that behaviour at income levels near the subsistence level may be very 
distinct from that observed when income levels are higher, Pitt, Rosenzweig et al. (1990) 
proposed a model incorporating linkages between nutrition, labour-market productivity, 
health heterogeneity, and intra-household allocation of food in a subsistence economy. 
This study focused on the relationship between intra-household distribution of food and 
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the distribution of activities across individuals, given that the linkage between healthiness 
and productivity differs between activities. The findings suggest that households are 
averse to inequality. Pitt et al conclude that the low variance in calories consumed by 
women relative to men in Bangladesh, reflects the limited participation by women in 
activities in which productivity is sensitive to health status. Since women are usually 
prevented from attending energy-intensive activities in which health may strongly 
augment return to effort, the estimated elasticity of calorie consumption by women with 
respect to health endowment (how to calculate health endowment will be discussed in the 
following section) is lower than that of men and is statistically insignificant. 
Unfortunately, there are very few studies pursuing Pitt et al's rationale, primarily because 
of the lack of data. In this research, we will use a very rich data set from China to study 
resource allocation within the family and we take the linkage between labour market 
productivity and health status into consideration. According to the model formulated in 
Pitt et al 's paper, the estimated elasticity of calorie consumption for women, with respect 
to health endowment, should be greater than that of men and will therefore be statistically 
significant. This is because, in rural China, more women have been involved in farm 
work than men since the introduction of the family based agriculture system and the rise 
of township and village enterprises in the 1980s. This has meant that on average women 
are now involved in more energy intensive activities than men and these activities are 
rewarded in the labour market. 
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3.3 Background and Data 
3.3.1 Background 
In the 1980's, the role of women in rural China changed dramatically (see Table 3.2), due 
to the fact that a large proportion of women undertook responsibility for much of the 
heavy physical labour on family farms. These changes were driven by the two forces of 
supply and demand. 
In 1979, a new agricultural system called the "Family Responsibility System" was 
introduced in China. Under this system, land was distributed equally among households 
within rural villages. At the same time, the rise of Township and Village Enterprises 
(TVEs) demanded a huge number of workers. In these circumstances, male family 
member (husbands) went to work in the TVEs while the women (wives) were required to 
perform the farm work previously done by their husbands. Our data shows that the 
number of male workers in the TVEs was twice that of female workers. 
Lin (1992) clearly shows that agricultural output increased dramatically in the early 
1980s due to the right incentive mechanism. There is also some historical evidence 
showing an increase in food consumption at this time. We believed that this increase in 
agricultural output improved the nut1itional status and health of the population, 
pai1icularly that of women. Women with better nutrition status are better equipped to 
unde1iake the physical heavy activity required of agriculture production. 
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Following the principle that the changing role of women in rural China would affect food 
allocation within family, within family allocation decisions are of interest and very 
important. Many Chinese rural households still cope with a standard of living near 
subsistence level with our data showing that the sample mean per capita income in 1989 
was 987 RMB (about one dollar per day). Resource allocation behaviour at low income 
levels may be quite distinct from that observed when income levels are well above those 
required for survival. For instance, the family may try to allocate limited food resources 
in the most efficient way by taking into consideration the productivity and activity levels 
of each individual member. 
The real-life saga of the poor household in rural China is a kind of life boat story. All 
family members need to cooperate in order to maximise their utility. This becomes 
interesting when links between productivity and health status are considered from the 
perspective of the process of food allocation within the family. In the following sections , 
we will examine how health status affects the distribution of calories. There is little 
research on the existence of a relationship between intra-household food allocation across 
individuals and labour market activities. Our observations on the rural labour market in 
China suggest that issues of within gender inequality are worthy of more attention. 
Healthier women are able to participate in activities where health augments returns from 
effo1i, therefore these women may receive a greater food allocation to compensate for and 
enhance the returns realised from their increased effort. However, women who are in 
poorer health (as well as children) may be allocated less food because limited resources 
are allocated to persons who can earn more. While an increase in labour force 
pa1iicipation by women would likely increase the quantity of calories allocated to some 
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women it would also increase inequality between adult women (i.e. within-gender 
inequality). 
3.3.2 Data 
We use panel data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) . The general 
description of the data set can be found in Chapter 2. The data includes rich information 
about individual health, nutrient intake and other social-economic variables. 
Nutrition intake data is available only for 1989 and 1991. All individuals in each 
household were surveyed in 1991 and 1993, however, in 1989, health and nutritional data 
was only collected from preschoolers and adults. In this chapter, the main data used is 
from the survey conducted in 1991. Information from the 1989 survey is used to create 
instrumental variables. Because our focus is on the population of rural areas, all 
observations from urban areas have been dropped. Individuals aged 10 years or less have 
also been dropped in our estimates of the health production function and the calorie 
consumption function. 
Table 3.1 presents the descriptive statistics. The variables measuring health include daily 
calo1ie intake, height, weight, constructed body mass index (BMI), triceps skin fold, and 
upper arm circumference. 
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3.4 The Model 
To understand food allocation within the family, we consider three models. 
3.4.1 Common Preference Model without a link between health and productivity 
In this model, we assume that there is no link between labour market productivity and 
health status. The family planner maximises a family utility function subject to the 
family's budget constraints. We assume that the family planner cares for each family 
member's health, and that health is a function of food consumption, working effort and 
health endowment. 
The health production function may be written as: 
(3-1) 
where Hi is the measure of health status of family member i, Ci is consumption of family 
member i , Ei is the working effort which is thought to delete health status. µi is health 
endowment which is thought of as the component of health influenced by neither food 
consumption and work effort. Z represents other individual characteristics and 
environmental variables that determine health status. 
We may write the family planner's problem as follows: 
(3-2) 
(3-3) 
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where X is a vector of demographic characteristic variables, Vis the non labour income 
of the family, Wi is wage of member i, P is price of the consumption. We assume that 
individual family members in-elastically supply one unit of labour. This assumption is 
quite reasonable because there is little tolerance for a lazy person in a poor economy. 
The first order conditions of this problem tells us that the family will equate the marginal 
utility from food consumption of individual i to the market price of the food. Because the 
market price of food is the same for all family members, the family will equalise 
marginal utility of food among individual members. 
Assuming that the health production function is the same among family members and the 
utility function is concave, static comparative analysis suggests that members with better 
health endowment will get less food since the marginal utility of food for him/her is 
relatively lower than it is for others. Basically, this toy model predicts that the family 
planner really avoids inequality among family members. Some research suggests that 
families at times appear not to allocate resources equally. This observation motivates 
further development of our theoretical model. One direction that this development may 
take is to try to understand food allocation within the family by introducing the linkage 
between labour market productivity and health status. A second direction would be 
concerned with bargaining processes within families. 
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3.4.2 Common Preference Model with a link between health and productivity 
The development economist has observed the linkage between health and productivity. 
Let us assume that health and effort are rewarded in the labour market, and returns to 
effort increases with health status. We may write the wage rate function as follows: 
W. =W(E.,H .). I l l (3-4) 
aw. aw. a2w. We assume i , i > 0, and i > 0. These assumptions mean that wage is an aE. aH. aE.aH . l l l l 
increasing function of effort and health status. In addition, the marginal return to effort 
increases with health status. Equation (3-4) and the health production function (3-1) 
capture the essential assumptions of nutrition-wage literature. 
With the linkage between health and wages, the family's problem may be written as: 
(3-5) 
(3-5') 
and the health production function (equation (3-1)) and wage function (equation (3-4)). 
We assume that individual health status and food consumption increases the family's 
utility function and effort decreases it. 
The first order conditions are: 
au aH + au =A(P- aw aH) 
aH. ac. ac. · aH. ac. l l l l l (3-6) 
au aH + au -:-- -A(aw + aw aH) 
aH . aE. aE. aE. aH. aE. I l I I I I (3-7) 
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From the first order conditions, it is clear that the family planner will equate the marginal 
utility of food (effort) to its shadow price. Look at equation (3-6), the left hand side 
represents the marginal utility achieved by the family from an additional unit of food 
consumption by individual i, the right hand side of the equation (in parenthesis) is market 
price minus the value of wages increased by the food consumption through health. Since 
health augment an individual's wages, the shadow price of food is lower for the person 
with better health endowment. 
Food and effort allocation within the family are determined from the first order 
conditions (equation (3-6) and (3-7)). Here, the question of interest is "how does the 
allocation of food and effort respond to changes in health endowment". Using the total 
differentiated equation (3-6) and (3-7) with respect to µ, we may produce the following: 
dCi =(P- aw aHi)(aH)-l(- a 2H S 
d :-i :::-i :::-i :::-i C. cici µ . uH . uC. uC. u l l l l l 
+ dci -s .. a2w + dci aw 
dV) clEi aE.H. dV aH . 
l l l 
(3-8) 
where SCiCi and SciEi are Hicks own substitution effects (negative) and cross substitution 
effects (negative if effort is "bad"), respectively. In equation (3-8) the first item in the 
right hand side is negative. This means that family member with higher endowed health 
status will receive less food if the income effect is small compared to the substitution 
effect. We call this the equalisation effect because higher health endo~ed members are 
taxed while low health endow individuals are compensated with more food. The last two 
items capture the interaction of health and effort in the labour market, which are both 
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positive factors. We call this a productivity effect. This effect indicates that a person 
might be allocated more food if he/she participates in activities in which health augments 
the return to effort most directly. However, we cannot judge from the theory the sign of 
dCi because the equalisation effect and productivity effect generate opposite outcomes. dµi 
The primary focus of this chapter is to use micro data to examine the effect on food 
allocation of personal health endowment. 
Pitt etc al.(1998) conducted a comparative exercise for a model using an income 
maximisation assumption. In the income maximisation model, both food allocation and 
effort of individual i respond positively to health endowment. The propositions are 
simple. Higher health endowment will increase return to effort, and effort depletes health. 
Family members need to be allocated more food to compensate for additional energy 
expended and enhance increased effort. 
3.4.3 Bargaining Model 
The assumption of a "unitary household" may be too restrictive. Some efforts have been 
done to model family decision processes because households can be thought of as a group 
of individuals who bargain with each other over resources. The consequences of this 
assumption have been examined in the literature (Manser and Brown 1980; Lundberg and 
Pollak 1993; Browning and Chiappari 1998). These researchers have developed a 
methodology that assumes that family resource allocation is Pareto optimal. This permits 
-
empirical testing of their predictions. 
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Given the health production function (3-1), the wage function (3-4) and budget 
constraints (3-5'), 
the Pareto-efficient allocation of resources within the family solves as: 
N 
max L~Ui(C,H , E) 
i=l 
s.t. equation (3-1), (3-4) and (3-5'). 
Where Ui is the utility function of family member i, which depends on the consumption, 
health and effort of individual i . N is the total number of family members, C is a vector 
of food consumption by each family member, His a vector of health status of each family 
member, and Eis a vector of effort for each family member. 
The family decision process can be divided into two stages. In the first stage, family 
members share non-labour income according to a sharing rule. We called this A, which is 
a function of the factors reflecting the bargaining power of individual members. In the 
problem under investigation, A is a function of health endowment. 
At the second stage, individual i maximises the following problem: 
s.t. PC<= Wi + A(µ)V 
and wage function (3-4) and health function (3-1). 
It is obvious thal food consumption by individual i is a function of A, hence µ. If the 
sharing rule is an increasing function of personal health endowment, this will increase the 
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individual's total income. Food consumption will also be increased. We call this the 
bargaining effect of health endowment. In this problem, the marginal utility from the last 
unit of food equals the shadow price. The comparative analysis is similar to the unitary 
model above except that we have incorporated the bargaining effect. 
3.4.4 Specifications 
In this chapter, we are interested in how the distribution of activities affects food 
distribution among family members when there is a linkage between health and 
productivity. If there is a big difference in the distribution of activities between genders, 
food allocation will also differ to reflect the extent to which health augments return to 
effort. In South Asia, women are not allowed to participate in activities in which health 
status strongly affects productivity and we expect to observe a different elasticity of food 
consumption with respect to personal health endowment. 
In China, the dist1ibution of activities between genders is very similar. However, within 
gender classes , the distribution of activities is an important factor when it comes to food 
allocation. We expect to see that there is no great difference in the elasticity of food 
consumption with respect to personal health endowment between genders. 
Initially, we need to estimate a health production function. 
H i =a+ /3Ci + y * Activityi + Xb + £ i (3 -9) 
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where Ci is calorie consumption by individual i, Activity proxies the effort of individual i, 
X represents other control variables such as individual characteristics and environmental 
variables. We define health endowment as the component of health influenced by neither 
calorie consumption nor effort. 
We derive an estimate of health endowment after estimating health production (3-9). We 
can then examine the effect of health endowment on the allocation of calories for 
individual consumption using the equation: 
Ci = a+ b * healthendowment + Zc + error (3-10) 
where Z represents control variables such as individual characteristics and family 
characteristics. 
We also need to examine how productivity or effort is affected by health endowment. 
The following equation may be used for this purpose: 
~ =a+ /3 * healthendowment + y *controls+ error (3-11 ) 
where Yi is a dummy for activity or wage. We expect that, in rural China, health 
endowment is positively related to heavy activity and wages are the returns of energy and 
physical strength which are rewarded in the traditional agricultural sector. 
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3.5 Heath Production 
In this pa1i of the study, health production (3-9) will be estimated using the body mass 
index (BMI) as a measure of health. BMI equals weight (kg) divided by squared height 
(m). How to measure health is a difficult question since health is multi dimensional. It 
has been suggested that anthropometric measurements such as height and weight are less 
subjective indicators of health status. Both height and weight are believed to be related to 
productivity. However, tall people may also be slight and overweight people may not be 
productive. For these reasons it may be convenient to analyse weight in relation to height. 
While different ways of expressing this ratio is possible, BMI is the most frequently used 
index (Thomas and Strauss 1997). Basically, BMI is a measure of health in the short run 
and may be affected by food consumption and effort13 . 
In equation (3-9), nutrition intake is measured by calorie intake. To reflect calorie 
outflow, we use dummy variables to indicating participation in activities classified as 
moderate heavy activity, heavy activity and very heavy activity. 
Individual characteristics such as age, age squared, gender dummy, interaction of gender 
and age, were controlled. To avoid omitting variable bias, we have tried to control 
13 It is argued that very high and very low values of B:tvII (being too obese and being too thin) are 
indicators of bad health. So in the research of effect of BMI , we need to include the squared 
BMI in the regression to reflect this fact. In this chapter we estimate a health production function 
and fron1 which to derive the health endowment. We don't need to consider this kind of non 
linear relation between BMI and observed health. 
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environmental characteristics such as water source, categories of floors and if a dwelling 
place is clean or dirty. 
Obviously, calorie consumption and activities in health production are endogenous and 
therefore the OLS estimator will be biased. 2SLS will be used to obtain a consistent 
estimator. The key to this phase of the study is to find valid instrumental variables. The 
instrumental variables chosen should affect health status only through calorie intake and 
work effort. Our rich data set offers us several exceptionally appropriate instrumental 
variables. We have used the following variable as instruments: a dummy for households 
with professional cooking equipment, a dummy for household's with poultry, and food 
prices such as rice, flour and noodles, vegetables, eggs, pork, fish and beans, and age and 
years of schooling of the head of the household. The dummy for households with 
professional cooking equipment and a dummy for household's with poultry may 
correlated with calorie consumption. A household with professional cooking equipment 
may have good knowledge about nutrition. And a household with poultry also have 
chance to take more nuttition. These two variables affect health only through nutrient 
intake rather directly. The prices of various foods obviously will affect health only 
through food consumption. Age and years of schooling of household head could be valid 
instrumental variables because these characteristics may correlated with individual's 
activity and not affecting family member's health. 
If a household has professional cooking equipment, nutrient intake will be directly 
affected because the family may have more knowledge about health and may produce 
nutrients more efficiently. However, there is no reason to believe that because a 
household has professional equipment, individual health will be affected directly. It is 
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widely accepted that the price of food is a valid instrumental variable for calorie intake. 
The age and years of schooling of the household head and the above mentioned 
instrumental variables are used to instrument activity choice. 
The results are reported in Table 3.5.1. The OLS estimate of the coefficient of calorie 
consumption is 0.046 and this is statistically significant. The coefficients of activities 
have correct signs and are significant for moderate heavy activity and heavy activity. The 
estimate of the coefficient of calorie consumption using 2SLS is 0.174, which is much 
higher than OLS estimates. 
The OLS estimate bias is downward compared to IV estimates. This is consistent with 
our theory. Increased intakes of nutrient will improve health status. However, better 
health will also make an individual more likely to engage in energy consuming activities 
that in return deplete health. As a consequence, health may not increase as much as it 
might be in the absence of the increased effort. 
Table 3.5.2 presents the 2SLS results of the health production function by gender. The 
results are not very much different from those in Table 3.5.1 except that the coefficient of 
calo1ie consumption for females is not significant. The variables of activity have the 
correct signs. The results suggest that males and females in Chinese rural areas may share 
the same health production technique. 
We also examine health production using alternative measurements of health status. 
Table 3 .5 .3 presents the results using arm circumstance and skin fold as dependent 
variables. 
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Obviously, calorie consumption improves an individual's health status and physically 
heavy activities deplete one's health. Food allocation within the family needs to balance 
calorie intake and calorie outflow due to work effort. 
From our estimate of the health production function , we can derive an individual's health 
endowment influenced by neither calorie intake nor effort. This estimate of health 
endowment will be used in the next section to examine the effect of health endowment on 
calorie distribution. 
3.6 Intra-household Calorie Allocation and Health 
Endowment 
In this section, equation (3-10) will be estimated. We rewrite it as follows: 
Ci =a+ b * healthendowment + Zc + error (3-10) 
where healthendownient is calculated from the above section. Z is a vector of variables to 
control individual and family characte1istics. 
To estimate equation (3-10) , healthendowment needs to be instrumented if there are 
measurement en·ors for calorie intake. Recall that our estimated health endowment µ;_ is 
calculated using: 
* * * µ . =H. -C.A , l l l 
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where the star symbol means true values for the variables, A is the coefficient of calorie 
consumption. Suppose that health status and nutrition are measured with e1Tors. We can 
write: 
* H . =H. +u . l l l 
* C. =C. +e. l l l 
where the error items are not co1Telated with the true values. The estimated health 
endowment is: 
* A 
=µ. +U . -e.A. l l l 
we are interested in the estimation of the following equation 
It is easy to show that 
A (j' pµ (j' Plimb = b----+--e_v -
(j' mm + (j' vv (j' Jll-l + (j' vv · 
That is, the estimation of the coefficient of health endowment in equation (3-10) will not 
be consistent if measurement errors are present. The suggested method of dealing with 
the classical measurement error problem is 2SLS. 
The instrumental variables used to account for the measurement problems in health 
endowment of 1991. We are assuming the measurement errors in different years and in 
different variables two waves are independent. In addition, skin fold thickness and arm 
circumference are obviously correlated with BMI. 
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Table 3.6.1 includes the 2SLS result for equation (3-10). All variables are in log except 
for the dummies. The elasticity of calorie consumption with respect to personal health 
endowment is 0.23. The person with higher health endowment will receive a greater food 
allocation to enhance his/her productivity and compensate for his/her effort. This finding 
suggests that the productivity effect is the key factor in the process of deciding food 
allocation within the family. A person might be allocated more food if he/she participates 
in an activity in which health augments the return to effort most strongly. 
We may wish to further determine if there are differences between men and women in the 
elasticity of calorie consumption with respect to personal health endowment. In rural 
China, under the "Family Responsibility System" initiated in the early 1980s, more and 
more women have participated in farming activities where health status strongly 
augments return to effort. Coincidently, since the mid 1980's, men have increased their 
participation in Township and Village Enterprises, working off the farm for wages. The 
role of women in farming became more important when they needed to take over the 
farm work previously done by their husbands. It is clear that farm work in rural China is 
one activity in which health status strongly augments return to effort. Table 3.2 shows the 
distribution of activities by gender, with the data showing 53% of farm workers being 
male and 56% female. Women play a major role in farming in rural China. 
Our theory predicts that the elasticity of calorie consumption with respect to health status 
should be higher for women than for men, or should at least be at the same level. We 
estimated equation (3-10) by gender and the results are presented in Table 3.6.2. We used 
the same control variables and instrumental variables used in Table 3 .6.1. The coefficient 
. 
of personal health endowment was calculated to be 0.21 and 0.39 for men and women, 
84 
respectively. As anticipated, women received more food when their health endowment 
was higher because of their increased role in farming. 
The cross effect of health endowment of other males and females in the household was 
negative but not significant. The negative sign of the cross effect may suggest that the 
income maximisation model should be rejected. Certainly, we cannot derive concrete 
conclusions from these insignificant estimates. 
In summary, the findings in this section may help us to understand the mechanism of 
food allocation within the family unit in rural China. The introduction of the family based 
farm ownership scheme and the rise of rural industry allowed females to play a more 
important role in farm work where health effort strongly augments return to effort. Under 
these circumstances, women seem to be allocated more food in order to enhance their 
health and to compensate for their effort. Although we cannot say whether the net welfare 
of women has increased or not, it is believed that the increasingly important role played 
by women in agricultural production enhances their bargaining power in determining 
resource allocation within the family. We won't pursue these issues further in this 
Chapter. 
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3. 7 Productivity and Health 
Our logic about family resources allocation may be expressed as follows: health 
dist1ibution • activity distribution • food distribution • health distribution. In this 
study , the key component is that health augments return to effort. In this section we will 
examine this link. 
Our theory implies that health endowment is positively correlated with individual income 
or wages, and that individuals with better health endowment are more likely to participate 
in labour intensive activities where energy is demanded. 
We firstly examine the effect of health endowment on activity choice. Physical strength is 
essential to undertake farm work in rural China, given the low level of mechanisation. As 
shown in Table 2, after 1980, more women are involved in heavy activities. We propose 
that this is the consequence of two forces. One is that the health status of women 
improved dramatically in the 1980s. In other words, women become physical stronger 
which gave them the capability to undertake heavier activities. The other force is a 
response to demand. Wives were required to finish farm work that had previously been 
undertaken by their husbands, after their husbands had moved into the rural industry 
sector. 
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Table 3.7.1 presents the results of the effects of health endowment on activity choice. The 
dependent variable is a dummy which indicates that a person undertakes heavy and very 
heavy activities. Individual characteristics such as age and sex have been controlled. We 
also include land size in the regression so that our results can be interpreted as being 
conditional on land holding. Household characteristics were also controlled. The 
regression has been estimated using Two Stage Least Square 14 . Personal health 
endowment has a significant effect on the probability of individuals engaging in heavy 
activities. Interestingly, the coefficient of sex is negative (not significant), this indicates 
that more males are involved in relatively less heavy activities. 
Secondly, we try to examine the effect of health endowment on per capita family income. 
Consider a family with a physically strong wife. The husband of this family may be able 
to move easily into the rural industry sector since his wife will finish his farm work. This 
may imply that personal health endowment will increase household income. Furthermore, 
the effect of health endowment on family income might be greater for females than for 
males. An increase in female health status has two effects on family income: increased 
productivity from higher health status , which in tum allows their husbands to engage in 
the rural industry sector to earn money. 
Table 3.7 .2 reports the results for determinants of per capita family income by sex. 
Individual family characteristics have been controlled. Here the effects of personal health 
endowment are significant for both males and females . As we expected, the effect for 
14 We use a bootstrap method to estimate the asyn1ptotic standard error for the estimated 
coefficient. 
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females is greater than that for males. The elasticity of per capita family income with 
respect to personal health endowment are 1.37 and 0.61 for females and males , 
respectively. The effect on income of improved health endowment for females is twice 
that of males. These results suggest that improvement in female health status is of 
significant benefit in increasing family income. 
3.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the calorie consumption distribution within the family has been examined 
taking into consideration links between productivity and health status in China. We firstly 
estimate a health production function, and then calculate health endowment, which is the 
component of health influenced by neither calorie consumption nor work effort. We then 
examine the effects of personal health endowment on calorie consumption. We also 
examine the effects of health on activity choice and family income. 
Our results suggest that health endowment indeed affects calorie consumption 
distribution within the family in rural China and this effect is greater for females 
compared to males. This reflects the fact that females have played an increasingly 
important role in fa1m work while males pursued job opportunities in the rural industry 
sector where they can earn more money. In order for husbands to be free to work in the 
industrial sector, it became necessary for their wives to be capable of undertaking heavier 
work. Women who had better health endowments and were strong enough to replace, at 
least partly, their husbands' role in farming, were allocated more calories to compensate 
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for their efforts. However, women with poorer health may have received fewer calories 
because they could only attend to light activities. 
The findings in this chapter reveal that both men and women rece1 ve calorie 
reinforcement with respect to their health endowment. The disparity between genders 
may not be a serious problem in rural China. However, the disparity within gender class 
needs to be noted. 
Roughly speaking, with the increase in labour force opportunities for women, resulting 
from development of rural industries and the family based land distribution system, 
women were allocated more food within the family. This has had a significant effect on 
the reduction of disparity between genders. 
Our findings also suggest that increases in the health status of individuals, ceteris paribus, 
will increase the family's income, and this effect is greater for women. It appears that a 
woman's health is a key factor in determining whether her husband joins the industrial 
sector. Thus, women's health indirectly affects the development of rural industry. Just 
how does women's health affect the development of rural industry in China? We would 
need to unde1iake further research to answer this question. 
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Definition Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
daycal91 Calorie intake in 1991 5667 2550 852 
daycal89 Calorie intake in 1989 3175 2399 937 
bmi91 Body mass index in 1991 6411 19.85 3.87 
arm91 Arm circumference (cm) 6238 22.16 5.35 
skin91 Skin fold (mm) 6002 9.29 5.47 
female daycal91 Female calorie intake in 1991 2894 2404.49 738.88 
female bmi91 Female body mass index in 1991 3226 20.11 4.03 
male daycal91 Male calorie intake in 1991 2773 2702.36 933.25 
male bmi91 Male body mass index in 1991 3185 19.58 3.67 
hours91 Working hours outside household 6411 5.81 5.94 
pcdef91 Per capita income in 1991 6411 1002.58 818.73 
Price variables 
pfish91 Fish 6411 3.95 1.60 
pbean91 Beans 6411 0.47 0.26 
price91 Rice 5104 0.65 0.28 
pg1ic91 pgric91 6411 0.73 0.35 
pflour91 Flour 6411 0.75 0.30 
pegg91 Eggs 6411 2.12 1.47 
pvege91 Vegetables 5653 0.33 0.33 
ppork91 Pork 6411 3.53 2.61 
pchic91 Chicken 6345 4.28 4.13 
pbeef91 Beef 5475 4.62 4.03 
light91 Light activity 6411 0.11 0.32 
heavy91 Heavy activity 6411 0.46 0.50 
vheavy91 Very heavy activity 6411 0.01 0.09 
sex sex 6411 0.50 0.50 
age91yrs Age in 1991 6411 28.40 19.26 
agesq Age squared 6411 1177 1355 
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Table 3.2: Individual Distribution of Activity by Sex in Rural China 
Males Females 
Activity Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
1 153 5.74 116 4.22 
2 172 6.46 276 10.03 
3 898 33.71 803 29.19 
4 1412 53 1538 55.91 
5 29 1.09 18 0.65 
Total 2664 100 2751 100 
Sources: CHNS survey in 1991 
Activity 1: very light physical activity (working in a sitting position, e.g. , office 
worker watch repairer, etc.). Activity 2: light physical activity (working in a 
standing position, e.g. salesperson, teacher, etc.). Activity 3: Moderate physical 
activity (student, driver, electrician etc.). Activity 4: heavy physical activity (farmer, dancer, steel worker etc.). Activity 5: very heavy physical activity (loader, 
logger, miner, stonecutter, etc .. ) 
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Table 3.3: Individual Distribution of Calories and Body Mass Index (BMI) by 
Activity and Sex 
Females Males 
Activity Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
1 body91 116 21.5 3.9 153 22.2 3.5 
daycal91 114 2236.5 641 .9 148 2607.0 671.8 
2 body91 276 22.0 4.4 172 21.5 3.3 
daycal91 267 2410.2 567.3 166 2779.7 621.1 
3 body91 803 18.4 3.9 898 18.1 3.8 
daycal91 564 2288.7 535 .5 616 2590.0 794.1 
4 body91 1538 21.4 3.0 1412 20.8 2.5 
daycal91 1522 2704.3 645.9 1396 3091.2 803 .1 
5 body91 18 22.0 2.6 29 21.9 3.1 
daycal91 18 2742.7 514.6 29 3241.0 836.1 
Sources: CHNS survey in 1991 
Activity 1: very light physical activity (working in a sitting position, e.g., office worker 
watch repairer, etc.). Activity 2: light physical activity (working in standing position, e.g. 
salesperson, teacher, technician, etc.). Activity 3: Moderate physical activity (student, driver, 
electrician etc.). Activity 4: heavy physical activity (farmer, dancer, steel worker etc.) 
Activity 5: very heavy physical activity (loader, logger, miner, stonecutter, etc .. ) 
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Table 3.4: Distribution of Calories by Age and Sex 
Females Males 
Age Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
under 10 94 1778.6 528.2 107 1792.3 452.0 
10--20 455 2451.5 545.1 469 2779.7 841.1 
20-30 521 2727.5 678.3 477 3182.5 815.5 
30-40 531 2661.0 573.1 460 3039.8 743.8 
40-50 435 2679.2 616.1 404 3083.2 720.5 
50-60 231 2558.0 636.9 226 2856.9 734.6 
60-70 150 2304.6 563.2 144 2675.5 657.2 
70-80 62 2010.0 601.3 57 2472.7 640.8 
80- 6 1883.2 709.4 11 2069.7 524.4 
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Table 3.5.1: The 2SLS Estimate of Health Production (Dependent Variable is Body 
Mass Index) 
Variables* 
Calorie consumption** 
Middle heavy activity** 
Heavy activity** 
Very heavy activity** 
Age 
Age squared 
Sex 
Age* sex 
Water from underground 
Water from open well 
Water from river, lake 
Floor is concrete 
Floor is brick 
Floor is earth 
Floor is wood 
Very little excreta around the dwelling 
place 
Some excreta around the dwelling place 
Much excreta around the dwelling place 
Constant 
N 
R sq 
OLS 
Coef. 
0.046 
-0.031 
-0.017 
-0.008 
0.014 
0.000 
-0.017 
0.000 
-0.005 
-0.013 
-0.015 
0.030 
0.010 
-0.002 
0.024 
-0.014 
-0.024 
-0.012 
2.418 
5586 
37.37 
* All variables are in logs except the dummy variables. 
** These endogenous variables are instrumented by: 
t 
6.97 
-4.45 
-2.17 
-0.36 
27.00 
-22.20 
-2.29 
-0.77 
-1.04 
-2.16 
-1.89 
2.14 
0.69 
-0.14 
1.03 
-2.93 
-4.74 
-0.80 
48.68 
dummy for whether the household has professional cooking 
equipment, dummy for whether the household has poultry, 
household head's age and years of schooling, and food p1ices 
such as rice, flour and noodles, vegetables, eggs, pork, fish and 
beans. 
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2SLS 
Coef. 
0.174 
-0.090 
-0.174 
-1.310 
0.017 
. 0.000 
-0.030 
0.000 
0.014 
0.008 
0.009 
0.016 
-0.002 
-0.011 
0.061 
-0.004 
-0.015 
-0.008 
1.482 
t 
2.48 
-1.49 
-4.57 
-2.90 
6.84 
-5.89 
-2.65 
-0.12 
1.67 
0.76 
0.77 
0.80 
-0.10 
-0.59 
1.86 
-0.54 
-1.87 
-0.39 
2.93 
5586 
Table 3.5.2: The 2SLS Estimate of Health Production by Sex (Dependent Variable is 
Body Mass) 
Variables* Male 
Coef. 
Calorie consumption** 0.276 
Moderate heavy activity** ~0.113 
Heavy activity** 
-0.204 
Very heavy activity** 
-0.706 
Age 0.009 
Age squared 0.000 
Water from underground 0.007 
Water from open well 0.003 
Water from river, lake 0.004 
Floor is concrete 0.005 
Floor is brick 
-0.010 
Floor is earth 
-0.004 
Floor is wood 0.035 
Very little excreta around the dwelling place -0.014 
Some excreta around the dwelling place -0.017 
Much excreta around the dwelling place 0.007 
Constant 0.769 
N 2731 
R sq 
* All variables are in logs except the dummy variables. 
** These endogenous variables are instrumented by: 
Female 
t Coef. t 
4.24 0.204 1.35 
-1.26 0.107 0.79 
-4.10 -0.154 -2.44 
-1.59 -0.903 -1.31 
1.39 0.011 1.57 
-1.09 0.000 -1.08 
0.67 0.033 2.05 
0.21 0.022 1.38 
0.32 0.018 0.91 
0.19 0.031 1.12 
-0.36 0.013 0.46 
-0.16 -0.002 -0.08 
0.83 0.049 0.98 
-1.39 0.000 -0.03 
-1.78 -0.006 -0.51 
0.31 -0.016 -0.53 
1.66 1.192 1.07 
2855 
dummy for whether the household has professional cooking equipment, dummy for whether 
the household has poultry, household head's age and years of schooling, and food prices 
such as rice, flour and noodles, vegetables, eggs, pork, fish and 
beans. 
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Table 3.5.3: The 2SLS Estimate of Health Production (Log of Arm Circumference 
and Log of Triceps Skin) 
Dependent variables 
Variables* 
Calorie consumption** 
Heavy activity** 
Very heavy activity** 
Age 
Age squared 
Sex 
Age sex 
Water from underground 
Water from open well 
Water from river, lake 
Floor is concrete 
Floor is brick 
Floor is earth 
Floor is wood 
Very little excreta around the dwelling 
place 
Some excreta around the dwelling 
place 
Much excreta around the dwelling 
place 
Constant 
N 
R sq 
Log of arm 
circumference 
Coef. 
0.103 
-0.147 
-0.152 
0.027 
0.000 
-0.007 
0.001 
0.015 
0.013 
0.014 
0.081 
0.079 
0.063 
0.047 
0.022 
0.008 
-0.029 
1.842 
5342 
43.45 
* All variables are in logs except the dummy variables. 
** These endogenous variables are instrumented by: 
Log of triceps skin 
t Coef. t 
2.06 0.821 4.79 
-4.69 -0.776 -8 .34 
-0.37 -3.065 -2.31 
12.32 0.018 2.42 
-11.36 0.000 -1.93 
-0.69 -0.350 -10.26 
2.35 -0.005 -5.31 
1.82 0.052 1.92 
1.38 0.028 0.85 
1.21 0.094 2.25 
4.14 0.145 2.15 
3.96 0.1 18 1.72 
3.32 0.102 1.56 
1.43 0.339 2.42 
3.05 -0.022 -0.88 
1.04 -0.041 -1.53 
-1.51 -0.007 -0.11 
5.14 -4.064 -3.31 
5219 5219 
41.25 
dummy for whether the household has professional cooking equipment, dummy for 
whether the household has poultry, household head's age and years of schooling, and 
prices of foods such as rice, flour and noodles, vegetables, eggs, pork, fish and beans. 
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Table 3.6.1: The Determinants of Calorie Consumption (2SLS) 
Total sample 
Variables* Coef. t 
Own health endowment** 0.228 2.72 
Family male health endowment** 
(not including himself) 0.012 0.13 
Family female health endowment** 
(not including himself) 
-0.183 -1.77 
Per capita income** 
Household size 0.001 0.06 
Age 0.043 2.96 
Age squared 0.036 8.35 
Sex 
-0.001 -8.74 
Age sex 0.114 2.15 
Land 0.003 1.42 
Proportion of family members male -0.403 -1.58 
Mean age of family members 0.004 1.68 
Deviation of ages of family members -0.008 -2.66 
reg 1 
-0.041 -1.73 
reg2 0.101 4.61 
reg3 0.018 0.62 
reg4 0.187 3.97 
reg5 0.097 4.38 
constant 7.087 35.71 
N*** 1352 
* All variables in logs, except for dummies. 
** Instruments are: household head's age and years of schooling, 
individual and family skin fold thickness and arm circumference measured in other year, 
the condition of floor, land holding and water sources. 
*** This is the number of observations with information of health and nutrition for both 
1989 and 1991. We need to use the health information in 1989 as instrumental variable. 
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Table 3.6.2: The Determinants of Calorie Consumption (2SLS) 
Male Female 
Variables* Coef. t Coef. t 
Own health endowment** 0.207 1.87 0.394 3.02 
Family male health endowment** 
(not including himself) 
-0.116 -1.05 0.000 0.00 
Family female health endowment** 
(not including himself) 
-0.173 -0.95 0.026 0.17 
Per capita income** 0.005 0.18 -0.030 -0.91 
Household size 0.033 2.55 0.015 1.21 
Age 0.041 7.43 0.033 3.64 
Age squared 
-0.001 -7.96 0.000 -3.74 
Sex 
Age sex 
Proportion of family members male -0.766 -0.91 0.066 0.58 
Mean age of family members 0.007 2.25 0.000 -0.05 
Deviation of ages off amil y members -0.008 -2.31 -0.009 -2.20 
reg 1 
-0.014 -0.40 -0.076 -2.34 
reg2 0.106 3.37 0.076 2.80 
reg3 0.017 0.35 -0.019 -0.51 
reg4 0.255 3.91 0.129 1.89 
reg5 0.106 3.52 0.113 3.32 
constant 7.553 15.33 6.81 24.11 
N 670 682 
* All variables in logs, except for dummies. 
** Instruments are: household head's age and years of schooling, 
individual and family endowment of skin fold thickness and arm circumference 
measured in other year, the condition of floor, land holding 
and water sources. 
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Table 3.7.1: The Determinants of Activity Choice (Two Stage Probit Model): 
Dependent Variable is the Dummy for Heavy and Very Heavy Activity 
Own health endowment* 
Sex 
household size 
Age 
Age sq 
Age*sex 
Land 
regl 
reg2 
reg3 
reg4 
reg5 
Proportion of family members 
male 
Mean age of family members 
Deviation of ages of family 
members 
Constant 
N 
Coef. 
4.332 
-0.032 
0.225 
-0.003 
-0.103 
0.003 
0.114 
-1.153 
-1.158 
-1.827 
0.257 
-0.347 
0.117 
-0.010 
-0.010 
-9.786 
1619 
z 
8.13 
-0.68 
8.19 
-7.65 
-0.26 
0.24 
5.77 
-7.29 
-8.46 
-10.52 
0.18 
-1.79 
0.41 
-1.48 
-0.90 
-10.31 
Marginal effect 
1.439 
-0.011 
0.075 
-0.001 
-0.034 
0.001 
0.038 
-0.425 
-0.423 
-0.634 
0.078 
-0.123 
0.039 
-0.003 
-0.003 
* Instrumental variables are household head age and years of 
schooling, individual health endowments for arm circumference and 
skin fold thickness measured in 1989. 
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Table 3. 7 .2: Determinants of Per Capita Family Income by Sex 
Variables Female Male 
Coef. t Coef. t 
Own health endowment* 1.373 4.59 0.612 2.41 
Household size 
-0.101 -3.42 -0.023 -0.69 
Age 0.001 0.01 -0.105 -2.13 
Age squared 0.000 -0.06 0.001 1.97 
Land 0.001 0.13 -0.005 -0.48 
regl 
-0.012 -0.12 -0.035 -0.31 
reg2 0.185 2.14 0.190 1.99 
reg3 0.126 1.08 0.202 1.46 
reg4 0.237 0.96 -0.053 -0.11 
reg5 0.230 2.13 0.203 1.68 
Propo1iion of family members -0.058 -0.33 -0.038 -0.17 
male 
Mean age of family members 0.021 4.16 0.024 4.51 
Deviation of ages of family -0.020 -2.61 -0.029 -3.39 
members 
Constant 4.177 4.55 7.190 7.21 
N 725 615 
R sq 0.084 0.088 
* Instrumental vaiiables include individual health endowments for arm circumference 
and skin fold thickness measured in 1989. 
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Table 3.7.3: The Effect of Health Endowment on Wage by Sex 
Variables Female Male 
Coef. t Coef. t 
Own health 1.049 3.25 0.612 2.41 
endowment* 
Household size -0.036 -1.39 -0.023 -0.69 
Age 
-0.004 -0.09 -0.105 -2.13 
Age squared 0.000 -0.13 0.001 1.97 
Land 
-0.014 -1.49 -0.005 -0.48 
regl 0.233 2.36 -0.035 -0.31 
reg2 0.275 3.20 0.190 1.99 
reg3 0.467 4.39 0.202 1.46 
reg4 0.108 0.55 -0.053 -0.11 
reg5 0.326 3.37 0.203 1.68 
Proportion of family -0.244 -1.47 -0.038 -0.17 
members male 
Mean age of family 0.024 4.86 0.024 4.51 
members 
Deviation of ages of -0.030 -4.06 -0.029 -3.39 
family members 
Constant 
-3.078 -3.36 7.190 7.21 
N 936 784 
R sq 0.088 0.074 
* Instrumental variables include individual health endowments for arm 
circumference and skin fold thickness measured in 1989. 
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Chapter 4 
It's True about Mothers-in-Law: Discri01ination 
and Bargaining Power within Fa01ilies 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 examines the relationship between calorie consumption and individual health 
endowment taking into account the linkage between health status and labour market 
productivity in the framework of the common preference model. We find that the 
individual health endowment affects calorie consumption distribution. This finding, 
however, also is consistent with the bargaining model. This chapter emphasises the 
distinction between the common preference model and the bargaining model. 
Welfare, living standards, and poverty are all characteristics of individuals of households , 
but there is not a one to one mapping from the individual to the household. Some 
members of a household may be poorer than others. Therefore, it is important to_ 
understand how resources are allocated within the household. Over the past two decades , 
a large body of literature has developed which documents that, in some areas of the world, 
the allocation of household resources favours males over females (Dreze and Sen 1989; 
Harriss 1990; Strauss and Thomas 1998). This may well be true of China. One of the best 
known findings in this literature relates to the extent of excess infant mortality among 
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girls, pa1iicularly in China (Dreze and Sen 1989; Coale 1991). Another relevant fact 
about China is that the life expectancy gap between males and females is much smaller 
than the world average. The life expectancy of females in China is only three years 
greater than males, while the world average gap is about eight years. In this chapter, we 
add to this literature by asking whether a gender bias exists between husband and wife in 
the allocation of resources within the family, particularly in poor rural areas. The question 
we address is: "Are wives treated equally within the family?" 
To answer this question we focus our attention on companng the health status and 
nutrient intake of husbands and wives. We measure health status using Body Mass Index 
(BMI) which is a ratio of height and weight squared. The BMI is thought to be a good 
measure of health status of human beings because it is closely related to the mortality rate 
and many illnesses. Nutrient intake is measured by calorie and protein consumption. In a 
poor economy, nutrient intake directly determines the individual's health status and 
labour productivity and thus it is closely related to an individual's welfare. 
The common preference model (Samuelson 1956, Becker 1981) assumes that the 
respective weighting of each family members in the household's utility is independent of 
environmental factors (wages, prices, individual incomes and other social or economic 
characteristics). For example, those who can earn a low wage, say the wife, receives the 
same weighting as the member who can earn a high wage, say the husband. The common 
preference model assumes that all members of the family jointly maximise a common 
objective function because selfish members find it in their self-interest to subscribe to the 
altruist's objective. The strong implication of this model is that the demand for each 
commodity is invariant to the division of resources within the family. In addition, the 
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social-economic characteristics of the individual do not affect demand if they do not 
affect family preferences. 
The bargaining model assumes that the household can be thought of as a group of 
individuals who bargain with each other over resources (Manser and Brown 1980; 
McElroy and Homey 1981; Lundberg and Pollak 1993). For example, the allocation of 
nutrients between a husband and wife may depend on the threat point, which is 
interpreted as the utility of remaining single or of getting divorced (outside option) 
(McElroy and Homey 1981), or as the non-cooperative equilibrium within marriage 
(inside option) (Lundberger and Pollak 1993). Chiappori (1988,1992) assumes that 
resource allocation within the household is Pareto efficient. Under this assumption, we 
can recover the preferences from the allocation outcomes without knowing the decision 
making process. The empirical work by Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori and Lechene 
(1994) suggests that the consumption of husband and wife is related to their individual 
resources. That is the bargaining model has a better prediction of outcomes than the 
common preference model. We have called the factors affecting the sharing rule 
distribution factors. In this chapter, the location of the husband's mother-in-law is one 
kind of distribution factor. 
We will test whether the ratio of nutrient intake and the health status of the husband and 
wife are affected by social-economic characteristics such as the location of mothers-in 
law (i.e. wives' parents), which is unlikely to affect individual preferences. Our test can 
help us to determine whether the common preference model is consistent with the data. If 
the common preference model is correct, we will find that the ratio of nutrient intake 
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between husband and wife should not depend on individual characteristics that do not 
change the preference, such as whether the wife's mother lives close or far away. 
Under the framework of the bargaining model, however, it matters where the wife's 
mother lives. If the wife's family lives close by, this might increase the wife's utility from 
divorce because she can easily get help from her parents. This help includes financial and 
emotional support. Considering the very low divorce rate in China before the 1990s, the 
separate sphere bargaining model may be a better altemati ve to describe bargaining 
leverage between husband and wife. This model assumes that divorce is not allowed and 
that the threat point is a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. In this case, the wife can 
readily obtain help from nearby parents. For example, the wife's parents can easily lend 
their daughter physical and monetary support such as taking care of the children, sharing 
some homework and intervening with their son-in-law if their daughter is badly treated. 
This intervention can shift the power balance in the family and increase the wife's 
nutrient intake. The prediction using the bargaining model is that the wife's share of 
allocated resources should be relatively higher if her parents live nearby, than if her 
parents live further away (for instance in a different county). 
Most of the existing literature studying gender bias in resource allocation within the 
household, is concerned with the direct comparison (by gender) of nutrition, health or 
education (Deaton 1997). Although there is considerable evidence of gender bias , the 
mechanisms underlying gender bias are not fully understood. In this chapter, we will 
attempt to establish the association between a series of outcomes of household resource 
allocation and a particular social-economic factor (i.e. location of mothers-in-law) that 
may affect the threat point of wives but not their preferences. 
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Previous research has usually focused on gender bias against women as a group. In this 
chapter we focus on the relative sharing of allocated resources between husbands and 
wives who are decision makers within families. This can shed light on the mechanism of 
gender bias within the family structure. 
In Chinese society, particularly in rural areas, males are the dominant partners in 
households because they are the pnmary income earners. In addition, tradition and 
cultural factors favour men against women. We guess that although the relative 
bargaining power between husband and wife will affect the resource allocation within the 
family, the prediction of the male is so strong that the location of husband's mother will 
have no significant effect on resource allocation between husband and wife. Men usually 
hold enough bargaining power over resources within the family that they may not need 
help from their parents. In contrast, women are usually weak negotiators in the bargaining 
process and may need help from outside the family. Therefore, the status of wife's 
mother may significantly affect resource distribution between husband and wife. In this 
chapter, we refer to the mothers-in-law as the wife's parents. 
This chapter is organised as follows: section 4.2 discusses the background; section 4.3 
presents the theoretical model; section 4.4 presents the econometric specification; data 
and empirical results are discussed in section 4.5; section 4.6 examines the robustness of 
our results; section 4.7 is the conclusion. 
109 
4.2 Background 
This chapter will study the relative nutrient status of husband and wife. Three measures 
of nutrient status are considered: calorie intake, protein intake and body mass index 
(Quetelet index). The body mass index is now recognised as a reliable measure of the 
nutritional status of adults (Deaton 1997; Dercon and Krishnan 2000). It is defined as 
weight in kilograms divided by squared height in meters. The body mass index can be 
used to measure chronic energy deficiency in adults. Some findings suggest that low 
values of body mass index (below 18) are associated with higher adult mortality (Waaler 
1984 ). In addition, the body mass index is also recognised as a measure of the amount of 
energy stored in the body. 
We use data from the Chinese Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS). There are about 
1,274 couples from rural China in the survey who provided socio-economic information 
of interest. This chapter focuses on these 1,274 couples. 
Table 1 presents the mean levels of body mass index, calorie intake and protein intake in 
rural China. The mean of the body mass index is just below 22 for both males and 
females, which is the same as the usual national average in poor countries (i.e. between 
21 and 23). Vosti and Witcover (see Dercon and Krishnan 2000) repo1i means of body 
mass index for a particular area in south central Ethiopia that are 18 .4 for males and 19 .1 
for females. Gillespie and McNeill (1992) report a mean for a village in south India of 
19.1, for both men and women. In the United Kingdom, the mean value is 24 and, in the 
United States, the mean value is approximately 25. 
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Table 4.1: Nutrient Status between Husband and Wife 
Ratio of husband Husband Wife 
to wife 
Calorie intake 1.06 2775.8 2616.0 
(1068) (718) 
Protein intake 1.06 80.4 75.5 
(34.5) (25 .3) 
BMI 0.99 21.8 21.9 
(2.8) (3.0) 
Note: the standard eITors shown in parenthesises. 
In our data, the ratios of calorie intake and protein intake between husband and wife are 
both 1.06. In determining if this ratio only reflects the difference of biological need 
between a husband and wife, we ask if factors affecting the bargaining power of husband 
and wife (such as if the mother-in-law lived nearby), have any influence on theses ratios. 
4.3 The Models 
4.3.1 Common preference model 
Chapter 3 emphasises the links between health status and labour market productivity. In 
this chapter, we try to test the common preference model against the bargaining model. 
We discuss again the common preference model as follows. The household is assumed to 
maximise a social welfare function: 
U = U ( u1 ( X , N ( X), Z 1 ) , u 2 ( X , N ( X), Z 2 ) .. . u H ( X , N ( X), Z H ) . (4-1) 
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subject to: 
(4-2) 
The family's social welfare depends on individual utility. X is a vector of commodities 
such as food, N represents nutritional status such as the body mass index, calorie intake 
or protein intake. The household consists of H members. Z1z is a vector of individual 
characteristics such as age, education and so fo1ih that are thought to affect preferences . 
p is the price vector, w1z is the wage rate for household member h, W1i is unearned income. 
The household demand function depends on all prices, wage rates and unearned income. 
The demand for commodity X and nutrition N are as follows: 
(4-3) 
demand depends on individual characteristics, price and total income. The household acts 
as if it pools all unearned income. 
To make the analysis a little clearer, we write the family welfare function as follows: 
H 
u = Lehuj (X,N(X),Z) (4-4) 
h=l 
and assume the price of N is PN15 . Consider the optimal allocation of N between two 
individuals i and j of the same household. If we maximise (4) subject to the constraint, 
we derive the first order condition as: 
15 If the N is body mass index it must be durable. PN represents user cost (Deaton and 
Muellbauer 1980). 
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au . I aN. l l 0 . PN J I 
au . I aN . J J (4-5) 
To illustrate this condition, let us assume that the utility function is the form: 
N r-p /(l - p) , 16 and the price of N is equal between i and j, ( 4-5) can be written as: 
N . 1 0 . log(-1 ) = - · log(-1 ) 
N . p 0 . J J (4-6) 
The log ratio of nutrient status between husband and wife is set equal to the proportion of 
the log ratio of the weighting that is given to each individual in the household by the 
family planner. According to Samuelson (1956), this weighting should not depend on 
environmental variables such as price, income and other social characteristics (eg. the 
location of the wife's mother). 
The common preference model shows that the demand ratio between household members 
should not be affected by the location of the mother-in-law, as long as her location does 
not affect the preferences of households. Furthermore, if we assume that the location of 
the wife's mother does not affect the total income of the household, the level of demand 
will be unrelated to the location of the mother-in-law. The latter assumption seems a little 
16 l Jti lity n1ay also depend on individual characteristics such as age, gender and physical 
characteristics. For simplicity, we omit them in our uti lity function since we want to emphasise 
that the allocation rule is closely related to weighting index that is associated vvith each family 
n1ember in household util ity. In the regressions below, we control for these individual 
characteristics . For example, the height and weight has been controlled for when we esti1nate 
calori e consmnption. 
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strict because a woman's mother is likely to give more support to her daughter's home, 
for instance, give more gifts or share some home work, and this would change the total 
amount of resources available for the household. In this case, both the husband's and 
wife's demand level will increase (or decrease) when the mother-in-law lives nearby 
(further away) because the total resources may increase ( or decrease). When resource 
allocation between husband and wife is determined by a bargaining procedure, the 
supplementation from wife's parents may increase wife's nutrient intake relatively more 
compared with the husband. If the common preference model con·ectly described the 
resource allocation within the family, we should observe that the demand ratio between 
husband and wife should not be related to the location of the mother-in-law. 
However, if we consider the effect of the location of mothers-in-law in an alterative 
framework such as the bargaining model, we will have a very different prediction. 
4.3.2 Bargaining model 
Bargaining models treat the household as a group of individuals who bargain with each 
other over resources. Manser and Brown (1980) discuss both Nash and Kalay-
Smorrodingsky' s definitions of a bargaining equilibrium; McElroy and Homey (McElroy 
and Homey 1981; McElroy 1990) focus on Nash equilibrium. Lundberg and Pollak (1993) 
consider separate sphere bargaining in that the threat point is not divorce but a non-
cooperative equilibrium within maniage. This non-cooperative equilibrium reflects 
traditional gender roles. For example, men carry the responsibility for earning income 
and women carry responsibility for activities within the household. 
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Consider a husband's and wife's bargain over the quantities of four variables, namely, the 
consumption levels of two private goods (NH and N w ) and two household public goods 
( X 1 and X 2 ). The income of the husband and wife are denoted as YH and Yw , The sum 
of the husband's and wife's incomes is greater than zero. The price of the private good is 
normalized to one, and the prices of the public good are Fi and P2 • 
The husband and wife will choose private and public goods to maximise the product of 
the differences between the utility level each achieves from the goods and the threat point 
of the reservation utility level. 
MAX (UH (NH , X l, X 2 ) - V H )(U W (NW , X l , X 2) - V W ) (4-7) 
Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horny (1981) assumed that while bargaining, 
each player has the option to divorce--which entails permanent disagreement. Thus the 
utility pair associated with divorce is the outside option point. In the above problem, if 
V H and V w are the outside option, they will depend on factors such as income and other 
environmental parameters (divorce laws, taxes, welfare payments and sex ratios) . 
Location of the wife's mother may affect the outside option. For example, a mother who 
Ii ved nearby can provide accommodation for a divorced daughter. It would be convenient 
for a wife to live in her parent's home before she begins the next marriage or a new life 
after she is divorced. Thus the location of the mother-in-law matters . 
However, in China, the very low divorce rate, particularly in rural areas (before the 
1990s), suggests that the alternative bargaining model , in which the threat point is 
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determined by the inside option may be a better description of the bargaining process 
within the household. If the wife temporarily disagrees over the allocation, the household 
continues to function and the couple lives together, but in the absence of co-operation. 
Based on established gender roles, to which the parties are committed, the husband 
controls and chooses private good NH and public good X 1 and the wife controls and 
chooses private good Nw and public good X 2 . The player's inside options are in line 
with the Nash equilibrium payoffs of the following simultaneous move game. The 
husband chooses NH and X 1 s.t. NH + p 1 X 1 = YH, and simultaneously, his wife chooses 
N w and X 2 s.t. N w + p 2 X 2 = Yw . The payoffs from these strategy choices, to the 
assume that the Nash equilibrium payoffs in this game are uniquely defined, and that they 
define the inside option point VH (Y H, Z) and Vw (Yw, Z), where Z is a vector of factors 
that affect the husband's or the wife's utility level in the non-cooperative game (eg. the 
location of the mother-in-law). 
The demand for private goods is 
Ni= f (p,YH ,Yw ,Z) wherei = H, W (4-8) 
and the ratio of demand between husband and wife is: 
(4-9) 
There are three channels through which the location of the mother-in-law might affect the 
demands of husbands and wives for private goods and the demand ratio between them: 
the wealth effect, the insurance effect and the intimidation effect (nagging or complaint). 
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Firstly, by increasing the income of the wife, the mother-in-law raises the wife's 
bargaining power. This increases the wife's inside option which is a function of Yw. 
While the husband's inside option does not change, the wife's demand increases relative 
to the husband's. 
When the mother-in-law's home is nearby, the wife can gain benefit from her mother's 
home in several ways. The mother-in-law can help to look after the children, at least 
when necessary. In rural areas, the labour of the mother-in-law's home can be utilised 
during peak seasons (harvest or planting times). The wife can also return to her mother's 
home for short periods of time. All of these activities will increase the wife's resource 
availability or reduce her living expenses. 
Secondly, the potential benefit that the wife can gain from a mother who lives nearby is 
"ready help". People in developing countries, such as China, face many risks including 
volatile income and expenditure shocks. If the wife's mother lives close, they can easily 
co-insure each other. The "ready help" effect demonstrates that the wife's bargaining 
position will be enhanced when her mother lives nearby. 
Thirdly, there is an intimidation effect. When the mother-in-law lives nearby, she can 
easily observe the bargaining outcomes between husband and wife. If the wife's share is 
too low, the mother may start to complain to help her daughter get more. In extreme cases, 
the wife's brothers (they would also usually live nearby) might intimidate the husband 
into treating his wife equally. 
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When the mother-in-law lives nearby, these three influences will increase the wife's 
share of consumption relative to her husband. Furthermore, while the wife's consumption 
level might increase when the mother-in-law lives nearby, the husband's consumption 
level may decrease or keep constant. We will test this hypothesises in the next section 17 . 
4.4 Econometric Specification 
Our empirical section focuses on the relationship between measures of the health status 
of the husband relative to that of his wife and the location of his mother-in-law. The 
measures we use are protein intake, the calorie intake ratio and the BMI ratio. A small 
number of studies have used individual nutrient intake data to study intra-household 
inequality in nutrient intake (Behrman 1988; Behrman and Deolalikar 1989; Pitt, 
Rosenzweig et al. 1990; Thomas 1990). 
Recall equation (3-5), we rewrite it as: 
au .!aN. 
I I 
au . I aN . J J 
from this first order condition, we derived equation ( 4-6) under the restriction that prices 
facing household members are equal. This is reasonable for calorie and protein intake 
because the household usually prepares food together unless the husband and wife eat 
different food. 
17 The location of mothers-in-law could be endogenous because the parents can choose where 
their daughter marries when making the marriage decision. We need an explicit model to 
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The user cost (for BMI) between members is assumed to be the same18 . User cost is 
primarily determined by the marginal return from increasing nutrition and this may be 
very similar at not so low levels of nutrition. In fact, the average BMI is about 22 in 
China, while the average of this index for poor countries is between 21-23. It is safe to 
assume that user cost is the same between members because we also examine the demand 
for calorie intake and protein intake, the price of which is the same between members . If 
we can obtain similar results for both BMI and nutrient intake, neglecting the difference 
in user cost between members may not result in a serious problem. In addition, even 
though there exists a difference in user cost, it can be controlled for in our regression, to 
some extent, by variables such as education and activity level. 
We will estimate the following specification: 
(4-10) 
where the dependent variables are the calorie intake ratio, the protein intake ratio or the 
body mass index ratio of the husband relative to that of his wife, x1 is the dummy 
variable for the husband who lives in his mother-in-law's home or as a neighbour, x 2 is 
the dummy variable for when the mother-in-law lives in the same village (but not as a 
describe the decision of the location of the wife's parents. Here, for simplicity, we assume that 
the location of mothers-in-law is exogenous. 
Ls This is the assumption to derive 3-5. In fact, in the regression of BMI ratio between husband 
and wife, education and activity level have been controlled. These variables may control 
different user costs facing husband and wife. 
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neighbour), x 3 is the dummy variable for when the mother-in-law lives in a different 
village but in the same county, x4 is the dummy for when the mother-in-law lives outside 
the same county. The excluded variable is x3. The control variables include: dummy 
variables for the activity level of both husband and wife, dummy variables for the level of 
education of both the husband and wife, regional dummy variables, and the age of 
husband and wife. For the regression of calorie intake and protein intake, we also control 
for the relative heights of husband and wife. 
From the analysis in section 3, the income effect, the "ready help effect" and the 
intimidation effect imply that coefficients of x1 , x2 and X3 are negative. Activity levels 
directly affect the body mass index and how much nutrition (calories and protein) is 
required to sustain activity. To control for this biological need effect, we use 5 dummy 
variables to represent the activity levels: very light physical activity (working in sitting 
position e.g office worker, watch repairer); light physical activity (working in standing 
position such as sales person, teacher); moderate physical activity (student, driver, 
electrician, metal worker); heavy physical activity (farmer, dancer, steel worker, athlete); 
very heavy physical activity (loader, logger, miner, stonecutter). We did not use 
occupational dummies because of the high correlation with activity levels. For the 
regression of calorie and protein intake, we also control for the height of both husband 
and wife. It is reasonable to assume that the taller person will demand more nutrients. 
Weight also affects nutrient intake. However, weight is different from height since height 
can be thought of as constant for adults. Height is exogenous in our regression, but 
weight is different. On one hand, the greater the weight, the greater the demand for 
nutrients. On the other hand, the greater the intake of nut1ients, the greater the weight. 
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We ran regressions with and without controlling for weight. We found that whether we 
treated weight as exogenous or endogenous had no significant influence on the 
coefficients of the dummies for location of mothers-in-law. 
The nutrient ratio between husband and wife also depends on education level. Firstly, 
education level is related to bargaining power. The higher the education level of the wife, 
the more likely it is that the wife will be treated equally. Secondly, education level can 
also represent differences in preferences. 
Regional dummy variables included in the regression are used to control for differences 
in preferences and for some unobserved environmental factors. Our data came from eight 
provinces which range from north to south, and from the plains to the mountain areas. 
Consider two couples, one lives in no1ih China where it is very cold, the other lives in the 
warm south. We assume that the wives usually stay inside the house to do homework but 
the husband must work outside. Under different climactic conditions, the ratio of nutrient 
intake between husband and wife may be higher in the north than in the south. 
Age variables are used to control for the length of marriage history. It maybe that the 
older the wife, the more likely she will be treated equally. 
Recall that the analysis in section 4.3 predicts that the nutrient demand for husband and 
wife will change in the same direction with the location of the mother-in-law if the 
common preference model is correct. If the mother-in-law lives nearby, the household 
can receive more benefit from the financial and physical support given by the mother-in-
law than if she lives outside the same county. Hence, if the household budget has been 
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increased, both the husband's and his wife's demands will increase because the altruism 
model implies income pooling. However, the bargaining model predicts that the demands 
of the husband and wife may change in different directions with the location of the 
mother-in-law. 
Accordingly, we also estimate the demand for nutrients of the husband and wife 
separately. The specification is as follows 
log( N) =a+ /31x1 + /32 x 2 + /3 3 x 4 + y control variables i = H, W 
( 4-11) 
The control variables include individual height, weight, activity, education, regional 
dummy variable and age. The common preference (altruism) model predicts that the 
coefficient of the dummy variable for the location of the mother-in-law should have the 
same sign and the same size for the husband and wife. The bargaining model predicts that 
these coefficients should have the opposite sign. 
The location of the mother-:in-law may be endogenous. For instance, the woman with 
higher bargaining ability is more likely to marry fu1iher away because she believes that 
ready help from her mother is not necessary. This means that the dummy for the mother-
in-law who lives in a different county may be negatively related with the error item, 
hence our coefficient would be underestimated. 
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We have tried to instrument the location of the mother-in-law 19 . The excluded 
instrumental variable is the dummy variable for village. Firstly, the village dummy has 
some relation with the marriage decision. For instance, women in a village consisting of 
the same surname households find it difficult to marry within the village because the 
culture discriminates against couples with the same surname. Secondly, the village 
' 
dummy may have no correlation with the degree of discrimination. Therefore, the village 
dummy could be a good instrumental variable to exclude. 
4.5 Data and Results 
The data used in this study is from the 1991 China Nutrient and Health Survey (CHNS). 
Table 4.2 presents the description of the data and the definitions of the variables used. 
The dependent variables in our regressions include the ratios of BMI, calorie and protein 
intake between husband and wife. To estimate the impact of the location of mother-in-
law unbiasedly, we need to solve the problem of heterogeneity. What we can do in this 
chapter is to control for as many variables as possible. We try to control for the husband's 
and wife's physical activity levels, years of schooling, years of schooling squared, age, 
age squared and region dummy variables. These controlling variables may reflect the 
19 The results using instrumental variables are not reported because the results are similar. 
Estimation using instrumental variables increases the estimated coefficient from 5% to 9-10%, 
but estimate is not statistically significant. 
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heterogeneity of individual preferences and the needs effect. As more variables are 
controlled for, the possibility of omitting variable bias decreases. 
Table 4.3 reports two versions of the regressions of the body mass index ratios between 
husband and wife against location of the mother-in-law. The results suggest that the 
location of the mother-in-law affects the BMI ratio. Regression 1 includes one dummy 
variable for households where the mother-in-law lives outside the same county. This 
coefficient implies that the BMI ratio, in households where the mother-in-law lives 
outside the same county is, on average, 9.5% lower than the ratio of households where 
the mother-in-law lives within the same county. 
We also present regression 2 which includes three dummy variables for the location of 
the mother-in-law: (1) living together or as a neighbour; (2) living in the same village but 
is not a neighbour; (3) living in a different village in the same county. We have omitted 
the group of households where the mother-in-law lives outside the same county. The 
coefficients of the three dummies are significant and have negative signs, as predicted by 
the bargaining theory. The coefficients show that the BMI ratio in these three groups of 
households are, on average, 8-10% below that of households where the mother-in-law 
lives outside the same county. · 
Although we have controlled for variables as much as we can, the regression results 
suggest that only a small part of the variation of BMI ratios between husband and wife 
have been explained. There are two possible reasons for the low value of R s_quared 
(about 5%) in our results. One is a measurement error problem. That is, much of the 
variations of the BMI ratios reflects measurement errors rather than true resource 
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distribution between husband and wife. The other is that we failed to include key 
variables that affect the resource distribution between husband and wife. Without further 
information, we may not be able to solve these two problems. 
To ensure that the potential bias from the different user cost of family members will not 
affect our estimate of the effect of the location of mother-in-law, we also estimate the 
ratios of calorie and protein intake that are believed to have the same prices between 
family members20 . The results are reported in Table 4.4. We have omitted the group of 
households where the wife's parents live outside the same county. The coefficients of the 
dummy variable where the mother-in-law lives as a neighbour, are significant at 10% 
level and have a negative sign in both regressions of calorie and protein intake. The ratio 
of calo1ie and protein intake of the husband relative to the wife, for the household where 
the mother-in-law lives as a neighbour are, on average, 4.7% and 5% below a comparable 
household's ratio. 
It is worthy of noting that in both the regression of calorie and protein intake, the age of 
the wife has an effect on the nutrient ratio for the couple. If the wife is older, the ratios of 
nutrient intakes are higher. Perhaps the power of older generation women is lower 
because of culture or tradition. 
Again, we have only explained a small part of the variation in the ratio of nutrient intakes . 
The R squared is 10% now, a little higher than that in the regression of the ratio of BMI. 
20 Actually , if there are links between individual health status and labour market productivity, the 
shadow prices facing individual family members may still differs. 
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Because we have used the log ratio of nutrient intake between husband and wife as 
independent variables in Table 4.3 and 4.4, family fixed effect has already been 
controlled for. To understand how fixed family effect d1ive our results we report the 
estimation of the wife's and husband's demand for calorie and protein in Table 4.5 and 
4.6. 
In these regressions, the group of households where the mother-in-law lives in a different 
village but in the same county is omitted. The demand for calories and protein by wives 
whose mothers live outside the same county is 3.7% and 5.5% lower than the omitted 
group. The coefficients attached to the other dummy variables related to the location of 
the mother-in-law are not significant. It is worth noting that the coefficient for the wives 
whose mothers lived together or as neighbour has a wrong sign. We guess this may come 
from the failure to control for the family fixed effect. 
In the regression of the husband's demand for nutrients, the result is quite the opposite. 
The dummy where the mother-in-law and family share the same house or where they live 
as neighbours is significantly negative and this has a sizeable effect on the husband's 
demands. Where the mother-in-law lives outside the same county, the demands of the 
wife are significantly affected but the same situation has little effect on the husband's 
demands. 
The location of the mother-in-law affects the demands of husbands and wives differently. 
However the signs of the dummies of the location of the mother-in-law demonstrate that 
a complicated decision process lies behind these regressions. 
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4.6 The Robustness 
4.6.1 Home location of the husband's mother 
The location of the wife's mother matters in the context of the allocation of household 
resources , but how does the location of the husband's mother affect this arrangement? In 
Chinese society, particularly in rural areas, males are the dominant partners in households 
because they are the primary income earners. In addition, tradition and cultural factors 
favour men against women. We predict that the husband's mother has no effect on 
resource allocation between husband and wife. This conjecture is examined and results 
are reported in Tables 4.7 and 4.8. The location of the husband's mother has no effect on 
the ratios of BMI, calorie and protein intake between husband and wife. 
4.6.2 Distance 
In our discussion, the distance that the wife's mother Ii ves from her daughter's household 
affects the mother' s influence over her daughter's situation. We assume therefore that the 
income effect, "ready help" effect and intimidation effect deteriorate with increased 
distance. In the above regressions , the way of constructing dummies for the location of 
the mother-in-law may not correctly reflect the true distance. For example, if two 
households from different counties live on the border of two adjoining counties , the 
construct of the location dummies may be misleading. 
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Dummy variables are reconstructed by using the physical distance of the mother-in-law's 
home from the household's home. Households were then divided into three groups. The 
first group represented households where mothers-in-law lived within 0.5 kilometres 
(xxl), the second group represented mothers-in-law located between 0.5 to 20 kilometres 
from their daughters' homes (xx2), the third group for those Ii ving more than 20 
kilometres away (xx3). 
The results are reported in Table 4.9 and 4.10. The effect of the location of the mother-in-
law measured by distance (kilometres) has no significant effect on the BMI ratio. 
However, the location of the mother-in-law has a significant effect on ratios of calorie 
and protein intakes. Roughly speaking, for the wives whose mothers lived over 20 
kilometres away (xx3), the ratio of calorie and protein intake between husband and wife 
averagely are 3% and 3.3% greater than for those wives whose mothers lived less than 20 
kilometres away. 
In the second instance, dummy variables are constructed using time spent on the trip to 
the mother-in-law's home. The results are reported in Table 4.11 and 4.12. Households 
were again divided into three groups. The first group represented households where 
mothers-in-law's lived together or as a neighbours (ttl), the second group represented 
mothers-in-law who were located between 0 to 150 minute trip from their daughters' 
homes (tt2), the third group was for those living more than 150 minutes trip away (tt3). 
The results indicate that the location of the mother-in-law (ttl and tt3) significantly 
affects the distribution of consumption between husband and wife. 
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In conclusion, the results suggest that the wife's welfare is significantly affected by these 
two measures, i.e. distance and trip time to the location of the mother-in-law. This may 
suggest that the location of mother-in-law really matters in the allocation of resources 
between husband and wife within the family. 
4. 7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we tested the effect of the location of mothers-in-law relative to resource 
allocation within the family. We find that the ratios of the Body Mass Index, calorie and 
protein intakes between husband and wife are affected by the location of the wife's 
mother. This implies that the bargaining model which capture the bargaining power of 
each family member, might be a more realistic model than the common preference model 
to describe resource allocation within the family. 
The implications of the findings in this chapter are important for policy analysts. For 
example, studies on inequality that fail to notice the potential for inequality within the 
family might be very misleading. If the bargaining power of family members directly 
determines their share of consumption in the family, policy makers may be able to protect 
vulnerable people such as poorly educated women and their children for a very low cost. 
For example, if governments change the target of some support programs from the 
husband of the household to the wife, this would alter the distribution patterns of 
consumption within the family. This change would favour women without increasing 
government expenditure. If the government in China can do this, the benefits from 
improving the status of women may well be large. For instance, mothers would increase 
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their bargaining power and this 1s known to be associated with better education for 
children. 
One residual problem in our empirical test in this chapter is that we did not model the 
marriage decision and could not use this information to solve the self-selection problem 
as it relates to where the couple lives in relation to the wife's parents. For example, if the 
well educated woman (hence, more bargaining power) intends to marry a man from a 
long distance, our result will understate the effect of mothers-in-law. In the context of 
Chinese rural areas, a man may intend to marry a woman who is from a remote poor area 
(hence, less bargaining power). This will make us overstate the effect of mothers-in-law. 
Lacking information about the marriage decision, we could not judge the direction of bias. 
So we need to be a little cautious in interpreting our results. 
130 
Table 4.2: Description of the Main Variables 
Variable Definition Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
hcal91 Husband calorie intake in 1991 1274 2775.8 1068.2 
hpro91 Husband protein intake in 1991 1274 80.4 34.5 
wcal91 Wife calorie intake in 1991 1274 2616.0 718.7 
wpro91 Wife protein intake in 1991 1274 75 .5 25.31 
hweight Husband weight 1104 60.9 12.22 
hheight Husband height 1104 165.8 9.41 
wweight Wife weight 1203 53.4 8.31 
wheight Wife height 1203 155.9 7.10 
hbody Husband BMI 1099 21.8 2.81 
wbody Wife BMI 1053 21.9 3.02 
hage Husband age 1274 35.0 7.1 
hages Husband's wage squared 1274 1360.0 554.02 
wage Wife age 1274 34.4 7.00 
wages Wife's age squared 1274 1237.0 584.01 
size Household size in 1991 1274 4.51 1.58 
Husband activity dummy variables 
hal Very light physical activity 1274 0.10 0.30 
ha2 Light physical activity 1274 0.09 0.29 
ha3 Heavy physical activity 1274 0.57 0.50 
ha4 Very heavy physical activity 1274 0.02 0.14 
Wife activity dummy variables 
wal Very light physical activity 1274 0.07 0.26 
wa2 Light physical activity 1274 0.16 0.36 
wa3 Heavy physical activity 1274 0.63 0.48 
wa4 Very heavy physical activity 1274 0.01 0.08 
hsch Husband's years of schooling 1274 7.98 3.31 
wsch Wife's years of schooling 1274 6.09 4.02 
Du1n1ny variables for the location of 
husband's 1nother-in-law 
xl in the same family or as neighbour 1274 0.07 0.26 
x2 in the same village 1274 0.18 0.38 
x3 in the same county 1274 0.62 0.48 
x4 in the different county 1274 0.13 0.34 
Dummy variables of location 
husband's parents 
yl in the same family or as neighbour 1274 0.40 0.49 
y2 in the same village 1274 0.16 0.36 
y3 in the same county 1274 0.09 0.29 
y4 in the different county 1274 0.04 0.19 
Dummy variables for distance to 
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husband's mother-in-law (Kilometre) 
xxl =0 1274 0.09 0.28 
xx2 >0 and <20 1274 0.71 0.47 
xx3 >=20 1274 0.20 0.40 
Du1n1ny variables for trip time 
to husband's mother-in-law 
ttl =0 1274 0.08 0.28 
tt2 >0 and <150 1274 0.83 0.38 
tt3 >= 150 minutes 1274 0.09 0.29 
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Table 4.3: Regression of the Ratio of Body Mass Index between Husband and Wife 
against Location of Mother-in-Law 
lhwq Coef. t Coef. t 
xl -0.085 -2.05 
x2 -0.078 -2.27 
x3 -0.101 -3.48 
x4 0.095 3.35 
wal 0.043 0.84 0.044 0.86 
wa2 -0.010 -0.26 -0.012 -0.33 
wa3 0.058 1.83 0.055 1.75 
wa4 0.068 0.64 0.060 0.57 
hal 0.004 0.09 0.006 0.15 
ha2 0.002 0.05 0.004 0.11 
ha3 -0.045 -1.60 -0.043 -1.53 
ha4 0.088 1.42 0.089 1.44 
hsch 0.006 0.63 0.006 0.63 
hschs 0.000 -0.50 0.000 -0.51 
wsch -0.004 -0.60 -0.005 -0.65 
wschs 0.001 1.20 0.001 1.24 
hage 0.012 1.00 0.011 0.94 
hages 0.000 -1.32 0.000 -1.27 
wage -0.011 -1.67 -0.011 -1.61 
wages 0.000 2.64 0.000 2.59 
rl -0.031 -0.93 -0.026 -0.78 
r2 -0.019 -0.57 -0.015 -0.44 
r3 -0.040 -1.09 -0.034 -0.93 
r4 -0.036 -1.09 -0.033 -1.01 
r5 -0.022 -0.69 -0.017 -0.52 
r6 -0.023 -0.63 -0.020 -0.53 
r7 0.023 0.58 0.027 0.66 
cons -0.018 -0.10 0.081 0.42 
N 948 948 
R sq 0.05 0.051 
Note: rl-r7 are dummy variables for provinces. 
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Table 4.4: Regression of Ratio of Calorie and Protein Intake between Husband and 
Wife 
Ratio of calorie Ratio of protein 
intake intake 
lhwcal Coef. t Coef. t 
xl -0.047 -1.65 -0.050 -1.60 
x2 -0.017 -0.74 -0.026 -1.01 
x3 -0.020 -1.03 -0.027 -1.26 
wal 0.017 0.49 -0.034 -0.89 
wa2 0.028 1.11 0.025 0.93 
wa3 -0.026 -1.20 -0.002 -0.07 
wa4 -0.138 -1.96 -0.139 -1.79 
hal -0.022 -0.77 0.036 1.14 
ha2 -0.076 -2.82 -0.091 -3.08 
ha3 -0.004 -0.18 -0.028 -1.30 
ha4 0.035 0.86 0.012 0.26 
hsch -0.003 -0.40 -0.006 -0.79 
hschs 0.000 0.01 0.000 0.53 
wsch 0.000 -0.06 -0.002 -0.29 
wschs 0.000 0.61 0.000 0.73 
hage -0.002 -0.27 -0.003 -0.29 
hages 0.000 0.20 0.000 0.20 
wage 0.014 3.09 0.015 3.07 
wages 0.000 -4.16 0.000 -4.13 
lhwh 0.152 2.12 0.118 1.51 
lhweight 0.162 4.10 0.168 3.89 
lwweight -0.159 -3.72 -0.122 -2.61 
cons -0.075 -0.32 -0.244 -0.95 
-
N 909 909 
R sq 0.1 0.09 
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Table 4.5: Regression of Wife's Demand for Calories and Protein 
Calorie intake Protein intake 
lwcal91 Coef. t Coef. t 
xl -0.026 -1.01 -0.050 -1.52 
x2 0.007 0.39 -0.009 -0.38 
x4 -0.037 -1.62 -0.055 -1.90 
wal -0.032 -0.85 -0.016 -0.34 
wa2 -0.018 -0.66 -0.025 -0.73 
wa3 0.045 2.05 -0.024 -0.85 
wa4 0.087 1.00 0.072 0.65 
wsch -0.003 -0.51 0.000 0.01 
wschs 0.000 -0.84 0.000 -0.79 
wage -0.006 -1.80 -0.002 -0.40 
wages 0.000 1.50 0.000 0.11 
lwheight 0.620 3.13 0.884 3.50 
rl 0.025 0.97 0.127 3.84 
r2 -0.016 -0.62 0.109 3.32 
r3 0.104 3.75 0.179 5.08 
r4 0.090 3.46 0.136 4.11 
r5 0.003 0.13 0.088 2.64 
r6 -0.068 -2.33 0.009 0.24 
r7 0.046 1.35 0.065 1.51 
cons 4.873 4.71 -0.137 -0.10 
-
N 1076 1076 
R sq 0.114 0.073 
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Table 4.6: Regression of Husband's Demand for Calories and Protein 
Calorie intake Protein intake 
lhcal91 Coef. t Coef. t 
xl -0.054 -1.94 -0.066 -1.86 
x2 0.002 0.12 -0.016 -0.63 
x4 -0.018 -0.77 -0.006 -0.21 
hal -0.076 -2.33 -0.092 -2.23 
ha2 -0.076 -2.53 -0.055 -1.45 
ha3 0.031 1.56 -0.017 -0.67 
ha4 0.113 2.29 0.099 1.58 
hsch 0.002 0.27 -0.008 -0.87 
hschs 0.000 -0.23 0.001 1.39 
hage -0.001 -0.18 -0.001 -0.13 
hages 0.000 -0.09 0.000 -0.01 
lhheight 0.070 0.76 0.189 1.63 
rl 0.024 0.91 0.114 3.39 
r2 -0.016 -0.59 0.102 3.02 
r3 0.154 5.23 0.246 6.55 
r4 0.082 3.15 0.133 4.03 
r5 0.001 0.05 0.049 1.46 
r6 -0.089 -3.05 -0.037 -0.99 
r7 0.057 1.71 0.045 1.07 
cons 7.666 
-
15.64 3.462 5.55 
N 954 954 
R sq 0.129 0.096 
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Table 4.7: Regression of BMI Ratio with Location of Husband's Parents 
lhwq Coef. t 
x4 0.100 3.49 
yl 0.002 0.11 
y2 0.021 0.80 
y3 -0.002 -0.04 
wal 0.051 0.99 
wa2 -0.014 -0.38 
wa3 0.045 1.41 
wa4 0.051 0.48 
hal 0.004 0.11 
ha2 -0.001 -0.02 
ha3 -0.050 -1.80 
ha4 0.086 1.38 
hedu l -0.013 -0.44 
hedu2 0.012 0.51 
hedu3 -0.008 -0.26 
hedu4 0.044 0.77 
wedul 0.027 1.09 
wedu2 0.016 0.64 
wedu3 0.052 1.49 
wedu4 -0.027 -0.39 
rl -0.033 -0.98 
r2 -0.029 -0.86 
r3 -0.050 -1 .34 
r4 -0.044 -1.33 
r5 -0.016 -0.48 
r6 -0.017 -0.45 
r7 0.019 0.47 
hage -0.008 -0.88 
hages 0.000 0.20 
wage 0.005 1.65 
-
cons 0.104 0.56 
N 948 
R sq 0.04 
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Table 4.8: Regression of Calorie and Protein Ratio with Dummy of Husband's 
Parents 
Ratio of calorie Ratio of protein 
lhwcal Coef. t Coef. t 
xl -0.046 -1.63 -0.049 -1.57 
x2 -0.014 -0.62 -0.021 -0.84 
x3 -0.018 -0.92 -0.023 -1.08 
yl -0.002 -0.15 -0.012 -0.77 
y2 -0.017 -0.95 -0.026 -1.35 
y3 -0.033 -1.35 -0.060 -2.21 
wal 0.018 0.51 -0.033 -0.86 
wa2 0.029 1.16 0.027 0.98 
wa3 -0.028 -1.29 -0.004 -0.18 
wa4 -0.140 -1.99 -0.145 -1.87 
hal -0.019 -0.67 0.040 1.27 
ha2 -0.076 -2.81 -0.090 -3.06 
ha3 -0.003 -0.15 -0.028 -1.30 
ha4 0.036 0.87 0.014 0.30 
hsch -0.003 -0.47 -0.006 -0.84 
hschs 0.000 0.06 0.000 0.58 
wsch 0.000 -0.06 -0.002 -0.34 
wschs 0.000 0.67 0.000 0.85 
hage -0.002 -0.22 -0.002 -0.21 
hages 0.000 0.11 0.000 0.07 
wage 0.014 3.10 0.015 3.07 
wages 0.000 -4.16 0.000 -4.11 
lhwh 0.152 2.12 0.121 1.53 
lhweight 0.163 4.12 0.171 3.95 
lwweight -0.161 -3.76 -0.126 -2.68 
cons -0.070 -0.30 -0.235 -0.91 
-
N 909 909 
R sq 0.104 0.113 
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Table 4.9: Regression of Ratio of BMI Using New Dummies 
lhwq Coef. t 
xxl -0.005 -0.17 
xx3 0.022 0.96 
wal 0.035 0.68 
wa2 -0.015 -0.41 
wa3 0.054 1.67 
wa4 0.073 0.68 
hal 0.005 0.13 
ha2 0.003 0.07 
ha3 -0.044 -1.56 
ha4 0.089 1.42 
hsch 0.006 0.58 
hschs 0.000 -0.50 
wsch -0.004 -0.59 
wschs 0.001 1.22 
hage 0.016 1.32 
hages 0.000 -1.62 
wage -0.012 -1.88 
wages 0.000 2.79 
rl -0.028 -0.85 
r2 -0.020 -0.60 
r3 -0.038 -1.04 
r4 -0.030 -0.90 
r5 -0.021 -0.64 
r6 -0.026 -0.69 
r7 0.026 0.63 
cons 
-
-0.051 -0.27 
N 948 
R sq 0.04 
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Table 4.10: Regression Using New Dummies for the Location of Mothers-in-Law 
Ratio of calorie intake Ratio of protein 
intake 
lhwcal Coef. t Coef. t 
xxl -0.027 -1.28 -0.027 -1.19 
xx3 0.030 1.94 0.033 1.99 
wal 0.017 0.51 -0.033 -0.88 
wa2 0.027 1.10 0.025 0.91 
wa3 -0.023 -1.07 0.001 0.04 
wa4 -0.127 -1.80 -0.127 -1.65 
hal -0.022 -0.78 0.036 1.14 
ha2 -0.073 -2.75 -0.088 -2.99 
ha3 -0.003 -0.15 -0.027 -1.26 
ha4 0.039 0.95 0.015 0.33 
hsch -0.003 -0.43 -0.006 -0.82 
hschs 0.000 0.05 0.000 0.56 
wsch 0.000 0.01 -0.001 -0.22 
wschs 0.000 0.51 0.000 0.63 
hage -0.001 -0.15 -0.001 -0.14 
hages 0.000 0.07 0.000 0.06 
wage 0.013 3.03 0.014 3.00 
wages 0.000 -4.10 0.000 -4.05 
lhwh 0.153 2.14 0.119 1.52 
lhweight 0.166 4.22 0.174 4.03 
lwweight -0.154 · -3 .61 -0.118 -2.51 
cons -0.148 -0.63 -0.331 -1.28 
-
N 909 909 
R sq 0.105 0.093 
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Table 4.11: Regression Using Time Spent on Travelling to Mother-in-Law's Home 
lhwq Coef. t 
ttl 0.004 0.12 
tt3 0.067 1.94 
wal 0.022 0.42 
wa2 -0.027 -0.74 
wa3 0.043 1.34 
wa4 0.060 0.55 
hal 0.017 0.40 
ha2 0.004 0.11 
ha3 -0.044 -1.55 
ha4 0.091 1.45 
hsch 0.004 0.42 
hschs 0.000 -0.34 
wsch -0.005 -0.67 
wschs 0.001 1.36 
rl -0.020 -0.59 
r2 -0.017 -0.50 
r3 -0.039 -1.06 
r4 -0.027 -0.81 
r5 -0.012 -0.35 
r6 -0.014 -0.39 
r7 0.029 0.70 
hage -0.006 -0.64 
hages 0.000 0.03 
wage 0.004 1.54 
cons 0.055 0.29 
-
N 948 
R sq 0.035 
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Table 4.12: Regression Using Time Spent on Travelling to Mothers-in-Law's Home 
Ratio of calorie Ratio of calorie 
intake intake 
lhwcal Coef. t Coef. t 
ttl -0.033 -1.60 -0.031 -1.34 
tt3 0.024 1.04 0.028 1.13 
wal 0.016 0.45 -0.035 -0.94 
wa2 0.027 1.09 0.024 0.89 
wa3 -0.026 -1.20 -0.003 -0.10 
wa4 -0.131 -1.87 -0.132 -1.72 
hal -0.022 -0.76 0.036 1.16 
ha2 -0.075 -2.80 -0.090 -3 .05 
ha3 -0.004 -0.19 -0.028 -1.30 
ha4 0.036 0.87 0.012 0.26 
hsch -0.003 -0.42 -0.006 -0.80 
hschs 0.000 0.03 0.000 0.54 
wsch 0.000 -0.05 -0.001 -0.29 
wschs 0.000 0.64 0.000 0.77 
hage -0.002 -0.24 -0.002 -0.24 
hages 0.000 0.18 0.000 0.18 
wage 0.013 3.05 0.015 3.02 
wages 0.000 -4.14 0.000 -4.10 
lhwh 0.152 2.12 0.118 1.50 
lhweight 0.163 4.15 0.171 3.95 
lwweight -0.161 -3.78 -0.125 -2.68 
cons -0.091 -0.39 -0.268 -1.04 
-
N 909 909 
R sq 0.1 0.09 
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Chapter S 
Risk and Consun1ption Insurance against Incon1e 
Change in China 
5.1 Introduction 
Consumption insurance has attracted considerable attention in the last ten years. The full 
consumption hypothesis is that consumption patterns of individual households should not 
respond to idiosyncratic income or wealth shocks. The underlying condition for full 
consumption insurance is that markets are complete, although competitive markets in 
explicit contingent claims . are not necessary to implement consumption-insured 
allocations because certain formal or informal institutions can also provide consumption 
insurance. The term "formal institution" refers to structures such as the credit market, 
unemployment, disability, and medical insurance, welfare and other government social 
programs. "Informal institutions" include gifts, loans from family networks , friends and 
neighbours, some altruistic inter-generation transfers and the underground credit market. 
A large number of empirical studies (Cochrane 1991; Alderman and Paxson 1994; 
Besley 1995; Deaton 1992; Morduch 1995 and Townsend 1994, 1995) have found that 
income risk is pervasive, but that consumers are able to protect consumption from risk, at 
least pa1iially, through both formal and informal institutional arrangements. 
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"Do formal insurance arrangements for consumption insurance work better than informal 
institutional arrangements?" Formal institutional arrangements (particularly those 
implemented by government) have some advantages. However, problems such as 
inefficiency of bureaucracy, or the weak fiscal position of government may lead to 
insufficiencies in the provision of government insurance. In contrast, informal 
institutional arrangements may be more efficient if they can survive in the market place. 
However, it is recognised that mo;:-al hazard and enforcement problems may weaken or 
destroy informal insurance arrangements. In this chapter, I consider the extent to which 
informal institutions in China help consumers to insure their consumption against risks. 
Can informal institutions work over a long physical spatial distance? Are informal 
institutions subject to serious information problems? 
These matters are of interest for several reasons. Firstly, in a developing economy, many 
workers are left exposed to risk, their incomes are volatile, and their earnings are very 
low. Consequently, the gap between "good times" and malnut1ition, disease and even 
starvation is slight. Consumers in these developing economies also lack access to formal 
insurance and credit markets. Given these factors, it is important to examine how and, to 
what extent, consumers can adjust their consumption when facing idiosyncratic shocks. 
Secondly, governments and non-government organisations have implemented various 
programs such as credit schemes and crop insurance schemes to help consumers shield 
consumption from income risks. If, however, info1mal insurance arrangements work well , 
are gove111mental programs necessary? Government programs might just crowd out the 
existing informal insurance arrangements. Chinese policy analysts and policy makers are 
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reluctant to extend the social security system (pensions and medical insurance) to cover 
the rural population, because they believe that family networks are effective in protecting 
consumption from risk in these areas. Is this true? 
Thirdly, in 1986, the Chinese government declared that 272 counties were nationally poor 
counties and targeted substantial aid programs to them. The argument for this strategy 
was that consumers are able to share risks within the county through informal 
an·angements, but informal arrangements cannot manage risk at the county level. The 
scope of insurance based on informal arrangements is a key input in this policy debate. 
Comparing the performance of formal and informal insurance arrangements is very 
difficult. Most research on consumption insurance has applied the general equilibrium 
framework, which has led researchers to focus on outcomes, namely, consumption and 
labour supply. As a result, all kinds of insurance institutions have been jointly evaluated. 
If we look at the risk sharing institutions, one at a time, the possibilities for adjustment in 
consumption, provided by the complete set of institutions may be missed. This is why the 
general equilibrium method dominates in the study of consumption insurance. However, 
within the framework of general equilibrium, how can we compare the performances of 
formal and informal arrangements? 
Fortunately, the special social-economic structure of the Chinese economy provides a 
natural laboratory for us to evaluate to some extent the relative performance of both 
fo1mal and info1mal insurance arrangements. 
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We can test full consumption insurance for rural and urban samples in China separately, 
because migration was severely restriction between rural and urban areas for a long 
period (Meng 1999). Before the 1980s, all the migration between rural and urban areas 
was completely controlled by the government and there were very few means (such as 
going into university), by which rural people could move to the cities. The amount of 
migration between rural and urban areas remained very small until the beginning of the 
1990s. 
The population in the rural and the urban areas in China have very different consumption 
insurance mechanisms. During the transition period (i.e. the change from a planned 
economy to a market economy), no formal financial market or social security system has 
been available to rural households. As a result, households in rural areas have had to rely 
on informal institutional arrangements such as charities, gifts and loans in family 
networks, or production diversification, to guard against risk. However, urban households 
still enjoy many government insurance programs, such as pension systems, medical 
insurance, collective medical insurance and unemployment insurance. 
The comparison of the extent of consumption insurance between rural and urban samples 
provides some evidence of the different effects of formal and informal insurance 
mechanisms. However, the quality of this study will depend on a number of conditions. 
Firstly, there must be neither migration nor risk sharing between the rural and urban 
groups. Secondly, the comparison requires that the urban population has exclusive access 
to the formal insurance mechanism only, and that the rural population can access only the 
informal insurance mechanisms. Although these restrictions must be strictly applied, we 
can still obtain some very useful information from comparisons between Chinese rural 
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and urban areas as long as the majority of governmental insurance programs cover only 
the urban population. 
We investigated the extent of consumption insurance in post-reform China between 
1989-1993 using a unique panel data set from the (CHNS) which contains excellent 
measures of income and consumption data. This data set also allows evaluation of the 
scope of informal insurance arrangements. Theoretically, information problems and 
enforcement problems affect the provision of insurance by informal institutional 
arrangements. It is believed that these problems become more serious with the increase of 
physical distance between individuals. In addition, higher transaction costs may prohibit 
the availability of market insurance between regions. However, information transfer 
problems can be solved for some small groups of people, for instance, at village level. 
Most Chinese villages were formed a long time ago and many families have remained in 
the same place for generations and villagers usually have the same ancestry. Many 
contemporary residents live, eat and work in the village. Villages have their own distinct 
lifestyle and informal legal systems that are replete with contract enforcement 
mechanisms. In addition, village residents have relatively good information about the 
ability, effort and reputation of village inhabitants. On this basis , we are able to study 
forms of consumption insurance within and across villages. This test has important 
implications for the theory of full insurance because it can tell us if insurance deteriorates 
with distance. The empirical evidence derived from within and between villages will lead 
us to understand how insurance is affected by information transfer problems such as 
moral hazard. 
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A direct policy implication of this chapter relates to the necessity of extending a 
government operated social security system to rural areas. With deep reforms 
characterised as "decentralisation and privatisation", recent reform proposals begin by 
emphasising the design of a more modem and financially viable social security system 
for people in urban areas. One of the most striking features of current policy discussion is 
the lack of attention paid to the majority of the population who live in rural areas. It is 
argued that family values remain strong in rural areas, and traditional morality helps to 
maintain the informal network through which rural people insure each other. Furthermore, 
some have argued that any form of public insurance will serve to undermine whatever 
informal arrangements currently exist. Unfortunately this debate is completely without an 
empirical foundation. This chapter offers some evidence by comparing the effects of 
insurance provided by both formal and informal institutions but cannot comment on the 
crowding out premise. Testing whether and, to what extent, household consumption 
responds to the risk of change in income, has important policy implications. If welfare 
lost due to the lack of full consumption insurance is very large, future reform should shift 
to the establishment of a formal social security system. 
Testing full consumption insurance also has methodological implications for 
macroeconomics and finance . Full insurance implies the existence of a representative 
consumer, that is, a social welfare function defined over aggregates that are independent 
of changes in the distribution of income or wealth over time. The failure of full 
consumption insurance suggests the rejection of a representative consumer model. 
Furthermore, the test of full insurance also sheds light on the research of savings 
behaviour, which has recently attracted attention of economists and policy makers in 
China. 
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In this chapter, I firstly test insuring consumption against income changes and compare 
the extent of insurance between different population groups. I then move to test insuring 
consumption against income change for sample villages. This might be the first paper to 
conduct these two tests by using one data set in one economy. The findings are as follows : 
--Full insurance hypothesis cannot be rejected in urban areas. 
--Full insurance is rejected for the rural sample. 
--Full insurance cannot be rejected within the village. 
--Full insurance is completely rejected across sample villages or neighbourhoods. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 is a short literature review; section 5.3 
discusses the institutional setting during the transition period in China and the relevant 
aspects of production, income and risk. Section 5 .4 describes the theoretical model. 
Section 5.5 discusses model specifications and econometric issues; section 5.6 then 
presents the description of the data and discusses the empirical results. The last section 
presents a short conclusion. 
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5.2 Literature Review 
People Ii ving in developing countries face substantial risks such as volatile incomes, 
sickness, crop disease and weather shocks. These factors are usually beyond the control 
of individual farmers and leave them exposed to risks. Reducing (i.e. smoothing) 
household consumption in response to these shocks has important welfare implications, 
particularly for people with low incomes. Finding ways to smooth out their consumption 
can mean the difference between life and death for many individuals. 
Households in developing countries usually lack access to formal insurance and credit 
markets. The question is: whether and to what extent can households in a low-income 
economy smooth their consumption in the face of major shocks, even without access to 
formal credit markets? Risk sharing and consumption smoothing has received a great 
deal of attention from development economists in the last ten years or so. 
The full risk sharing concept has been derived from work done by Debreu (1959) 
Diamond (1967) and Wilson (1968). Their theory posits that household consumption will 
not respond to idiosyncratic shocks. The basic idea is that if households are risk averse 
and if actuarially fair insurance is available, they will choose to buy insurance. In addition, 
if these risks are idiosyncratic, risk averse households ought to group together to share all 
risks. Idiosyncratic risks include the weather, shocks associated with the incidence of 
crop disease and human illness, shocks associated with changes in prices, outside the 
group or the local economy, and random factors which determine births, deaths, 
migration and division of extended families. If risks are fully pooled, then the growth in 
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household consumption should track the growth of group average consumption, and 
nothing else. In other words, the movement of average group consumption represents 
aggregate risk and all other shocks are pooled through risk sharing mechanisms. 
To test the extent of consumption insurance, we need evidence on whether the income or 
wealth risks that facing consumers is insurable within the group. If individual income co-
varies too much, in the extreme, common to the population, insurance within the group 
must be limited. Therefore, it is important to understand what income fluctuations occur 
in developing countries and whether they are idiosyncratic to the household. In the 
history of development economics, the literature usually assumes that risks are co-varied, 
i.e. all of the people are doing the same thing and face a common risk. Actually this 
assumption appears not to represent the facts. Townsend (1994) used ICRISAT 21 data to 
show that individual household incomes vary considerably over time from the village 
average. To understand the presumption of covariant risk, Townsend also calculates the 
variance-covariance matrices of net income from different sources. His findings are that 
income does not co-move across households in each of these villages because households 
earn their income from various ways and face different risks. Lim (1992) also analyses 
this data by applying a factor model to household incomes. He found that there are some 
unobserved factors that drive income across households. After accounting for these 
unobserved factors, Lim attributed 25% of the income variance to residual , household-
specific, idiosyncratic items. A similar story of the idiosyncratic variability of income 
21 The ICRISAT (International Crops Research Institute For the Semi-Arid Tropics) data comes 
from a special survey in which up to 40 households were sampled almost continuously, month to 
month, in each of three villages for 10 years. 
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emerges for households in villages in the Cote d'Ivoire (Deaton 1992). There is 
considerable diversity in growth rates across counties in a given region over a given pair 
of years. 
The literature mentioned above suggests that there is considerable scope for co-insurance 
within the group because many risks are idiosyncratic. However, is full consumption 
insurance available? To answer this question, researchers have compared the regression 
of individual household consumption growth against average group consumption growth, 
the growth of specific incomes of each household and shocks such as unemployment and 
sickness. If risk sharing is complete, the coefficient on group consumption change will be 
one, and the coefficient of household income and any other shocks will be zero. 
Townsend's paper (1994) is the best known of these studies, using ICRISAT data to set 
up a regression in which the dependent variable is the change in household consumption 
relative to the village average. He found a relatively low influence of current household 
income on cu1Tent household consumption. The marginal propensity for a household to 
consume out of idiosyncratic changes in income was no greater than 0.14 in any of three 
villages22 . Townsend also extended his model to explore the sensitivity of consumption 
to other shocks. Unexpectedly, he found that neither unemployment nor sickness was 
found to impact on household consumption. He also found that landless households are 
significantly less well insured than their village neighbours, who had land. In another 
paper, Townsend (1995) reported on a similar survey conducted in the context of the 
22 For the United States, Mace used data from PSID and found a positive and significant 
coefficient of 0.1 to 0.2. 
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whole of Thailand. The dependent variable was designated as the change in average 
county consumption (in log form); the independent variables were the change in average 
log county income and the change in regional average consumption. From his results, the 
full insurance hypothesis can be overwhelmingly rejected because consumption in a 
county does move with income in that county. The idiosyncratic county-specific income 
coefficient was quite high, from 0.33 to 0.37 across regions. Attanasio and Davis (1996) 
analysed how relative wage movements among birth cohorts and education groups affect 
the distribution of household consumption and economic welfare and they found a 
spectacular failure of between-group consumption insurance. In contrast, Paxson (1992) 
found that households are able to smooth consumption across weather variability through 
savings decisions. Paxson ran a regression of savings against the measure of weather and 
her work showed a coefficient of transitory income close to one (0.73 and 0.83). 
Although the results of the test for full consumption insurance are mixed, most tests 
indeed show the existence of more consumption insurance than might have been 
anticipated. These studies, however, do not identify how consumption is smoothed in 
reality. Lim and Townsend (1998) constructed measurements for changes in farm 
inventory, real asset, currency and financial assets from the ICRISAT transaction and 
production files. Their findings show that purchases and sales of real capital assets do not 
play an important role in smoothing income fluctuations. On the other hand, crop 
inventories play a relatively large role in the monthly and annual data. Relatively large 
landholders tend to use crop inventory while landless households use currency. 
Rosenzweig (Rosenzweig 1988, Rosenzweig and Stark 1989) found that households 
seem to deliberately marry-off daughters over a space-in-time to provide insurance. His 
paper sheds light on this informal risk sharing arrangement among family members. 
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These findings show that many kinds of informal insurance arrangements contribute to 
consumption insurance in developing countries. Besley (1995) provides an excellent 
survey of research on non-market institutions providing credit and risk sharing 
oppo1iunities in low-income countries. He found that informal institutional arrangements 
(which he calls non-market institutions) such as credit cooperation, informal credit, 
rotating savings and credit associations, help consumers protect themselves against risks. 
5.3 Institutional Background 
To discuss risk sharing in the Chinese economy, we need to document the institutional 
background of China. During the period 1989 to 1993, during which our sample was 
observed, China's economy was transforming from a planned economy to a market 
economy. Since 1949, China had pursued a Stalinist economy, whereby assets and 
property belonged to the people (i.e. to the government) and there existed no 
conventional labour market. Labour was thus not considered to be a commodity and 
wages were not perceived to be the price of labour. The government controlled the 
allocation of resources in the economy and risk sharing was arranged by government 
planners. The principle of income distribution was to share the yield from production as 
equally as possible among the population. There was no necessarily to share risk within 
the community for the residents. 
One of the most striking irregularities about the institutional background of consumption 
insurance in China, is the strict division between rural and urban areas. For instance, 
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almost all government insurance programs, such as unemployment insurance, pension 
systems, medical insurance, food support and so forth cover only the urban population 
and not the rural population. This kind of institutional background offers us a great 
opportunity to test the performance of formal (particular by government) and informal 
risk insurance arrangements. We can do this just by studying the extent of consumption 
risk insurance for rural and urban populations separately and comparing them. The 
underlying assumption is that rural consumers insure their consumption only through 
informal measures and urban consumers insure through formal arrangements. 
5.3.1 Risk sharing in rural areas 
To implement the Stalinist econormc model, the Chinese government conducted a 
strategy of mutually exclusive rural and urban economies and rural people were excluded 
from working and living in the cities. During the commune movement in the 1950s, rural 
people were organised as a single entity: the commune. On average, communes consisted 
of 5,000 households. An attempt was made to apply the communist principles of 
production and income distribution: " from each according to their ability, to each 
according to their needs". There existed no risk sharing problem between households 
within the same commune. At the same time, substantial risk sharing arrangements across 
communes were implemented by higher-level government agencies and these were 
controlled at county or provincial level. Early in the 1960's, the commune movement 
faced economic disaster due to the lack of an appropriate incentive system. After the 
economic catastrophe of the 1960s, the commune system was modified and a "three 
tiered" system implemented to correspond with the three administrative hierarchies: 
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communes, brigades and production teams. The brigade (about 200 households) became 
the basic accounting unit. Under this system, most income and agriculture production 
was distributed more or less equally and a small portion was distributed as rewards for 
effort. Under this arrangement, there was almost full insurance among households within 
brigades or production teams. At the higher government level, communes and counties 
still implemented some insurance among brigades and communes by reallocating 
resources with no compensation. 
However, under the commune, brigades and production team system, the rewards for 
individual work were still not tied directly to effort, and the incentive to work was thus 
very low. From 1978 onward, the government subdivided collectively owned land into 
individual household farms to improve farmer's incentive. By the end of 1983, 98% of 
the production teams had adopted the household responsibility system (HRS). Under the 
HRS, collectively owned land and other resources were assigned to individual 
households with contracts of 15 years. These contracts were extended to 30-50 years 
when they were renewed in the 1990s. The other most important element of these reforms 
was the greater role given to markets in guiding agricultural production. During the post-
reform pe1iod, the problem of risk sharing became very serious for individual households 
that now had to cope with a variety of risks. The brigade and production teams could no 
longer offer insurance for their members because all resources were now assigned to 
individual households. 
In fact, for some policy makers in the early of 1980s, their rejection of the HRS was 
attributed to the problems associated with risk sharing. In rural areas, some households 
with less strong household members retained the old production team system. Some 
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policy makers argued that families that were in a weak position would suffer from the 
introduction of the newly agriculture system. This debate had continued up to the present 
and evaluation of the degree of full insurance in rural areas of China has direct policy 
implications. 
5.3.2 Risk sharing in urban area 
From the 1950s, the Chinese government completely controlled allocation of economic 
resources in a Marxist construct. According to Marxist theory, workers are the ultimate 
owners of property, and they can obtain jobs whenever they are needed. In addition, no-
one can dismiss anyone else. Under this doctrine, full employment and lifetime tenure are 
the fundamentals on which economic security is based. 
Wages in the urban areas were also centrally determined and controlled by the 
government and enterprises were not financially independent. The government 
introduced a graded wage system, which reflected education, seniority and regional 
differences. Wage increases were awarded only according to government regulations. 
To keep wages low and rigid, most welfare benefits-such as housing, medical care, 
pensions and schooling were provided by state-owned enterprises as an internal social 
security system. 
It is clear that, in the planned economy, urban households faced a much lower income 
risk than rural households. However such a system cannot offer a proper incentive system. 
Encouraged by the success in rural area reform, the government began to take a bolder 
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approach to reforms in the urban sector. Markets were given a greater role in determining 
prices of output, wages, and employment numbers. During 1989-1993, when our sample 
was collected, urban households lived in a more competitive and risky environment 
compared with the period preceding the reforms and interest in consumption insurance 
increased. 
5.3.3 The Separation of rural and urban areas 
The difference between institutional insurance a1Tangements in the rural and urban areas 
is very significant. Table 5 .1 compares insurance a1Tangements in rural and urban areas. 
Table 5.1: Comparison of Insurance Arrangements in Rural and Urban Areas 
Rural Urban 
Government Unemployment No Yes 
programs insurance 
Public medical No Yes 
insurance 
Worker medical No Yes 
insurance 
Work unit medical No Yes 
insurance 
Food subsidies No Yes 
Pension system No Yes 
Informal Yes Not 
clear 
Formal credit Very Yes 
and insurance difficult 
market 
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The di vision of rural and urban areas is implemented by the "hukou" system (household 
registration system). Under this system, individuals are forced to register with local 
authorities to gain residency, thereby determining where they live and work. Migration 
between rural and urban areas was severely restricted. 
In the context of the Chinese economy, we are interested in the following questions: 
How well developed are institutions that might insure people during the transition period 
of the Chinese economy? 
Are there differences in the amount of insurance available between the rural and urban 
samples? 
If there is some insurance, at which level does this insurance occur: village level, regional 
level or national level? 
Can we find evidence of a relationship between insurance and geographical distance? 
From the description of China's institutional background, we could predict that urban 
households are likely to enjoy more insurance than rural households, because of the 
absence of a formal insurance system and formal credit market in rural areas. It is also 
difficult for rural area households to co-insure each other across villages. However, there 
are a variety of informal institutional insurance arrangements within villages that could 
be very effective in helping individuals to insure each other. 
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5.4 The Theoretical Model 
Consider a pure exchange economy with N members. An individual's time separable 
expected utility function over a single consumption good can be written as: 
00 s 
L p t Ln(sa )U (c/ (srz ), b/ (sa )) (5-1) 
t=O r 
Where c/ (sa) 1s consumption for individual j 1n event r at time t, b/ (sa) 1s a 
preference shock, and O < p < l the discount factor. 
The Pareto-optimal consumption allocation is derived from the planning problem, 
Maximize a weighted sum of individual household utilities: 
N oo S 
Max L A1 L pt L n(srz )U (c/ (srz ), b/ (srz )) (5-2) 
j = l t=O r 
where ;// is Pareto weight associated with individual j. 
The feasibility constraint is that aggregate consumption must be less than the aggregate 
endowment, at each date and in each state: 
(5-3) 
s.t. ca (s 11 ) = L c1 (s 11 ) <= L e1 (s 11 ) for all sa 
j j 
where the left hand side is the total consumption of N members and the right hand side is 
total endowment available at time t. The reason is that the planner can solve a plan with 
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production by first determining the optimal distribution of aggregate goods across dates 
and states, and then determining how to distribute those aggregate goods, acting as 
though they were endowments. 
The first order condition for the planner's maximization problem is: 
(5-4) 
The left-hand side is the discounted weighted marginal utility. The right hand side is the 
Lagrange multiplier associated with the feasibility constraint (5-3), divided by the 
probability of state sn. The right hand side depends on aggregate consumption. It is 
constant across household j. The individual household's endowment does not enter into 
the determination of individual household's consumption allocations, given aggregate 
consumption and the Pareto weights. 
In the first order conditions, the Pareto weight is not observable by the econometrician. 
This problem can be solved, by dividing the first order condition at two points in time. 
Hence, panel data (at least two time points) is required to test the full insurance 
hypothesis. 
pi uc(c/+~,b,~1) = µt+I 
uc(c/ ,b/) µ , (5-5) 
This equation shows that the growth of marginal utility of individual j is constant across 
households. Given aggregate consumption, individual household endowment has nothing 
to do with the determination of the growth of discounted individual household marginal 
utility, 
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Now suppose the utility function is a CRRA utility function 
U = b/ -1-_ (c/ )cri 
(J' J (5-6) 
Substituting (5-6) into condition (5-5) , and take logs , we get 
(5-7) 
This equation indicates that the growth of consumption for individual household j is 
determined by the risk aversion coefficient, preference shifter, time preference, and the 
refined Lagrange multiplier. All of these factors can be captured by a constant item in a 
statistical model. When we consider any variable that represents the idiosyncratic shocks, 
it will be independent of consumption growth if this idiosyncratic variable is cross-
sectionally independent. 
To test full consumption insurance, we consider a statistical form of (5-7) , 
j 
1 o-( Ct+l ) - RAV J rL1 J J ob . -a+µUA. t+1 +r1~ +E,+1 
C J 
t 
(5-8) 
where A/ is the demographic term correlated with preference shift, ~ / are idiosyncratic 
shock variables such as income changes. According to our model , these variables should 
not enter into the determination of increases in consumption. 
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We also have an alternative form of (5-7). By substituting utility function (5-6) into (5-4), 
adding the first order condition over individual household} in village or neighbourhood v, 
one obtains a formula as follows: 
C J . C (5 
log(__!_:!i__) = log(__!_:!i_) v +--(b1 -b1 ) - (b v -bv) 1 2 V j l t+l t t+l t ' V = ' , ... 
ct ct - O' 
C 1 N,, C J 
Where log(__!_:!i_) v = -Llog( 1: 1 ) = cv, 
ct N v J ct 
Therefore we have an alternative reduced form version: 
j 
1 ( Ct+ l ) _ S: - V f-l A V J ,A J J og --_ - a+ uc + f-lD.A 1+1 + Yr11 + £ 1+1 
C J 
t 
Specification and empirical applications: 
(5-9) 
(5-10) 
In both equation (5-8) and equation (5-10), M ,~1 is the change of income or the change 
of health status. The coefficient of these variables is predicted as zero by the model. 
Actually, to match the test exactly to the model requires data on a measure of income that 
has not been insured. When we use total income, it is possible that some risk sharing has 
taken place and is included in the measure of income, for instance, the total household 
income may include welfare benefits from a social security program, interest income, 
va1ious lump-sum receipts , gifts and transfer etc23 . 
2J We are assuming that consumption :insurance does not take place through income insurance. If 
that is the process of insurance, our empirical test in this chapter will overstate the ability of 
consumption insurance. Chapter 6 will discuss it in details. 
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In equation (5-13), the risk sha1ing model predicts that 8 =1 and ~=0. 
5.5 Specification and Econometric Issues 
In this section we show that the separability, power form, and rest1ictions on individual 
heterogeneity in the example above are not essential to the full insurance proposition. 
5.5.1 Separability problem 
Equation (5-8) is robust to the non-separability assumption. This becomes obvious when 
we write the planning problem as follows: 
N oo S 
Max LA1 L p t LnCsir )U (c/ (sir), l/ (sir), b/ (sir)) 
J=l t=O T 
N N N N 
s.t. Le/< L e/ , and Lz/ <L z/ , (5-11) 
j =l j j =l j 
where zl is endowment of leisure for individual household} at time t. We can obtain two 
first order conditions for consumption and leisure analogous to (5-5), respectively. 
Suppose the utility function is as follows: 
U = b J _l_ ( J) (J' j _1_ (l J) ej 
t · Ct · I a l 01 (5-12) 
We can get consumption allocation analogous to (5-8): 
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where the difference between (5-13) and (5-7) is that the Lagrange multiplier associated 
with leisure constraints enters into the determination of the consumption allocation. 
Therefore, if the idiosyncratic variables are cross-sectionally independent of preference 
shift, time preference and the risk aversion coefficient, these idiosyncratic variables will 
be independent of consumption growth. 
This conclusion seems to contradict traditional wisdom as to the non-separability 
assumption. For instance, if leisure and consumption are substitutes, less leisure will 
change the marginal utility of consumption and increase consumption. Therefore 
unemployment will c_o1Telate with consumption growth. However this is not the case, 
because leisure is also part of the plan and is allocated across individuals without regard 
to endowments. In other words, the planner simultaneously determines consumption and 
leisure. The key assumption behind this argument is that the planner can transfer leisure 
across households freely. We have to admit that it is quite a strong assumption. If this 
assumption fails, the qualified idiosyncratic variables, on the right hand side of 
equation(5-8), also need to be independent of leisure. Obviously, unemployment status 
does not satisfy this requirement. Although the majority of researchers use employment 
status as right hand side va1iables, (eg. Cochrane 1991 and Mace 1991), we will not use 
employment in this chapter. 
Regarding the more general form of utility function, Cochrane (1991) argued that 
marginal utility growth is not just a function of consumption growth and that we may still 
write marginal utility growth as a function of consumption growth and initial 
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consumption level. Additionally, if the right hand variable is independent of the initial 
consumption level, it should still be independent of consumption growth. Finally, if the 
idiosyncratic variables are cross-sectionally independent of the initial consumption level 
(as well as preference shifts and measurement error), these idiosyncratic variables are 
cross- sectionally independent of consumption growth. 
5.5.2 Pooled versus cross-sectional regressions 
Pooled time-series cross-sectional regressions are affected by non-separability and 
functional form assumptions. From equation (5-8), the error item includes factors that 
affect consumption growth but which are not observed by the econometrician. Amongst 
these factors are the shape of utility function, risk aversion, time preference and 
measurement e1Tor of the consumption growth rate. For instance, lower risk aversion 
households are likely to have a more volatile consumption path. Consequently, the right 
hand variable should not correlate with the above factors , over time, in pooled time series 
and cross sectional regression. However this correlation is difficult to satisfy. For 
instance, individual income is likely to be correlated over time with aggregate income 
and hence with the Lagrange multipliers. Townsend (1994) and Mace (1991) control for 
this problem by including average consumption growth of the community on the right-
hand side. Cochrane (1991) pointed out several reasons for including it on the right side 
that may fail to control for correlation of the right hand side variable with the Lagrange 
multiplier. In summary, the assumptions of pooled and strictly cross-sectional regression 
are different. It is difficult to choose between pooled and strictly cross-sectional 
regression. We will offer results from both methods. 
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5.6 Data and results 
Equation (5-8) and (5-10) are the test specifications in this section. These involve growth 
rate of consumption and income. This test requires a minimum of two observations for 
each household. 
5.6.1 The Data 
Data is taken from the China Health and Nutrition Surveys (CHNS) of 1989, 1991 and 
1993. 
Detailed household food consumption data was collected during 3 consecutive days, 
which were randomly allocated from Monday to Sunday and were almost equally 
balanced across the 7 days of the week for each sampling unit. 
At the same time, the state and free market stores were visited and prices were collected 
for a representative basket of commodities for each community. This enabled us to 
construct food expenditure. The method is as follows: Firstly, food consumed by 
households is categorised into classes and matched against the prices collected. A total of 
40 kinds of food and prices were listed. Secondly, calculation are made to obtain real 
food expenditure by product of 1989 prices and the quantities of food consumed in each 
year. There are three kinds of price: state stores price, free market price and negotiated 
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price. We use free market price or negotiated price. If they are not available, we then use 
the state store price. 
The income variable comes directly from the survey data. Of course, the quality test of 
the full insurance hypothesis depends on the quality of the income data. If there is a 
serious measurement error, the coefficient will be biased toward zero. However, we 
cannot identify between the effect of full insurance and measurement error. This is the 
potential weakness of this chapter. This problem cannot be solved without good 
instrumental variables. To confirm our test, we will test the full insurance hypothesis 
using an alternative shock variable such as a dummy for different illnesses. This segment 
of the study will be conducted in another chapter. 
5.6.2 Results 
We ran cross sectional regressions of consumption change against income change by 
using the 1989 and 1991 data. This simple and robust technique for testing consumption 
insurance is used in Cochrane (1991). Non-separability, functional form assumptions, and 
generalisations of preference shocks do not affect this test. 
The regression is based on equation (5-8). The dependent variables are change of total 
food consumption, grain consumption and non-grain food consumption. To compare the 
different consumption insurance behaviour in rural areas and urban areas , the regression 
has been run for the total sample and two sub-samples (i.e. a rural area and urban area 
respectively). 
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In our regression, in order to capture the demographic effect, household size and the 
regional dummies have both been added. 
The results of our test are reported in Tables 5.4.1 to Table 5.4.3. Apparently, full 
consumption insurance is rejected in the rural area, however it cannot be rejected in the 
urban area. The coefficient of income change is significantly different from zero for the 
rural area, but not for the urban area. The coefficients of income change in the regression 
of food consumption growth are 2.3%, 2.4% and 1.7% for the total sample, the rural 
sample and the urban sample, respectively. The coefficients are statistically significant at 
the 5% level for the total sample and the rural area sample, but not the urban. This is true 
for the regression of grain consumption and non-grain consumption. It is worth noting 
that the coefficients of income change are quite small. This coefficient increases to 0.04-
0.05 in the regression of non-grain consumption for the total sample and rural areas . This 
result is consistent with the previous works. For instance, in the empirical work by Mace 
(1991), the elasticity of income for 12 goods in the USA is about 0.04 and significant. 
The small size of the estimated coefficients shows that there is significant insurance in 
the Chinese economy. As we mentioned before, using income change as an idiosyncratic 
variable suffers several disadvantages. On one hand, income from labour supply and 
other sources may be neither independent from the consumption of the household nor 
exogenous from the decision problems facing a typical household. So it can be argued 
that the significance of the coefficient is not sufficient to reject the full insurance 
assumption. On the other hand, the measurement error of income will result in downward 
bias. 
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How does the risk insurance happen? Does it deteriorate with distance? We include 
village or neighbourhood average consumption growth as a right hand variable. In our 
total sample there are 188 villages or neighbourhoods. The results are reported in Table 
5.5.1-Table 5.5.3. All of the coefficients of income change are now not statistically 
significant from zero for any one of the total, rural and urban samples and the coefficient 
of village or neighbourhood average consumption change is between 0.93-0.96. This 
indicates that the consumption of households indeed tracks with the village's average 
consumption. These results confirm that there is very significant insurance confined in 
villages and neighbourhoods. Recall that there is no formal credit market, insurance 
market or social security system in the rural areas and from this we can conclude that 
insurance within the village is implemented through informal mechanisms. It has been 
found that the exchange of labour ("huan gong") and borrowing and lending among 
households are very popular in Chinese villages. From our results, it seems that these 
informal mechanisms are doing a good job. It is worthy doing further research to 
investigate the conditions that help these informal markets work with such success. 
If within the village and neighbourhood, households can insure each other, how about 
risk sharing across villages? To answer this question, regression equation (5-8) is run 
again for the sample villages or neighbourhoods. The dependent variable is the average 
change in food consumption (in log form) for households in the village (neighbourhood). 
The independent variable is the change in average log village income. We also try to 
control for population change of the village and unobserved regional type (by using a 
province dummy). 
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The results are reported in Table 5.6.1. It is apparent that the full insurance hypothesis is 
overwhelmingly rejected. The coefficients of village income change are 0.11, 0.08 and 
0.17 for the regression of total food, grain consumption and non-grain consumption 
respectively and these coefficients are statistically significant. Village (neighbourhood) 
income changes have a significant impact on village (neighbourhood) consumption 
changes. However, the hypothesis that village consumption moves one to one with 
village income is also rejected. This means that there is a considerable amount of risk 
sharing but, in this case, it is much less than perfect. 
We ran the same regression by including village population size change as a right hand 
variable, the result is reported in Table 5.6.2 and it is very similar to the result above. The 
coefficient of the size change ranged from 0.06 to 0.146. 
The most interesting observation to be made from these results is that the idiosyncratic 
village-specific income coefficients are not uniformly reduced when we control for the 
province dummy (see Table 5.6.3). The coefficients are 0.08, 0.02 and 0.196 for the 
regression of total food consumption, grain consumption and non-grain consumption 
respectively. This result might suggest that there is little risk sharing across villages 
within the province. 
As in section 5 .5, pure cross-sectional regression, pooling time series and cross-sectional 
regression are based on different assumptions. To look at the robustness of our result, 
from the perspective of cross-sectional regression, we have re-worked the regressions in 
the context of a panel by using the 1989, 1991 and 1993 data. The results are reported in 
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appendix A5.1 to A5.3.3. The results are similar to those of a cross-sectional regression. 
In the regression for sample villages, the coefficients become smaller. 
With these results, we can partially answer the question: "does insurance deteriorate with 
distance?" One might hypothesise that there would be a fair degree of risk sharing at the 
village level (just as Townsend found in his research on Indian village data), less at the 
regional level, and still less at the national level. This issue has been examined by several 
researchers 24 . Our results show that there is a far more effective inter-household 
insurance support system within villages (neighbourhoods) than across villages. 
This finding has important implications. It helps us to understand the reasons behind the 
rejection of full insurance for rural areas. For instance, our results lead us to think that 
information transfer problems (i.e transfer of information related to moral hazard and 
adverse selection) could be the cause of the failure of full insurance. The information 
transfer problem could disappear in the small group situation, such as in villages or 
neighbourhoods. In China, the village usually consists of households bearing the same 
family name. These households have the same ancestors and have lived closely in one 
village for many generations. Everyone knows each other very well and the interaction 
between households can be thought of as a repeated game. The reputation model 
guarantees that market equilibrium exists. In fact the existence of the informal credit 
market has a long history in Chinese villages. This could be the reason why a good risk 
24 Rashid (1991) found the degree of insurance deteriorates with distance in Pakistan data. 
Crucini ( 1999) found that cross-state and cross-province insurance in the USA and Canada, is 
better than across OECD countries. 
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sharing system exists within villages. However, the factors we mentioned above cannot 
support the concept of a general credit market across villages. 
In summary, our results suggest that there are quite satisfactory insurance arrangements in 
place within villages while regional financial markets are fragmented. 
5. 7 Conclusion 
We tested the full insurance hypothesis by checking consumption responses to income 
changes in the context of the Chinese economy. The main findings are as follows: 
(a) We reject the full insurance hypothesis in the context of the Chinese economy when 
we use income change as the idiosyncratic shock variable, particularly in rural areas 
(however with a very low coefficient). Our study shows that informal institutional 
arrangements do part of the work of protecting rural households against income 
change. Meanwhile, we cannot reject full insurance in urban areas (recall the 
institutional background of China.) This tells us that social security and different 
kinds of income suppo1i programs for urban people do insure households from 
income shocks. Although these systems were established under the planned economy 
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they are now c1iticised by most economists and policy makers for their inefficiency 
and financial fragility25. 
(b) Full insurance within the village cannot be rejected. At present, info1mal institutional 
arrangements are doing a good job at village level. The informal credit market 
probably plays an important role in providing consumption insurance. Knowledge of 
traditional village life in China helps to explain this full insurance phenomenon. 
Because information and enforcement problems can be coped with within the village 
setting, the informal market will work well. Of course this explanation needs an 
explicit model to formalise it. 
(c) We completely reject full insurance in the context of regression for sample villages. 
There is no full insurance across villages. This confirms the explanation above. 
Factors such as long periods of living together and accessibility to information about 
ability, output, effort of village members and the village legal system can work to 
overcome the difficulties raised by moral hazard, adverse selection etc. within the 
village. However, these information networks may lose their function across villages . 
For these reasons , we can observe that there is full insurance within villages , but not 
across. 
25 In this chapter we use income change as idiosyncratic risk. The potential rnis1neasurement of 
incon1e will down bias our estirnate. So if the n1easure1nent errors are quite big, we could not 
reject the hypothesis of full consumption insurance. So we need to be cautious to interpret our 
results . We could not reject full consmnption insurance for urban areas and within village. This 
1nay come from poor measurement of the income. To overcome this proble1n, we use illness 
shock in Chapter 6 to examine the full consu1nption insurance hypothesis. 
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It thus seems that China needs to establish a social security system and income support 
system in rural areas as soon as possible. Of course, the biggest problem is to decide if 
the insurance system should be government oriented or market oriented. It is beyond the 
scope of this chapter to discuss this argument further. 
Table 5.2: The Definitions of the Variables 
Name 
cg8991 
grai8991 
ngra8991 
incg8991 
size8991 
liaoning 
.. J1angsu 
shandong 
henan 
hubei 
hunan 
guangx1 
cgv 
1ncgv 
s1zegv 
Definition 
Food consumption growth rate of the household from 1989 to 1991. 
Grain consumption growth rate from 1989 to 1991 
Non-grain consumption growth rate from 1989 to 1991 
Income growth rate from 1989 to 1991. 
Household size growth rate from 1989 to 1991. 
Province dummy 
Province dummy 
Province dummy 
Province dummy 
Province dummy 
Province dummy 
Province dummy 
Growth rate of village consumption 
Growth rate of village income 
Population growth of village 
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Table 5.3: The Statistical Description of Main Variables 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. 
grain93 Grain consumption in 93 6.73 4.58 
foode93 Food in 93 12.95 7.06 
grain91 Grain in 93 7.15 4.47 
foode91 Food in 91 13.38 6.83 
grain89 Grain in 89 7.62 4.92 
foode89 Food in 89 13.96 8.12 
ngrain93 Non-grain in 93 6.22 4.82 
ngrain91 Non-grain consumption in 91 6.23 4.71 
ngrain89 Non-grain consumption in 89 6.34 5.72 
incto89 Income of 89 3235 4275 
incto91 Income of 91 3025 3827 
incto93 Income of 93 3700 7198 
size91 Household size in 91 4.09 1.45 
Table 5.4.1: Regression of Food Consumption Growth Rate against Income Change 
Total sample Rural areas Urban areas 
cg8991 Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
incg8991 0.023 2.75 0.024 2.46 0.017 1.02 
size8991 0.726 16.43 0.741 13.81 0.709 9.05 
agehead -0.001 -1.43 0.000 -0.01 -0.004 -2.43 
agewife 0.000 0.64 0.000 0.04 0.001 0.60 
liao 0.214 5.40 0.208 4.53 0.248 3.19 
.. 0.045 1.17 -0.003 -0.06 0.155 2.10 Jiangsu 
shandong 0.132 3.38 0.146 3.26 0.100 1.28 
henan 0.039 0.98 -0.001 -0.03 0.124 1.64 
hubei 0.032 0.85 -0.032 -0.72 0.179 2.41 
hunan 0.184 4.76 0.178 3.98 0.192 2.53 
guangx1 0.036 0.93 0.033 0.74 0.067 0.87 
cons -0.043 -0.92 -0.068 -1.22 0.033 0.35 
-
R sq 0.112 0.1193 0.117 
N 3028 2089 939 
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Table 5.4.2: Regression of Grain Consumption Change against Income Change 
Total sample Rural areas Urban areas 
grai8991 Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
incg8991 0.018 2.13 0.013 1.30 0.030 1.80 
size8991 0.789 17.15 0.797 14.09 0.786 10.01 
agehead -0.004 -4.59 -0.003 -2.41 -0.005 -3.38 
agewife 0.000 0.23 0.001 0.63 0.000 -0.41 
liao 0.227 5.54 0.251 5.17 0.219 2.84 
Jlangsu 0.038 0.95 -0.057 -1.20 0.258 3.49 
shandong 0.040 0.99 0.092 1.96 -0.078 -1.00 
henan 0.037 0.90 -0.016 -0.34 0.161 2.13 
hubei -0.049 -1.25 -0.055 -1.17 0.002 0.02 
hunan 0.061 1.53 0.040 0.84 0.128 1.69 
guangx1 -0.061 -1.52 -0.082 -1.74 0.001 0.01 
cons 0.118 2.46 0.076 1.29 0.106 1.14 
-
R sq 0.134 0.135 0.161 
N 3013 2081 932 
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Table 5.4.3: Regression of Non-grain Consumption Change against Income Change 
Total sample Rural areas Urban areas 
ngra8991 Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
incg8991 0.038 2.96 0.047 3.06 0.007 0.28 
size8991 0.691 10.20 0.712 8.41 0.666 5.89 
agehead 0.001 0.82 0.002 1.08 -0.002 -1.13 
agewife 0.000 0.30 -0.001 -0.73 0.002 1.04 
liao 0.204 3.37 0.181 2.50 0.236 2.11 
Jtangsu 0.114 1.93 0.125 1.76 0.073 0.69 
shandong 0.206 3.43 0.195 2.75 0.220 1.95 
henan 0.051 0.84 0.030 0.41 0.070 0.64 
hubei 0.083 1.41 0.009 0.12 0.201 1.88 
hunan 0.330 5.59 0.354 5.04 0.235 2.15 
guangx1 0.231 3.87 0.264 3.72 0.178 1.61 
cons -0.191 -2.70 -0.201 -2.30 0.009 0.07 
-
R sq 0.052 0.058 0.053 
N 3026 2087 939 
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Table 5.5.1: Regression of Consumption Change against Income Change [Village 
(neighbourhood) Consumption Change Included] 
Total sample Rural areas Urban areas 
cg8991 Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
cgv 0.932 22.07 0.948 18.81 0.900 10.1 
incg8991 0.007 0.85 0.007 0.76 0.006 0.36 
size8991 0.655 15.92 0.670 13.48 0.632 8.5 
agehead -0.001 -1.50 -0.001 -1.02 -0.001 -1.3 
agewife 0.001 1.60 0.001 1.20 0.000 1.1 
liao -0.008 -0.21 -0.017 -0.38 0.014 0.2 
Jiangsu -0.004 -0.12 -0.009 -0.22 0.008 0.11 
shandong -0.011 -0.29 0.001 0.02 -0.040 -0.55 
henan 0.021 0.58 0.033 0.77 0.000 0.008 
hubei -0.003 -0.07 0.001 0.02 -0.002 -0.04 
hunan 0.013 0.37 0.012 0.28 0.012 0.17 
guangx1 0.040 1.11 0.040 0.97 0.040 0.6 
cons 0.031 0.71 0.022 0.43 0.069 0.8 
-
R sq 0.236 0.248 0.120 
N 3028 2089 939 
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Table 5.5.2: Regression of Grain Consumption Change against Income [Village 
(neighbourhood) Consumption Change Included] 
Total sample Rural areas Urban areas 
grai8991 Coef. t Coef. t 
gr8991 0.933 23.84 0.952 19.74 0.870 11.4 
incg8991 0.012 1.47 0.007 0.73 0.023 1.47 
size8991 0.719 17.01 0.708 13.58 0.740 10.1 
agehead -0.002 -2.14 -0.002 -1.95 -0.001 -0.34 
agewife 0.001 0.82 0.001 1.10 0.000 0.002 
liao -0.014 -0.35 -0.021 -0.45 0.001 0.021 
.. 
-0.007 -0.19 -0.014 -0.33 0.016 0.22 Jtangsu 
shandong -0.016 -0.42 -0.003 -0.07 -0.050 -0.08 
henan . 0.017 0.45 0.023 0.51 0.005 -0.07 
hubei -0.018 -0.49 -0.009 -0.22 -0.037 -0.55 
hunan 0.002 0.06 0.004 0.09 0.000 -0.003 
guangx1 0.028 0.76 0.026 0.60 0.020 0.37 
cons 0.084 1.91 0.079 1.48 0.110 1.36 
-
R sq 0.272 0.272 0.260 
N 3013 2081 932 
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Table 5.5.3: Regression of Non-grain Consumption Change against Income [Village 
(neighbourhood) Consumption Change Included] 
Total sample Rural areas Urban areas 
ngra8991 Coef. t Coef. t 
ngr8991 0.955 24.02 0.955 19.78 0.950 12.6 
incg8991 0.001 0.11 0.009 0.60 -0.017 -0.8 
size8991 0.627 10.09 0.666 8.57 0.560 5.4 
agehead 0.000 -0.40 0.000 -0.08 -0.001 -0.54 
agewife 0.001 1.45 0.001 0.53 0.002 1.59 
liao -0.010 -0.19 -0.025 -0.38 0.020 0.18 
.. 
-0.012 -0.22 -0.017 -0.25 0.000 0.008 Jiangsu 
shandong -0.006 -0.11 -0.003 -0.05 -0.008 -0.08 
henan 0.024 0.44 0.038 0.56 0.005 0.06 
hubei 0.009 0.17 0.008 0.13 0.010 0.1 
hunan 0.018 0.32 0.014 0.21 0.022 0.22 
guangx1 0.057 1.03 0.060 0.91 0.064 0.63 
cons -0.023 -0.35 -0.013 -0.16 -0.023 -0.186 
-
R sq 0.204 0.207 0.180 
N 3026 2087 939 
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Table 5.6.1: Regression of Consumption Change of Village or Neighbourhood 
against Its Income Change 
Food growth Grain growth Non-grain 
growth 
cgv Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
. 0.108 4.13 0.084 2.83 0.165 3.99 1ncgv 
cons -0.026 -1.57 -0.057 -3.07 -0.002 -0.07 
-
R sq 0.084 0.041 0.079 
N 188 188 188 
Table 5.6.2: Regression of Consumption Change of Village or Neighbourhood 
Against Its Income Change (Controlling Population Change) 
Food growth Grain growth Non-grain 
growth 
cgv Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
. 0.087 3.46 0.061 2.13 0.146 3.55 1ncgv 
s1zegv 1.200 4.90 1.286 4.62 1.014 2.52 
cons 0.013 0.76 -0.015 -0.77 0.031 1.08 
-
R sq 0.190 0.140 0.109 
N 188 188 188 
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Table 5.6.3: Regression of Consumption Change of Village or Neighbourhood 
against Its Income Change (Controlling Population Change and Regional Dummies) 
Food growth Grain growth Non-grain 
growth 
cgv Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
. 0.079 2.90 0.021 0.68 0.196 4.34 1ncgv 
s1zegv 1.148 4.72 1.136 4.13 1.138 2.84 
liaoning 0.115 1.71 0.300 3.95 -0.179 -1.62 
.. 
-0.015 -0.24 0.103 1.45 -0.161 -1.57 Jiangsu 
shandong 0.071 1.15 0.125 1.78 -0.113 -1.10 
henan -0.015 -0.25 0.100 1.48 -0.226 -2.29 
hubei -0.039 -0.62 0.035 0.49 -0.268 -2.59 
hunan 0.120 1.97 0.131 1.91 0.039 0.39 
guizhou -0.066 -1.06 0.057 0.80 -0.302 -2.93 
cons -0.009 -0.20 -0.126 -2.37 0.187 2.42 
-
R sq 0.270 0.236 0.199 
N 188 188 188 
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5.9 Appendix 
Table AS.1: Regression of Growth of Consumption against Income Change (Panel 
Data of 1989, 1991 and 1993) 
cg Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
incg 0.017 2.85 0.02 3.043 0.006 0.45 
size8993 0.695 22.72 0.74 19.681 0.630 11.73 
liao 0.121 4.30 0.13 3.840 0.115 2.10 
Jtangsu 0.033 1.20 0.00 0.140 0.096 1.83 
shandong 0.109 3.89 0.10 3.164 0.133 2.32 
henan 0.006 0.21 0.00 0.048 0.026 0.47 
hubei 0.021 0.78 -0.01 -0.462 0.098 1.87 
hunan 0.077 2.81 0.07 2.300 0.093 1.74 
guangx1 0.006 0.23 0.01 0.224 0.011 0.21 
cons -0.054 -2.84 -0.05 -2.109 -0.078 -2.00 
-
R sq 0.094 0.10 0.082 
N 5781 3975 1806 
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Table AS.2: Regression of Food Consumption Growth against Income Change with 
Control of the Aggregate Food Consumption in Village or Neighbourhood 
(1989,1991 and 1993) 
Total sample Rural areas Urban areas 
cg Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
incg 0.007 1.22 0.007 1.16 0.004 0.33 
cgv 0.939 30.16 0.948 25.65 0.923 15.82 
size8993 0.639 22.42 0.684 19.64 0.572 11.35 
liao 0.002 0.09 -0.004 -0.12 0.013 0.26 
Jlangsu 0.002 0.08 -0.005 -0.17 0.016 0.31 
shandong 0.003 0.12 0.004 0.15 0.001 0.02 
henan 0.010 0.36 0.020 0.65 -0.007 -0.14 
hubei 0.006 0.23 -0.005 -0.19 0.027 0.56 
hunan 0.007 0.28 0.010 0.32 0.004 0.07 
guangx1 0.019 0.76 0.007 0.24 0.047 0.92 
cons 0.012 0.67 0.011 0.57 0.012 0.31 
-
R sq 0.217 0.231 0.194 
N 5781 3975 1806 
Table AS.3.1: Regression of Consumption Change of Village or Neighbourhood 
against Its Income Change 
Food growth Grain growth Non-grain 
growth 
cgv Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
incgv 0.057 3.22 0.045 2.22 0.090 3.41 
cons -0.036 -3.15 -0.066 -5.17 -0.003 -0.19 
-
R sq 0.027 0.013 0.030 
N 376 376 376 
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Table AS.3.2: Regression of Consumption Change of Village or Neighbourhood 
Against Its Income Change (Controlling Population Change) 
Food growth Grain growth Non-grain 
growth 
Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
. 0.047 2.74 0.034 1.73 0.080 3.06 1ncgv 
s1zegv 1.061 6.06 1.127 5.64 1.062 3.95 
cons -0.004 -0.32 -0.033 -2.38 0.029 1.55 
-
R sq 0.114 0.091 0.069 
N 376 376 376 
Table AS.3.3: Regression of Consumption Change of Village or Neighbourhood 
against Its Income Change (Controlling Population Change, Year and Regional 
Dummies) 
Food growth Grain growth Non-grain growth 
cgv Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
. 0.050 2.91 0.037 1.88 0.081 3.04 1ncgv 
s1zegv 1.070 6.11 1.136 5.68 1.064 3.95 
year93 -0.025 -1.16 -0.025 -1.00 -0.007 -0.21 
cons 0.009 0.54 -0.020 -1.11 0.032 1.29 
-
R sq 0.117 0.093 0.069 
N 376 376 376 
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Chapter 6 
Consu01ption Insurance against Illness Shocks in 
China 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter continues to test the full consumption insurance hypothesis in China. We 
test if the change of consumption response to major illness shocks that reflect the 
substantial risks facing consumers. The reasons for examining the response of consumers 
to illness shock are as follows: 
Firstly, in developing countries such as China, many workers are left exposed to risks. 
Illness shock may be the most significant and least predictable shock to future 
opportunities of consumers. Illness usually brings huge medical expenditure and a direct 
reduction of income. In China, the process of making the transition from a planned 
economy to a market oriented economy has resulted in the collapse of the collective 
system. The commune system has been replaced by the Family Responsibility System 
and farm land has been equally distributed to each family. The collective medical 
insurance system, established under the planned economy, has also been destroyed as a 
result of the quasi-privatisation movement in rural areas. Without any fo1mal medical 
insurance system, can Chinese rural people succeed in protecting their consumption 
against illness shock? 
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The answer to this question has significant policy implications with regards to recent 
moves to reform the Chinese social security system. At present, the Chinese government 
seems to believe that informal institutional arrangements function well-enough in rural 
areas to insure consumers against a variety of risks. Because the government also lacks 
administration skills and resources, very little effort has been made to establish a medical 
insurance system covering rural residents in the recent wave of reforms to the social 
security system. Increasingly, observers are finding that many families are falling into 
poverty because they are unable to deal with the risks brought on by income shocks such 
as illness. We believe that Chinese policy makers, who are reconsidering social security 
system reform strategies, would benefit from careful examination of how, and to what 
extent, consumers are able to insure themselves against illness shock. 
Secondly, in previous research undertaken by Mace (1991), Townsend (1994) and Jalan 
and Ravallion (1999), income shocks were carefully examined. The basic weakness of 
these tests relates to the attenuation effect of measurement error of the income variable. 
In this case, the extent of consumption smoothing is very likely to be overestimated. 
Cochrane (1991) included some variables such as number of illness days and rejected the 
full insurance hypothesis for the US economy. It is believed that variables such as illness 
status may be measured in a more precise way than by using income. If we examine the 
response of consumers to illness shock, we may get a more precise estimation of 
consumption smoothing. 
Thirdly, special institutional arrangements in China allow us to understand the efficacy of 
existing medical insurance. It is almost impossible for Chinese rural residents to access 
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any formal medical insurance services. At the same time, urban residents are covered by 
medical care provided by either government or state owned enterprise. If the only 
consequence of illness is medical care expenditure, we are expected to observe that urban 
residents are able to fully insure against illness shock, since their medical care costs are 
covered. In contrast, if illness also dramatically reduces consumer income, both urban 
and rural residents may not be able to smooth consumption. 
Testing the extent to which household consumption responds to the risk of income 
change due to illness is important for the future course of economic reform in China. If 
the loss to welfare bought on by incomplete insurance is very large, natural logic dictates 
that future reform should shift emphasis from privatisation and decentralisation to the 
establishment of a national social security system. 
In this study, we use very detailed variables to measure illness shock. Illness variables in 
our data describe four kinds of illness: conditions related the heart, lungs and stomach; 
conditions of the upper extremities, shoulders, neck and upper back; conditions of the 
lower extremities and spinal cord; and conditions related to hearing, eyesight and speech. 
The results show that consumers with medical insurance can insure very well against 
illness shock. However, consumers in rural areas (most of them without medical 
insurance) are able to smooth their consumption against short-term illness shock, but they 
fail to do this in the face of long-term illness shock. The results show that household 
consumption is reduced by over 20% when the head of the household has been ill for a 
period of two years. 
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This chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 is a short literature review. We discuss 
the institutional setting during the transition period in China and relevant aspects of 
illness shock in section 6.3. Section 6.4 describes the data and our empirical results. 
Section 6.5 presents a short conclusion. 
6.2 Literature Review 
We reviewed the related Ii terature in Chapter 5 and found that empirical findings from 
previous works were mixed on the question of the availability of full consumption 
insurance both for developed countries (Cochrane 1991; Mace 1991; Attanasio and Davis 
1996; Nayga, Tepper et al. 1999) and for developing countries (Townsend 1994; Lim and 
Townsend 1998; Gertler and Gruber 2002). 
This study, in the context of developing countries, is of special interest. People facing 
substantial illness 1isks in low level income countries are more likely to fail in smoothing 
consumption against various shocks. Failure to adjust consumption not only drops these 
families into a temporary state of poverty, but also permanently destroys the health of 
family members and reduces their future possibility of success. This is particularly true in 
the case of women and children. The link between health and labour market outcomes 
has been well established by development economists Strauss and Thomas (1998). The 
link between health and productivity makes the cost of failure to shield consumption 
from illness shocks, in low-income countries, much more serious than it first appears. 
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In recent years, empirical research on insurance has been divided into two streams. One 
focuses on gathering more detailed information and attempts to discover how people 
smooth their consumption in an uncertain world (Dercon and Krishnan 2000). 
The other group, inspired by Morduch (1995) argues that the ability of people to smooth 
their consumption is not precisely measured due to the omission of income smoothing. 
According to Morduch, coping with risk may occur at two stages. First, the household 
can choose a path of conservative production or employment to protect themselves from 
adverse income shocks before they occur. Second, households can smooth their 
consumption by borrowing, savings, depleting and accumulating financial assets, 
adjusting labour supply, and employing formal and informal insurance arrangements after 
shocks occur. As a result, any remaining variability in observed income, after the 
production process has been chosen, may be easily smoothed. In addition, mitigating risk 
through production choice can be costly because expected profits must be sacrificed for 
lower risk. This cost can intensify over time as risk-averse households show reluctance in 
adopting new technologies and taking advantage of new economic opportunities. With 
these factors in mind, the above-mentioned study may overstate the household's ability to 
smooth consumption. 
In addition to the two stage insurance problem, the measurement error of income 
variables contaminates the test of full consumption insurance. It is a well-known fact that 
the attenuation effect of measurement error of right hand side variables , also leads us to 
overstate the extent of insurance. The strategy used to deal with this problem is to find 
alternative variables that are less likely to be contaminated by measurement error. We 
suggest the use of a health shock variable in our study because it may be better measured 
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and reflect the major shock facing consumers (Gertler and Gruber 2002). The striking 
feature of this kind of variable is its close association with income and expenditure. 
Gertler and Gruber use this kind of variable to represent shocks facing consumers to 
overwhelmingly reject the hypotheses of full consumption insurance against periods of 
illness in Indonesia. 
The test of consumption insurance in developing countries attracts attention due to its 
rich policy implications. In these societies, social security systems such as pensions, 
unemployment insurance and medical care systems are being established or reformed. 
How well the existing formal or informal system works has profound implications for 
newly designed systems. 
In this chapter, we will present some evidence about the Chinese family's ability to 
smooth against shocks arising from a variety of illnesses. 
6.3 Institutional Background 
Since the communist pa1iy came into power 1n 1949, the Chinese government has 
demonstrated great concern for the health of the population and energetically sought to 
develop medical and health care services. A health care network was established in urban 
and rural areas and a large contingent of professional medical workers trained. China's 
medical and health care system has been very successful. 
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In China, medical and health care systems take diverse forms. First, the state provides 
free medical care service for personnel in public institutions and in government 
organisations, as well as for students in institutions of higher learning. Second, for free 
enterprise personnel, a medical care insurance scheme has been adopted whereby 
expenses are paid wholly by the state through the enterprises. Third, in rural areas, a 
cooperative medical care system was set up during the period of the planned economy. 
Funds used to support this medical system were collected from the collectives and the 
farmers themselves. Patients were treated free of charge or they paid a portion of the 
medical costs. Those who did not belong to any of these categories were responsible for 
their own medical expenses. Actually, there were very few people not covered by one of 
the above pre-reform medical and health systems. In addition, it is worth noting the 
structure of ownership of medical care institutes. At the end of 1984, 80% of China's 
hospital beds were owned by the state and 20% were under collective ownership. The 
funds for support of medical care institutions were allocated from the budgets of 
government and state owned enterprises. 
It is also worth noting that the cooperative medical system in rural areas operated quite 
differently to medical services in urban areas. In the vast rural area, a three-level medical 
care network was established. This network centred on medical institutions at the county 
level that in tum designated public health centres at the township or commune level as 
local hubs. From the commune level, the network reached out to health clinics at the 
village or brigade level to form a rural medical care and prevention system. By the end of 
1984, there were 2,000 county hospitals , 56,000 township public health centres, and 
710,000 village clinics. There were 1.25 million part-time physicians who provided 
medical services to farmers working in the fields. 
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The medical care systems established under the planned economy faced many problem 
after the reform and open-door policy was adopted. The cooperative medical system in 
rural areas has been almost completely destroyed since the collective production system 
was abandoned and the family responsibility system introduced at the end of the 1970s. 
By the end of the 1980s, the majority of the village clinics were contracted by individuals. 
Farmers were required to pay all of their own medical expenses. In our survey data, only 
0.1 % of the rural population enjoyed the benefits of the cooperative medical insurance 
system in 1991. 
In this chapter, we will study consumption smoothing against illness and compare the 
degree of adjustment between people with and without health care insurance. The cost of 
illness consists of two parts. One is the income foregone and this is associated with 
reduced labour supply, the other is the cost incurred in diagnosing and treating the illness. 
It is obvious that the portion of the population that is fully insured by formal medical care 
insurance only needs to cope with the losses associated with reduced labour supply due to 
the illness. However, the portion of the population without formal medical care insurance 
(the majority of whom are rural residents) , have to cope with both loss of income due to 
reduced labour supply and the costs of medical care. 
Although families in rural areas are not able to access the formal insurance market, they 
may rely on informal mechanisms such as dissaving, borrowing and the family network 
to smooth their consumption against illness . In addition , it seems that labour subst_itution 
amongst family members in rural areas is easier than it is in urban areas. 
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6.4 Specification and Test for Insurance against 
Illness Shocks 
6.4.1 Specifications 
This test is based on the full consumption insurance model as in Chapter 1. The full 
insurance model claims that income risk is spread evenly over the entire population of 
households through formal or informal insurance mechanisms. 
Through solving a planner problem with a constant relative risk aversion utility function 
and manipulating the first order condition, we can reach the so called full insurance 
formula which states that individual consumption growth is completely determined by 
aggregate consumption growth and the preference shifter. Since we implicitly assume 
that income risk is fully covered by insurance, there is no need for the individual 
household to adjust its consumption to the realised income once any expansion in 
community growth has been taken into account. 
Therefore we may write our empirical specification to test if families are able to smooth 
consumption against illness as follows: 
j C . . . 
log(_!_±..!_)= a+ /JX 1 + vA 1 + E 1 j t+l l 1 ~ t+l 
c, 
(6-1) 
Where the left-hand side is the consumption growth rate, A/ is the demographic term 
co1Telated with preference shift, xJr+i represents the idiosyncratic variable indicating 
illness . 
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There are several limitations in previous works that tested full consumption insurance 
against risks. The measure of health employed was not precise. Information such as 
"whether the individual got ill or not" has been widely used. Gertler and Gruber (2002) 
pointed out that this measure might reflect only small changes in health status , not serious 
unexpected illnesses. Families may be able to insure against small and infrequent illness. 
To test if families can insure against serious illness has important policy implications. 
Social planners should use their limited resources to help people to cope with 
catastrophic illness if families cannot insure themselves from serious illness through 
informal mechanisms. 
Secondly, because of a lack of information, researchers have been unable to distinguish 
the shocks of various illnesses. Different illnesses will incur different medical cost and 
will affect labour supply to different degrees. 
6.4.2 Data and illness measurement 
The data used in this chapter is panel data of the China Health and Nutrition Survey 
(CHNS). We have taken samples from the 1991 and 1993 data, and dropped the 1989 
sample because the measures of health in 1989 are not consistent with that of the later 
years. We use 2,525 observations with complete information about illnesses. 
The key to our analysis is that good measures of health status of family members are 
available in the CHNS. Good measures of health status need to satisfy two conditions. 
202 
One is that the health measure can reflect major illness shock. This means that we need 
information that will tell us if the illness affects an individual's physical ability to 
perform the activities of daily living. These measures of physical function allow us to 
judge if the family is confronted with a large illness shock. The other condition is that the 
health measure should allow us to understand the problem of state dependence. State 
dependence refers to consumption change associated with changes in underlying 
preferences of the household due to illness. The detailed information about symptoms 
may help us to understand if underlying preferences have been changed. 
In the survey, we pose four questions: 
(1) "What is the present condition of your heart, your lungs, and stomach?" 
(2) "What is the present condition of your upper extremities, shoulders, neck, and upper 
back?" 
(3) "What is the present condition of your lower extremities and spinal cord?" 
( 4) "What is the present condition of your hearing, eyesight, and speech?" 
For each question there are four answers: 
(1) "Functioning normally." 
(2) "Occasionally affected by work or daily activities." 
(3) "Frequently affected by work or daily activities." 
(4) "Unable to work or carry out daily activities." 
For each kind of illness, we give value one to the illness dummy variable, to indicate the 
individual choosing answer (3) and (4). This is because individuals who choose answer 
(3) or (4) face a large illness shock that will incur major costs to them through medical 
expenditure and reduced labour supply. 
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Regarding the state dependence problem, the preferences over food consumption may 
change because of changes in the condition of heart, lungs and stomach. Common 
knowledge also tells us that changes in the condition of the upper extremities, lower 
extremities, hearing and speaking may not change preferences over food consumption. 
In our test, we define dummies to indicate the health status for the household head in the 
years 1991 and 1993. For each year, the health of the household head has two states: 
good or ill. Therefore, in total we have four dummies to indicate these joint health states 
in 1991 and 1993: (good, good), (good, ill), (ill, good) and (ill, ill). 
The description of health status in 1991 and 1993 by areas is presented in Table 6.1 and 
Table 6.2. There are two features worth noting. The proportion of the population with 
improved health status (that is from ill to good) is slightly higher than those who reported 
that his/her health becomes worse (that is from good to ill) (in Table 6.2). This means 
that average health conditions improved in 1993 compared to 1991. This is consistent 
with the time trend of the improving health conditions in China attributed to economic 
development. The other issue is that the proportion of ill people is higher in urban areas 
than in rural areas (Table 6.1). This should not be true, given that urban residents enjoy 
higher income levels and better medical insurance. The possible explanation of this is 
that rural residents systematically overestimate their health conditions compared to their 
counterparts in urban areas. 
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6.5 Results 
We use estimation equation (5-1) to examine if families can insure against the four kinds 
of illness shock. We examine each of the illness shocks separately. The assumption is 
that there exists no correlation between this four illness shocks. There are only 6 
observations that report more than two illness symptoms. This justifies our assumption of 
the independence of the four kinds of illness. 
Table 6.3 to Table 6.6 presents the results for the shocks of (1) illness of heart, lung and 
stomach, (2) illness of upper extremities, shoulder, neck and upper back, (3) illness of 
lower extremities and spinal cord, ( 4) illness of hearing, eyesight and speech. For each 
kind of shock, we report the results for both the sample with formal medical insurance 
and the sample without it. The family size and regional dummies are controlled. 
For the illness of heart, lung and stomach, we cannot reject full insurance for both 
samples. That is, food consumption does not adjust in response to this illness shock 
experienced by the family head. 
Table 6.4 reports the test of full insurance against illness of upper extremities. The 
coefficient of the dummy indicating that the household head was ill during both 1991 and 
1993 is about 0.19 for the total sample. Consumption does not respond to the other two 
dummy variables indicating that health becomes better and health becomes worse. This 
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result implies that the family may fail to insure themselves from persistent illness. For 
farmers in rural areas, another family member may spend extra effort in order to finish 
the work of the ill member for a short period of time because labour substitution amongst 
family members is not difficult in traditional farming practice. However, if the family 
head is ill for a long period of time, the family's income will certainly be seriously 
reduced because labour substitution amongst family members is imperfect. The informal 
insurance arrangements may fail to insure this kind of risk. 
The results in Table 6.4 show that the consumption growth of households without 
medical insurance was reduced by about 29 percentage points if the family head was ill in 
both 1991 and 1993. For the sample with medical insurance, this coefficient is not 
significant from zero. We cannot reject full insurance for households with medical 
insurance. This result is not difficult to understand. In the context of China, almost all 
households with formal medical insurance are in urban areas, except a few people such as 
government employed primary school and middle-school teachers. The medical costs 
incurred by households in this sample have been covered substantially by insurance. The 
important issue here is that physical strength in the urban labour market is not as 
important as it is 1n rural areas. Therefore, the illness of upper extremities may not 
significantly reduce family resources for urban residents . 
Table 6.5 presents the estimations for illness of the lower extremities and spinal cord. 
The results are almost the same as for an illness of the upper extremities. For the sample 
without medical insurance, the coefficient of the dummy indicating that the household 
head has been ill for a long period is 0.25. Again, full insurance cannot be rejected for the 
sample with medical insurance. 
206 
The shocks of illness related to hearing, eyesight and speech are examined in Table 6.6. 
A household head whose condition changes from good to bad condition, will reduce 
family food consumption growth by 11 percentage points. For the sample with medical 
insurance, we cannot reject the hypothesis of full consumption insurance. Why doesn't 
persistent illness of hearing, eyesight and speech reduce consumption? We conjecture 
that while these illnesses will probably cost a large amount in medical spending, they 
may not substantially reduce labour supply. Due to the lack of additional information, we 
cannot explain this point satisfactorily. 
We also performed the test exercises by region type: village, city, town and suburban area. 
However, as mentioned above, almost all of the people in villages are not covered by 
medical insurance. In contrast to the people in cities and towns are able to access formal 
medical insurance. We present the results for illness of hearing, eyesight and speech by 
region types in Table 6.7. Our explanation is that the functions of hearing, eyesight and 
speech are more important for a worker in the urban labour market than in rural areas. 
Therefore, a person who Ii ves in an urban area who suffers from an illness related to 
hearing, eyesight and speech, will reduce his labour supply substantially. In an extreme 
case, that person may become unemployed. This would reduce his family ' s resources 
dramatically if he/she is the primary earner in the family. Table 6.7 shows that food 
consumption growth was reduced by 24 percentage points due to the illnesses affecting 
hearing, eyesight and speech for city households lived. 
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6. 6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have examined the data to determine if consumers can protect 
themselves from illness shocks in different institutional settings in China. The measures 
of health shocks reflect an individual's physical ability to perform daily activities or work. 
We also use detail symptoms in the study as they may also help to understand if the 
findings in this chapter are driven by changes in underlying preferences. 
Our basic findings are as follows. 
(1) The test of full insurance against illness shocks 1s inconclusive. It appears that 
households are able to smooth consumption against episodes of short-term illness but not 
those lasting for long periods. This implies that certain kinds of major illnesses may be 
difficult to insure against because of large medical costs and reduction of the individual's 
labour supply. 
(2) Amongst the population with formal medical insurance, households are able to shield 
themselves from illness shocks. This indicates that the medical cost of illness is a large 
burden for households without medical insurance. 
Based on the outcomes of our tests, the policy implications are obvious. Since 
households without medical insurance are able to insure their consumption against minor 
illness shocks but not major ones, the optimal for social insurance intervention to adopt 
should be the extension of insurance coverage to rural areas and that limited resources 
should be used to insure only catastrophic events. This policy would substantially 
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improve the welfare of households in rural areas and dramatically reduce the new wave 
of poverty attributable to catastrophic events. 
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Figure 6.1: Insurance Types 
Insurance type 
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lliiil No Insurance 
11 Public insurance 
• Worker insurance 
• Work unit 
msurance 
• Dependent medical 
msurance 
lliiil Cooperative 
medical insurance 
• The other 
Table 6.1: Description of Present Condition on Health 
Present condition on health (total sample) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Heart, lung and stomach (1991 ) 2574 1.096 0.343 1 4 
Upper extremity (1991 ) 2572 1.082 0.342 1 4 
Lower extremity(1991) 2572 1.070 0.293 1 4 
Sensory function (1991) 2570 1.095 0.353 1 4 
Heart, lung and stomach (1993) 2574 1.101 0.364 1 4 
Upper extremity (1993) 2572 1.070 0.308 1 4 
Lower extremity(1993) 2572 1.077 0.291 1 4 
Sensory function (1993) 2570 1.099 0.347 1 4 
Present Condition on Health (Rural Areas) 
Va1iable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Heart, lung and stomach (1991) 1723 1.081 0.321 1 4 
Upper extremity (1991) 1722 1.057 0.293 1 4 
Lower extremity(1991) 1722 1.055 0.252 1 4 
Sensory function (1991) 1722 1.072 0.312 1 4 
Heart, lung and stomach (1993) 1723 1.095 0.354 1 4 
Upper extremity (1993) 1723 1.048 0.245 1 3 
Lower extremity(l993) 1722 1.057 0.234 1 3 
Sensory function (1993) 1721 1.063 0.278 1 3 
Present Condition on Health (Urban Areas) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Heart, lung and stomach (1991) 807 1.121 0.370 1 3 
Upper extremity (1991) 806 1.130 0.413 1 4 
Lower extremity(1991) 806 1.103 0.364 1 4 
Sensory function (1991) 804 1.144 0.425 1 4 
Heart, lung and stomach (1993) 807 1.116 0.391 1 4 
Upper extremity (1993) 805 1.111 0.401 1 4 
Lower extremity(l993) 806 1.122 0.383 1 4 
Sensory function (1993) 805 1.171 0.447 1 4 
Note: There are 44 households whose information about living in rural or urban is missing. 
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Table 6.2: Dummy Variables for Change of Health Status 
Variable 
heartl 1 
heart12 
heart21 
heart22 
upextrl 1 
upextr12 
upextr21 
upextr22 
loextrl 1 
loextr12 
loextr21 
loextr22 
sensorll 
sensor12 
sensor21 
sensor22 
Total sample 
Mean 
0.86 
0.06 
0.06 
0.02 
0.89 
0.05 
0.05 
0.01 
0.89 
0.04 
0.05 
0.02 
0.86 
0.05 
0.06 
0.03 
Std. Dev. 
0.35 
0.23 
0.24 
0.15 
0.31 
0.22 
0.21 
0.11 
0.32 
0.20 
0.22 
0.14 
0.34 
0.22 
0.23 
0.16 
!Rural area 
Mean 
0.88 
0.05 
0.06 
0.02 
0.92 
0.04 
0.03 
0.01 
0.90 
0.04 
0.05 
0.01 
0.90 
0.04 
0.04 
0.02 
Note: " ... 11" is a dummy for the household head's health 
status is good in both 1991 and 1993 
" ... 12" is a dummy for the household head's health is 
good in 1991 but got problem in 1993. 
" ... 21" is a dummy for the household head's health has 
problem in 1991 but good in 1993. 
" ... 22" is a dummy for the household head's health has 
problem in both 1991 and 1993. 
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Std. Dev. 
0.33 
0.21 
0.23 
0.14 
0.27 
0.19 
0.18 
0.08 
0.29 
0.19 
0.21 
0.11 
0.29 
0.20 
0.19 
0.13 
!Urban area 
Mean 
0.83 
0.07 
0.06 
0.03 
0.83 
0.08 
0.07 
0.02 
0.85 
0.05 
0.07 
0.04 
0.78 
0.07 
0.10 
0.05 
Std. Dev. 
0.37 
0.26 
0.24 
0.18 
0.38 
0.28 
0.25 
0.15 
0.36 
0.22 
0.25 
0.19 
0.41 
0.26 
0.30 
0.22 
Table 6.3: Regression of Illness Shocks (Health Status of Heart, Lungs and Stomach) 
Total sample Sample without Sample with 
medical insurance medical insurance 
Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
heart12 -0.005 -0.12 -0.054 -0.95 0.090 1.174 
heart21 0.008 0.17 0.020 0.36 -0.014 -0.198 
heart22 -0.013 -0.19 -0.054 -0.56 0.015 0.160 
size9193 0.671 14.65 0.689 12.09 0.620 7.801 
liaoning 0.003 0.09 0.032 0.60 -0.019 -0.249 
.. 0.004 0.11 0.056 1.01 -0.017 -0.244 Jlangsu 
shandong 0.113 2.75 0.093 1.94 0.187 2.243 
henan -0.054 -1.24 -0.039 -0.80 -0.076 -0.805 
hubei -0.030 -0.75 0.007 0.14 -0.082 -1.054 
hunan -0.027 -0.69 -0.034 -0.76 0.017 0.208 
guangx1 0.004 0.10 0.026 0.59 -0.042 -0.494 
cons -0.014 -0.49 -0.018 -0.58 -0.021 -0.343 
-
R sq 0.086 0.090 0.087 
N 2525 1659 856 
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Table 6.4: Regression of Illness Shock (Upper Extremities Illness) by Insurance 
Type 
Total sample Sample without Sample with 
medical insurance medical insurance 
Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
upextr12 0.026 0.55 0.035 0.56 0.021 0.29 
upextr21 -0.023 -0.46 -0.017 -0.23 -0.020 -0.29 
upextr22 -0.194 -2.04 -0.291 -2.16 -0.101 -0.74 
size9193 0.673 14.72 0.697 12.23 0.615 7.73 
liaoning 0.008 0.19 0.038 0.71 -0.016 -0.21 
Jlangsu 0.008 0.21 0.055 1.00 -0.015 -0.21 
shandong 0.114 2.78 0.093 1.94 0.184 2.22 
henan -0.052 -1.20 -0.038 -0.77 -0.079 -0.84 
hubei -0.029 -0.73 0.006 0.13 -0.083 -1.07 
hunan -0.026 -0.65 -0.034 -0.75 0.017 0.20 
guangx1 0.007 0.19 0.026 0.59 -0.042 -0.50 
cons -0.014 -0.50 -0.020 -0.63 -0.016 -0.25 
-
R sq 0.088 0.092 0.087 
N 2525 1659 856 
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Table 6.5: Regression of Illness Shock (Lower Extremities Illness) by Insurance 
Type 
Total sample Sample without Sample with 
medical insurance medical insurance 
cg9193 Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
loextr12 -0.023 -0.44 -0.049 -0.76 0.014 0.16 
loextr21 0.011 0.23 -0.029 -0.50 0.086 1.12 
loextr22 -0.214 -2.88 -0.247 -2.36 -0.174 -1.64 
size9193 0.670 14.67 0.692 12.16 0.615 7.77 
liaoning 0.008 0.20 0.037 0.70 -0.014 -0.19 
Jiangsu 0.008 0.21 0.057 1.03 -0.018 -0.25 
shandong 0.112 2.73 0.089 1.86 0.181 2.18 
henan -0.046 -1.05 -0.032 -0.65 -0.069 -0.73 
hubei -0.031 -0.77 0.003 0.07 -0.084 -1.07 
hunan -0.026 -0.67 -0.036 -0.79 0.020 0.24 
guangx1 0.007 0.19 0.028 0.62 -0.035 -0.41 
cons -0.011 -0.41 -0.014 -0.46 -0.019 -0.30 
-
R sq 0.089 0.093 0.090 
N 2525 1659 856 
215 
Table 6.6: Regression of Illness Shock (Sensory Illness) by Insurance Types 
Total sample Sample without Sample with 
cg9193 medical insurance medical insurance 
Coef. t Coef. t Coef t 
sensor12 -0.118 -2.51 -0.112 -1.91 -0.123 -1.53 
sensor21 -0.057 -1.27 -0.086 -1.27 -0.018 -0.29 
sensor22 -0.064 -1.03 -0.056 -0.60 -0.064 -0.76 
size9193 0.665 14.56 0.688 12.08 0.607 7.65 
liaoning 0.007 0.16 0.029 0.55 -0.015 -0.20 
.. 0.007 0.18 0.052 0.94 -0.021 -0.29 Jtangsu 
shandong 0.113 2.77 0.094 1.95 0.178 2.14 
henan -0.042 -0.97 -0.031 -0.64 -0.064 -0.67 
hubei -0.031 -0.78 0.002 0.04 -0.085 -1.09 
hunan -0.030 -0.77 -0.039 -0.85 0.007 0.09 
guangx1 0.004 0.11 0.024 0.53 -0.048 -0.57 
cons -0.004 -0.16 -0.010 -0.32 -0.004 -0.06 
-
R sq 0.089 0.092 0.089 
N 2525 1659 856 
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Table 6.7: Regression of Illness Shock (Sensory Illness) by Region Types 
Village Village(and without City Town Suburban 
cg9193 medical insurance) 
Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t 
sensor12 -0.088 -1.32 -0.137 -1.90 -0.237 -2.50 -0.096 -0.81 0.083 0.48 
sensor21 -0.067 -0.85 -0.058 -0.69 -0.089 -0.97 -0.034 -0.38 -0.011 -0.08 
sensor22 -0.120 -1.15 -0.123 -1.01 -0.093 -0.83 0.066 0.50 -0.089 -0.41 
size9193 0.646 10.08 0.620 9.06 0.416 4.01 0.901 8.01 0.854 6.18 
liaoning 0.015 0.26 0.036 0.60 0.032 0.30 -0.262 -2.29 0.094 0.99 
.. 0.004 0.07 0.068 1.10 0.127 1.17 -0.180 -1.84 0.039 0.34 Jiangsu 
shandong 0.173 3.09 0.170 2.94 0.275 2.34 -0.132 -1.32 0.019 0.19 
henan -0.034 -0.59 -0.027 -0.45 -0.089 -0.76 -0.019 -0.18 -0.115 -0.97 
hubei -0.012 -0.22 0.004 0.07 -0.018 -0.16 -0.108 -1.05 -0.065 -0.66 
hunan -0.020 -0.37 -0.026 -0.47 -0.078 -0.72 -0.074 -0.74 -0.031 -0.33 
guangx1 0.056 1.06 0.061 1.12 -0.085 -0.76 -0.155 -1.56 -0.008 -0.09 
cons -0.027 -0.74 -0.028 -0.73 -0.034 -0.42 0.135 1.83 0.004 0.05 -
R sq 0.091 0.087 0.101 0.155 0.100 
N 1295 1148 403 402 425 
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Chapter 7 
How Prudent Are Con1n1unity Representative 
Consun1ers? 
7.1. Introduction 
Many recent studies have investigated the role of precautionary savings in the life-
cycle consumption model. While theoretical analysis has devoted considerable 
attention to the precautionary savings motive since the pioneering work done by 
Sandmo (1970) and Dreze and Modigliani (1972), the empirical importance of 
these studies is still an open question. Ca1Toll (1994), Carroll and Samwick (1997, 
1998), and Lusardi (1997 , 1998) present evidence of a significant level of 
precautionary motivation whereas other studies have found little or no evidence of 
precautionary savings (Kuehlwein 1991; Dynan 1993; Starr-McCluer 1996). 
Among empi1ical studies that have directly tested the role of precautionary savings , 
Dynan (1993) was able to directly estimate a relative prudence coefficient (a 
parameter in the utility function) that reflects the strength of the precautionary 
savings motive. Using consumption variance to capture all forms of risk, Dynan 
found that the prudence coefficient implied from the estimation was too small to be 
consistent with widely accepted beliefs about risk aversion (Mehra and Prescott 
1985). 
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An extremely small estimate of prudence coefficient may result if individual 
households are not cut off from all forms of insurance opportunities. A key 
assumption in the standard life-cycle-permanent-income model, employed by 
Dynan, is that some individuals are not able to access insurance markets and almost 
all assets markets. This model assumes that individual households can only 
purchase non-negative amounts of single, risk-free assets. Therefore, the absence 
of insurance markets causes them to adjust their holdings by seeking "self-
insurance". However, if individual households were able to purchase insurance or 
share risks among themselves through informal arrangements, their consumption 
would be less sensitive to idiosyncratic risks than if they could not insure at all. In 
the extreme case of full insurance, household consumption will only respond to 
aggregate risks. As a result, the relative prudence coefficient cannot be identified 
using data based on individual households. 
The weak result for precautionary motives may also stem from measurement error. 
Cogley (2002) argues that 98% of the variance in individual consumption growth in 
the USA can be att1ibuted to measurement error. Measurement error biases the 
estimate down to zero. Furthermore, the short time period in the dataset used by 
Dynan makes the key coefficient biased unless we unrealistically assume that there 
are complete markets between cross-sectional units (Altug and Miller 1990; Deaton 
1992). 
In this paper, we have used a unique dataset of Chinese household consumption to 
estimate the relative prudence coefficient of a representative consumer in the 
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community. Our focus on the community, rather than individual households, is 
motivated by two salient features of Chinese communities: 26 (1) they are largely 
isolated from each other; and (2) a significant amount of risk-sha1ing occurs among 
households within each community. 27 Dynan' s estimation procedure can be 
justified at the community level in the Chinese context. More importantly, because 
of risk-sharing behavior within the community, the effective length of the time 
periods for our estimation is substantially "enlarged": while an average of the 
forecast errors across N individual households need not converge to zero even 
when N • 00 (Chamberlain 1984 ), the average of the forecast errors converges to 
zero as the size of the community goes to infinity under complete risk-sharing 
within the community. Our empirical results demonstrate that while the growth of 
household consumption in Chinese communities responds weakly to uncertainty 
(supported by Dynan's findings), the relative prudence coefficient for a community 
representative consumer becomes dramatically greater. This is consistent with the 
widely held belief about the magnitude of risk aversion in the life-cycle 
consumption model. To check if our results were driven primarily by the simple 
averaging effect, we conducted an experiment in which we randomly divided 
households into "fictional communities". We then estimated the prudence 
coefficient of the representative consumer in the "fictional community". Our 
results from this experiment indicate that the averaging effect accounts for about 
one third of the increase in the prudence coefficient. 
26 In this paper, we refer to Chinese communities as rural villages and urban neighborhoods. 
27 Using the same dataset, Chen (2002) found that the full-consumption insurance hypothesis cannot be 
rejected within the community, but is overwhelmingly rejected between villages. Townsend (1994) also 
presents evidence in support of substantial within-village risk-sharing in India. 
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This paper contributes to the literature in two respects. Firstly, to the best of our 
knowledge, our study is the first attempt to combine the complete markets model 
and the precautionary savings model to estimate the relative prudence coefficient at 
a community level. Averaging across individuals in the same group can reduce 
measurement error and purely idiosyncratic factors that are not necessarily of 
interest. Secondly, following Dynan's methodology, we have used variability in 
food consumption to measure risk. Our data covers three time periods: 1989, 1991 
and 1993. This provides a better measure of uncertainty faced by individual 
households than Dynan's four consecutive quarterly expenditure data. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we set forth the 
model and specifications. Section ill provides a brief description of consumption 
insurance in Chinese communities. Section IV describes the data and reports the 
results. Section V discusses two econometric issues related to the results in Section 
IV. Section VI concludes. 
7 .2. The Model and Specifications 
Following Dynan' s model, we assumed that each household chooses consumption 
and savings in each period so as to maximize expected lifetime utility, which is 
time separable. The household' s problem at time t can be described as follows: 
Max E, ~ ( l ) j ( C,1,~:j ) 
j =O 1 + c) 1- p 
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subject to: 
where Ci,! is consumption of household i at time t, 8 is time preference, xi,! is 
the asset at time t, Yi,t+i represents stochastic labor income of household i at time. 
We also assumed a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function. 
Hereafter, we ignored the subscript i when it did not cause confusion. 
Solving this model and applying a second-order Taylor approximation method, we 
derived the following specification (see Dynan (1993) for details): 
l T l T 2 
-I Li log ci ,t+l = al + /31 (-I (Li log ci,t+l ) ) + Ei ,t+l 
T t=l T t=l 
(1) 
where T represents the number of periods in the sample, Ei,t+l are error terms , 
which include two pa1is: one represents the taste shifter and the other is associated 
with replacing expected values with their sample means. In this specification, 
average consumption growth was regressed against average squared consumption 
growth. The coefficient /31 equals _!_ (1 + p) , and (1 + p) is the prudence coefficient. 2 
224 
A key assumption of Dynan' s model is the absence of insurance markets and almost 
all asset markets. This implies that all agents are isolated from each other and have 
to self-insure through savings and dissavings. Browning and Lusardi (1996) argue 
that the introduction of uncertainty leads to considerable losses in welfare. Thus, 
there is considerable scope for insurance. Why then do households not use various 
formal or informal insurance arrangements to insure against income risk, but rely 
only on self-insurance? If households face idiosyncratic risk, the introduction of 
some insurance schemes would lead to considerable welfare gain. Browning and 
Lusardi point out that "the introduction of a precautionary motive leads to a rationale 
for social insurance and the introduction of the latter leads to a consequent 
attenuation of the precautionary motive." 
The coefficient in equation (7-1) could not be identified if the agents were able to 
gain access to insurance markets and almost all asset markets. In the extreme case, 
all individuals would enjoy the same growth rate under complete markets with a 
CRRA utility function. They would not respond to idiosyncratic risks but to 
aggregate risks. A cross sectional regression of equation (7-1) would generate a poor 
estimate because there is insufficient variation in consumption growth across 
individual households. 
Risk-sharing is pervasive both in developed and developing countries. Since the 
beginning of the 1990s, a line of literature has been growing to test the full insurance 
hypothesis (Cochrane 1991; Mace 1991; Townsend 1994). The basic idea behind this 
exploration is that household consumption will not respond to idiosyncratic risk 
because households can utilize formal or informal insurance markets to share the risk. 
225 
It should be noted that Townsend (1994) also suggests the existence of substantial 
consumption insurance in Indian villages. 
In our study, we next tried to combine the standard additive consumption model and 
full consumption insurance model in order to derive a testable specification. We 
assumed that there are N households residing in V different communities that are 
isolated from each other. The number of households in the community v is denoted 
by v N. We also assumed that there is a complete market within the community. 
Following Cochrane (1991) and Townsend (1994), under some regular conditions, 
we have 
j 
c 1+1 log(-. ) = gcvt , v = 1,2, ... , V; j = l,2, ... , V N 
J ' 
ct 
(2 
Equation (7-2) means that individual consumption growth changes one to one 
against aggregate community consumption growth gcv,t . That is , if the hypothesis of 
the complete market assumption holds, there exists a representative consumer whose 
consumption growth is the geometric average of all of the individual households in 
the community. So combining equation (7-1) and (7-2) yields a new specification as 
follows: 
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v = l,2 ... V 
(3) 
where /32 is one half the prudence coefficient of the representative consumer in the 
community. 
We then tested specification (1) and (3) and compared the two results in the next 
section. Both specifications examine the relationship between consumption growth 
and uncertainty in consumption, not in income. Since in either specification the taste 
shifter in en·or terms is likely to be correlated with average squared consumption 
growth, instrumental variables are needed to obtain a consistent estimate of /31 
and /32 • In this instance, we employed commonly used instrumental variables, such 
as occupation, education, regions and the number of adults in the household. 
Casual observations reveal that households in Chinese communities that are virtually 
confined to remaining in one location are able to insure against risks among 
themselves through formal and informal arrangements. Chapter 5 demonstrates that 
there is some evidence of the presence of within-community consumption insurance 
in China. Under these circumstances, the estimated coefficient /32 in specification (3) 
should be greater than /31 in specification (1). This is because the latter measures the 
strength of the representative consumer's response to uninsured, c?mmunity-wide 
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aggregate risk, while the former measures the individual household's response in 
consumption to both insured (idiosyncratic) and uninsured (aggregate) risk. 
Estimating specification (7-3) using community level data reflects the need to take 
into account within-community insurance and has the advantage of reducing 
measurement errors associated with individual consumption variations. Cogley 
(2002) found that 98% of the variance in individual consumption growth in the USA 
arises from measurement e1Tors. The weak result in Dynan' s test may suffer from 
serious measurement errors that contribute to the variation in consumption growth 
among the individuals. 
The problem of short time periods has long perplexed the empirical studies of 
consumption behavior in general and those of precautionary savings in particular 
(Altug and Miller 1990; Deaton 1996; Attanasio and Weber 1995). A well-cited 
remark made by Chamberlain (1984: 1311) points out the critical difference between 
cross section moments and time-series moments. The short time period makes the 
coefficient estimate in life-cycle model biased unless we make a very unrealistic 
assumption about the presence of complete markets between cross sectional units. 
Our estimation based on the community level, to some extent, may help us reduce 
the seriousness of the short panel problem.28 Based on specification (7-3), it can be 
shown that if there is complete risk-sharing within the community but not between 
communities, the average of forecast errors converges to zero as the size of the 
28 We are very grateful to Per Krusell for directing us to exploring this possibility explicitly. 
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community goes to infinity. Let us imagine one community which contains, say, 20 
households. If there is one observation on the community at one time point, it is 
virtually equivalent to observing the typical household 20 times over time under 
complete risk-sharing regime. Consequently, averaging all the individual households 
within the community helps "enlarge" the effective length of time period in our 
analysis. 
7 .3. Consumption Insurance in Chinese 
Communities 
In China, the community, rural village or urban neighborhood, are not formal layers 
of government administration. People who live in a rural village usually share the 
same ancestors, and consequently, the village is dominated by one major surname. 
The villagers not only live together, but they collectively own some productive 
resources, such as land. In contrast, residents in urban neighborhoods may come 
from diverse sources and as a group are not as homogenous as villagers. However, as 
a result of the long period of China's planned economy, state-owned work units 
provided concentrated housing for their workers. In many urban neighborhoods , a 
majority of the residents are associated with one or two work units. In the areas 
sampled in this survey, the average size of a village was about 400 households and 
1,973 individuals. The typical urban neighborhood had about 950 households and 
3,847 individuals . 
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It is widely believed that risk-sharing within Chinese communities is pervasive and 
that formal and informal institutional arrangements help community residents insure 
each other. These arrangements include: gifts, "loans" from family members , 
relatives, neighbors and friends, credit groups, production groups, cooperative 
medical insurance and so forth. These networks considerably attenuate the 
motivation of precautionary saving. 
Apart from these networks, it is difficult for rural residents to obtain insurance 
beyond the scope of the village due to the lack of formal insurance markets. Across-
village contracts are rare because of information asymmetry and high enforcement 
costs. Insurance plans provided by the government are virtually non-existent for 
rural areas. In this regard, Chinese villages can be treated as separate "islands". 
Rural households have to rely on self-insurance to insure against aggregate risks 
common to the village. 
Households in urban neighborhoods also share risks to a substantial degree. This is 
made possible because of the development of long-term neighborhood relationships 
resulting from the very low location mobility of urban workers. Even in urban areas , 
risk-sharing across neighborhoods remains limited for two reasons: (1) until the early 
1990s, China's social security plans for workers were mainly work-unit based~ and 
(2) individuals have had limited access to financial markets for consumption loans 
due to heavy government restrictions. 
The standard life-cycle-permanent-income model assumes that consumers are cut off 
from all insurance markets and almost all assets markets. However, the nature of 
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Chinese communities, as we describe them above, makes this assumption invalid in 
the Chinese context if we confine ourselves to the level of individual households. 
Alternatively, we can reasonably justify approaching the problem at a community 
level because China's community representative consumers can be approximately 
treated as "individuals" who are cut off from outside insurance markets. 
7.4. Data and Results 
The data used in this study was drawn from the three waves of China Health and 
Nutrition Survey (CHNS) collected in 1989, 1991, and 1993. 
The 1989 survey covered 3,795 households and 15,917 individuals. The 1991 and 
1993 surveys included 3,616 and 3,441 households respectively. In the construction 
of the food consumption variable, there were some missing values on food prices and 
quantities. Some of the information on education levels and occupations of 
household heads was also incomplete. We therefore had 3,292 effective observations 
to use in our household-level analysis. We obtained complete information on key 
characteristics for 170 out of 190 communities surveyed. We deleted 6 villages 
containing only 3-5 households and used 164 communities for our analysis of 
consumption behavior at community level. Of this final sample, 80 percent of the 
communities contained 18-20 households and the remaining communities were made 
up of 16-18 households . 
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We constructed food expenditure from information about food consumption and 
prices charged in the local markets. 29 Food expenditure included consumption of 
market purchased and self-produced food, valued at market prices. The distribution 
of consumption growth of both households and communities is shown in Figure 7 .1 
and Figure 7.2 respectively. 
The CHNS also contains several variables that might predict uncertainty and risk 
confronting individual households. Occupation and education level of the household 
head, regions, and the number of adults in one household are variables that are 
widely used as instruments for avg(gci )2 (for instance, Dynan 1993; Carroll et al. 
1999). 
The CHNS contains detailed information of the community and this provided us 
with the opportunity to estimate equation (7-3) for the representative community 
consumer. There are some variables in our data set that might predict the 
representative consumer's risk. These include community population, proportion of 
the work force in agriculture, access to telecommunications, newspapers, road 
conditions, and the ownership structure of residential housing. We chose them as 
good instruments for avg (gc v) 2 in a similar spirit to our choice of instrumental 
variables (IVs) at household level. 
29 For the details of the data construction, see the Appendix. 
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Figure 7.1: The Kernel Density Estimate of Average Log Consumption Change of 
Households ( avg(gci )) 
1.35119 
Density 
.00233 
-1.45576 
c8993 
Kernel Density Estimate 
1.50714 
Figure7. 2: The Kernel Density Estimate of Average Log Consumption Change 
of Communities ( avg(gcv)) 
3.82361 
Density 
0 
-.442411 
vacg 
Kernel Density Estimate 
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.425647 
Table 7.1: Descriptive Summary of Household Variables 
Definition Mean Std. Dev. 
avg(gcJ Household consumption growth 0.036 0.335 
avg(gcJ 2 Squared household consumpb 0.379 0.586 
growth 
occup 1 Senior technical worker 0.029 0.170 
occup 2 Junior technical worker 0.029 0.170 
occup 3 Manager, village leader 0.065 0.240 
occup 4 Office staff 0.030 0.170 
occup 5 Farmer 0.510 0.500 
occup 6 Skilled worker 0.092 0.288 
occup 7 Non-skilled worker 0.091 0.287 
occup 8 Army and police officer 0.001 0.029 
occup 9 Ordinary soldier and policeman 0.001 0.034 
occup 10 Driver 0.012 0.112 
occup 11 The others 0.140 0.383 
eduno No education 0.372 0.823 
eduprim Primary school 0.234 0.423 
edumidl Junior middle school 0.259 0.438 
edumidh Higher middle school 0.101 0.301 
edumcol College and above 0.034 0.181 
Number Numbers of adult in the household 3.06 1.351 
adults 
Note: The sample size is 3292. 
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Table 7.2: Descriptive Summary of Community Variables 
Definition 
Community 
population 
Proposition 
of workforce 
in agriculture 
Telegraph 
Provincial 
newspaper 
Dirt road 
Owner 1 
Owner 2 
Owner 3 
Owner4 
Average community consumption 
growth 
Squared average community 
consumption growth 
Population of the community 
Percentage of the work force of the 
community engaged 1n agricultural 
activity 
Whether the community has access to 
telegraph service 
Whether the community receives a 
provincial newspaper daily 
Dummy for dirt road around the 
community 
Residential houses are owned by: 
Work unit 
Government housing office 
Individual households 
A mixture of all three owners listed 
above 
Note: The sample size is 3292. 
Mean 
0.037 
0.048 
2580 
0.408 
0.315 
0.326 
0.281 
0.258 
0.146 
0.477 
0.117 
Std. Dev. 
0.120 
0.057 
4203 
0.336 
0.466 
0.470 
0.451 
0.439 
0.354 
0.500 
0.323 
We argue that a community population may affect the scope of risk-sharing but not 
average community consumption growth. A similar argument is implied in choosing 
the number of adults in the household as the independent variable when estimating 
equation (1). The proportion of the workforce in agriculture (which we believe has 
no direct bearing on community consumption growth) will probably be associated 
with some specific risk. For example, a dramatic change in the weather pattern 
could affect the income volatility of the whole community. In the tv set, we also 
included certain characteristics of the community (access to telegraph, newspapers 
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and local road conditions) on the grounds that these variables reflect the ability of 
communities to acquire information from the outside world that might be useful in 
detecting uncertainties or risks. Again, there is no prior reasoning that would lead us 
to believe that consumption growth relates to these community characteristics. 
Finally, the ownership structure of residential housing tells us whether the properties 
are owned by a work unit, government housing office, or private household. This has 
pa11icular relevance for urban neighborhoods. For instance, in some neighborhoods, 
almost all residents are employees working for the same employer (mostly state-
owned enterprises) while in others, residents may come from different work units. 
Homogenous communities are more exposed to risk than those that are mixed 
because the former relies on a more concentrated income source. 30 
It could be argued that the short length of our panel data might imply that actual 
squared consumption growth is a poor measure of risk. However, the Two-Stage 
Least Squared method will generally yield consistent estimates of the coefficient of 
relative prudence. Dynan also argues that the short length of the panel data is not a 
serious problem if the coefficient of relative prudence can be estimated precisely. In 
our case, we show that the coefficient of relative prudence for individual households 
can be estimated at a level of significance of 10%. This means that the actual squared 
consumption growth indeed reflects the degree of risk, not only noise. 
Our empi1ical analysis began with estimating equation (7-1) using data at the level of 
individual households. Table 7 .3 reports the results based on the total sample . . The 
30 The homogeneity of the community may also influence the ability of residents to risk-share. Thus it is 
difficult to determine the sign of the effect of ownership structure on squared consumption growth, i.e., the 
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four sets of instrumental variables were used alternatively in order to check for 
robustness. 
Table 7.3: 2SLS Estimate of Prudence Coefficient at Household Level (Total Sample) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
First Stage F-Test (p-value) 
Occupation 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Education 0.345 0.543 0.367 
Number of adults 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Regions 0.240 
N 3292 3292 3292 3292 
R-sguared (%) 2.17 2.03 1.20 2.30 
Second Stage Regressions 
avg(gcJ 2 0.30 0.30 0.32 0.23 
(0.069) (0.08) (0.099) (0.069) 
Implied p -0.40 -0.40 -0.36 -0.54 
(0.138) (0.200) (0.198) (0.138) 
Test of over-
identifying 0.592 0.913 0.956 0.008 
restrictions (p-value) 
Note: Con·ected standard errors are in parentheses. 
The first stage results (the F-tests are reported) demonstrate that the instruments 
explain only a small part of the variability of consumption growth. The R-squared in 
our results is slightly lower than Dynan' s. Our results show that the occupation of the 
household head and the number of adults in a household are significant predictors of 
consumption growth squared. The second stage estimation indicated that risk or 
uncertainty significantly and positively affect consumption growth, but the size of 
uncertainty in consumption. 
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the estimated coefficient of avg (gc) 2 was very small, ranging from 0.23 to 0.32. As 
a result, the implied relative risk aversion coefficient turned out to be negative, 
which is inconsistent with the commonly held belief about its magnitude. We 
encountered Dynan' s puzzle again in a totally different institutional and economic 
context. 
Surprisingly, the over-identification test rejected the use of regional dummies as 
valid instruments. 31 This test confirmed that occupation and education are valid 
instruments. 
In order to check if our results were driven by any difference in consumption pattern 
between urban neighborhoods and rural villages, we repeated the same estimation as 
in Table 7.3, based on the rural sample only. A very similar result emerged in Table 
7.4, and again, the implied coefficient of relative risk aversion was negative.32 
31 Many authors have argued that regional dummies are good instruments as in the case of the USA (Canoll 
et al. 1999). Their basic argument is that the regional dummy satisfies the requirements of exogeneity since 
most households do not choose where to live on the basis of regional differences in income variability. As 
to why regional dummies do not work as valid instruments in our sample, we speculate that the virtual lack 
of freedom of mobility of people across regions, in China, may be a factor. Because of the notable 
difference in the diffusion of economic reform policies across regions, the pattern of income growth varies 
significantly between different provinces . The residents of a poor province, that is more vulnerable to 
adverse climate conditions, may, at the same time, experience low consumption growth. 
32 We also ran the same regressions using urban samples and obtained a qualitatively similar result. 
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Table 7.4: 2SLS Estimate of Prudence Coefficient at Household Level (Rural 
Sample) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
First Stage F-Test (p-value) 
Occupation 0.027 0.031 0.024 
Education 0.658 0.725 0.663 
Number of adults 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Regions 0.257 
N 2288 2288 2288 2288 
R-squared (%) 1.30 1.80 1.10 2.00 
Second Stage Regressions 
avg(gcJ 2 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.16 
(0.101) (0.100) (0.100) (0.091) 
Implied p -0.48 -0.48 -0.46 -0.68 
(0.202) (0.200) (0.262) (0.182) 
Test of over-
identifying 0.722 0.903 0.186 0.117 
restrictions (p-value) 
Note: Corrected standard errors are in parentheses. 
As mentioned in section III, Chinese communities use various forms of risk-sharing 
mechanisms to reduce the responsiveness of individual household consumption to 
idiosyncratic risks. This implies that the proper unit of analysis should be community 
representative consumers instead of individual households. Furthermore, the use of 
community level data will considerably decrease the possibility of measurement 
en·or. We have taken this approach because Dynan' s puzzle may result from a 
combination of risk-sharing among households and measurement error. 
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Table 7.5: 2SLS Estimation of Prudence Coefficient at Community Level (Total 
Sample) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
First Stage Regressions 
Village population -0.015 -0.015 -0.014 -0.010 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
Propo1iion of workforce -0.015 -0.016 -0.013 -0.023 
in agriculture (0.011) (0.010) (-0.011) (0.012) 
Telegraph 0.022 0.025 0.023 0.021 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Provincial newspaper 0.008 0.009 0.007 0.007 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Dirt Road -0.007 -0.005 -0.012 -0.009 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) 
Ownerl 0.012 0.010 0.007 0.007 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) 
Owner 3 0.007 0.005 0.004 0.003 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) 
Owner4 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.005 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) 
N 160 160 160 164 164 
R-sguared (%) 11.00 10.70 10.40 5.10 8.97 
Second Stage Regressions 
avg(gcv )2 2.25 2.40 2.31 2.12 2.32 
(0.710) (0.730) (0.732) (0.961) (0 .768) 
Implied p 3.50 3.80 3.62 3.24 3.64 
(1.420) (1.460) (1.464) (1.922) (1.536) 
Test of over-
identification restriction~ 0.938 0.946 0.805 0.777 0.828 
( -value) 
Note: Co1Tected standard e1Tors are in parentheses. 
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We estimated a community representative coefficient of relative prudence using the 
same data set. The results are reported in Table 7 .5 and 7 .6. For the total sample, 
five sets of instruments were used alternatively in the first stage regressions. In all 
specifications, the explanatory power of the instruments is reasonably large, 
especially in light of the first-stage results shown in Table 7.3. The coefficients of 
instruments describing the demographic features of communities were statistically 
significant with the expected signs. However the remaining instruments were less 
satisfactory in terms of both the level of significance and signs. For example, we do 
not have a good explanation for the positive correlation between access to telegraph 
services and the risks to which the community is exposed. 
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Table 7.6: 2SLS Estimation of Prudence Coefficient at Community Level (Rural 
Sample) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
First Stage Regressions 
Village population -0.021 -0.022 -0.022 -0.015 
(0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.009) 
Proportion of workforce ir-0.009 -0.011 -0.001 -0.002 
agriculture (0.015) (0.015) (-0.001) (0.002) 
Telegraph 0.022 0.023 D.022 0.021 
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) 
Provincial newspaper D.006 D.007 D.007 D.007 
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
Dirt Road -0.007 -0.007 -0.013 -0.008 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) 
Ownerl 0.003 D.000 D.008 D.000 
(0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.015) 
Owner 3 -0.002 -0.006 -0.005 -0.003 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) 
Owner 4 0.013 0.010 D.021 D.014 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) 
N 110 112 110 112 113 
R-sguared (%) 11.30 9.84 9.18 5.10 9.42 
Second Stage Regressions 
avg (gcv) 2 1.72 1.92 1.69 1.37 2.00 
(0.860) (0.901) (0.907) (1.162) (0.926) 
Implied p 2.44 2.84 2.38 1.74 3.00 
(1.723) (1.802) (1.814) (2.324) (1.832) 
Test of over-identificatior 
restrictions (p-value) D.569 D.522 D.301 D.628 D.647 
Note: Corrected standard errors are in parentheses. 
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In the second stage, the coefficients of community consumption growth squared 
range from 2.12 to 2.40, and all of them were estimated very precisely, at a 
significance level of less than 5 % . The implied coefficient of relative prudence 
ranges from 4.24 to 4.80, which indicates a strong motivation of precautionary 
savings. Our results are much larger than either Dynan' s: ranging from 0.024 to 
0.312, or Merrigan and Normandin's (1996): ranging from 0.78-1.33. We used the 
community as the unit of analysis, therefore the coefficients measure the 
responsiveness of the whole community to aggregate risks which are hard to insure 
against in China's current institutional context. In this sense, we believe the 
variations in consumption growth squared in our study represent true uncertainty 
while in Dynan's estimation, which is based on individual household level data, the 
va1iations may be contaminated by measurement error. To reduce the possibility that 
group-specific shocks drive the results, five sets of instruments were designed. The 
five sets of instrument variables all passed the over-identifying test. Our results are 
robust to different specifications. 
Again , we estimated equation (7-3) with the rural sample to address possible 
concerns about the systematic difference between rural villages and urban 
neighborhoods. The results are presented in Table 7.6. The estimated coefficients on 
avg(gcJ 2 reveal that risk positively and significantly affects consumption growth. 
The difference between Table 7 .5 and Table 7 .6 is that the magnitude and 
significance level of the coefficients are slightly lower for the rural sample.33 
33 We also redid the estimation using the urban sample (not reported here) and obtained a similar result. 
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7 .5. Discussion 
7.5.1. The Impact of the Averaging Effect 
One may question whether the simple averaging effect is the primary driving force of 
our estimate of the prudence coefficient for the village representative consumer. It is 
well known that in OLS regressions, averaging of independent variables will reduce 
the attenuation bias resulting from measurement error. However, it is unclear how 
the averaging effect influences the estimates in the 2SLS. This is particularly true in 
our study where we used aggregate characteristics of communities as instrumental 
variables instead of averaging characteristics of individual households in the 
communities. Given this ambiguity, we decided to try to explore the potential 
influence of the averaging effect on our estimates. We randomly divided the 
households into 150 "fictional communities" (about 22 households per community) 
and then estimated the prudence coefficient of the "fictional community" 
representative consumer with 2SLS. In our calculations, we used average education 
level, occupation of household heads and the average number of adults in one 
household as instrumental for the "fictional community". It was not possible to 
employ instrumental such as road conditions for the "fictional communities" in the 
same way as we did in Tables 5 and 6. We repeated the expe1iment 1,000 times. 
Figure 3 describes the distribution of the coefficients of avg (gc v) 2 • The mean of this 
distribution is about 0.9, in contrast with the estimates of 0.23 to 0.32 in Table 3. 
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This may suggest that our results are only partly driven by the averaging effect. 
Consumption insurance within villages is probably the key factor in arriving at our 
estimates. Because of the problem of picking the instrumental variable(s) for 
"fictional communities", we must be cautious 1n interpreting this experimental 
outcome. 
Figure 3: The Kernel Density Estimate of Coefficients of avg(gcv ) 2 
.121846 
Density 
0 
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 .9 2 4 6 8 
b 
Kernel Density Estimate 
7.5.2. Log Linearized Euler Equation Method 
In this paper, our specification is a linear approximation of the Euler equation. 
Carroll (1997) and Ludvigson and Paxson (1999) argue that low estimates of the 
relative prudence coefficient come from approximation bias. We estimated the 
coefficients of relative prudence for individual households and community 
representative consumers. The former is similar in size to that calculated by Dynan 
(1993), but the latter is much larger. This implies that the approximation bias of the 
log linearized Euler equation method may not be a serious problem. 
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7 .6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we estimated the relative prudence coefficient, which measures the 
strength of precautionary savings, focusing our estimation at the level of Chinese 
communities. We argue that given the features of China's institutions, Dynan ' s 
specification is better justified at the community level than at individual household 
level. The CHNS data offers accurate food expenditure data for a large number of 
households and community information for associated communities. The comparison 
between estimates of prudence coefficients for individual households and community 
representative consumers highlights some important issues related to precautionary 
saving and risk sharing. Our approach has the advantage of reducing measurement 
errors. 
At individual household level, our estimation obtained a weak relative prudence 
coefficient similar to Dynan' s. On the other hand, the relative prudence coefficient 
for a community representative consumer was found to be relatively large. The 
strong motivation of precautionary savings at community level may indicate the 
presence of substantial risk sharing behavior within, but not between, communities 
in China. Our findings indicate that households accumulate precautionary savings to 
insure against aggregate 1isks common to the whole community that cannot be 
effectively shared among communities. 
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7. 7. Appendix 
Detailed household food consumption data was collected during three consecutive 
days, which were randomly allocated from Monday to Sunday and were almost 
equally balanced across the seven days of the week for each sampling unit. 
At the same time, state-owned and free market stores were visited and prices were 
collected for a representative basket of commodities for each community. This 
enabled us to construct food expenditure. The following method was used: Firstly, 
food consumed by households was categorized into classes and matched against the 
prices collected. A total of 40 kinds of food and prices were listed. Secondly, 
calculations were made to obtain real food expenditure by product at 1989 prices and 
the quantities of food consumed in each year. There were three kinds of prices: state 
store price, free market price and negotiated price. We used the free market price or 
negotiated price. If they were not available, we then used the state store price. The 
income variable came directly from the survey data. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
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This thesis focuses on three important issues: the relationships between health and the 
labour markets, intra-household resource allocation and inter-household risk sha1ing. We 
use the data of the China Health Nutrition Survey of 1989, 1991 and 1993 and address 
questions such as: "What is the return to health in the rural labour market in China? How 
does allocation within the family take into consideration links between health and labour 
market productivity?" " Do informal insurance mechanisms shield household 
consumption from income fluctuations?" 
8.2 Main findings 
8.2.1 Return to health 
Health is a kind of human capital similar to education. To understand the relationship 
between health and labour market outcomes, we study the health consequences of the 
great Chinese famine of 1959-1961. Our difference-in-differences methodology suggests 
that the attained height of an individual who was a baby, or who reached pube1iy during 
the famine , was 2.9 to 4.8 cm shorter than it would otherwise have been if the famine had 
not occurred. We also use the famine as a natural experiment to estimate the return to 
attained height of individuals and the economic value accompanying their return to health 
and strength. In this study, we find that annual income increases by 2.5 percent if attained 
height increases by 1 cm. This implies that the famine reduced the income of individuals 
during each year in the labour market by about 7-12 percent. 
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8.2.2 Intra household resource allocation 
To further investigate the linkage between health status and labour market outcomes, we 
examine food allocation among family members. Chapter 3 estimates a health production 
function and uses it to derive individual health endowments. We also estimate the calorie 
intake elasticity with respect to individual health endowments for males and females. We 
find that health endowments affect food allocation among family members and in the 
context of the Chinese rural economy this elasticity is greater for women than for men. 
The larger elasticity for women reflects the fact that females played an increasingly 
important role in farm work while males pursue job opportunities in the rural industry 
sector where they could earn more money. In order for husbands to be free to work in the 
industrial sector, it became necessary for their wives to be capable of undertaking heavier 
work. Women who had better health endowment and were strong enough to replace, at 
least partly, their husbands' role in farming, were allocated more calories to compensate 
for their efforts. However, women with poorer health might have received fewer calories 
because they could only perfo1m light activities. 
Chapter 4 assesses the effect of the location of the husband's mother-in-law in the 
allocation of resources between husband and wife. We find that the relative share of the 
husband's nutrient intake, relative to his wife's intake, decreases when his mother-in-law 
lives in the same village or neighbourhood, but increases if his mother-in-law lives 
outside the county in which the husband's family is located. The ratio of nutrient intake 
of the husband relative to the wife, for households in which the wife's mother lives very 
far away (in a different county) is, on average, 5-10% below the comparable group where 
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the mother-in-law lives within the same county. Our test rejects the hypothesis that a 
multi-person household can be treated as a single decision-maker and sheds light on the 
degree of intra-family discrimination against the wife. 
8.2.3 Inter-household risk sharing 
Chapter 5 discusses 1isk sharing among households. The full consumption insurance 
hypothesis is tested. The nature of the special institutional arrangements in the Chinese 
economy allows us to compare the degree of insurance between rural and urban areas. 
The full insurance hypothesis is rejected for rural areas, but not urban. Furthermore, full 
insurance cannot be rejected within villages, but it is completely rejected across villages. 
Our results suggest that to some extent insurance deteriorates with distance. This suggests 
that problems with information transfers are important in explaining the pattern of 
insurance cover in China. The government interventions in the insurance market may be 
necessary to help households to achieve better risk sharing across different regions. 
Chapter 6 examines the response of consumption to major illness shocks which we use to 
overcome the measurement errors in income shocks. The detailed information of 
symptoms and impacts of major illnesses allows us to test the full insurance hypothesis 
more precisely. The results suggest that households without medical insurance are able to 
insure their consumption against minor illness shocks but not major ones. This suggests 
that the optimal social insurance intervention should extend insurance coverage to rural 
areas and limited resources should be used to insure catastrophic events only. This policy 
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would substantially improve the welfare of households in rural areas and reduce the new 
wave of poverty attributed to catastrophic events. 
The research in previous chapters shows that there is substantial risk sharing among 
households. It is important to consider this iisk sharing issue when analysing 
consumption and saving decisions within the Life Cycle and Permanent Income (LCPI) 
model. In Chapter 7, we combine the LCPI and risk sharing model to provide an explicit 
estimate of the parameters in the utility function that reflect the strength of the 
precautionary saving motive, using a second order Taylor expansion of the Euler equation. 
Our results produced a small relative prudent coefficient for the individual household, 
which is too small to be consistent with widely held beliefs of relative risk aversion. 
Meanwhile, a significant relative prudent coefficient, which is about 4 (hence the risk 
aversion is about 3 for the constant relative risk aversion utility function), has been 
estimated for village representative consumers based on group data. Our findings suggest 
that the village unit approach "works" in the estimation of the precautionary saving 
model, and this approach may be a possible way to solve Dynan's puzzle. 
8.3 Future research 
This thesis investigated the relationship between labour market outcomes and health, 
resource allocation within the family and inter-household risk sharing. It enriches our 
knowledge of household economic behaviour in China. However, it is just a small step 
ahead. Much remains to be done. 
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We used height to proxy health and estimated the return to height in Chapter 2. Since 
health is a multi-dimensional measured variable, other dimensional measures of health 
status such as weight, body mass index, blood pressure, nutrient intake, illness days , also 
need to be studied. 
Due to limitations of the available data of individual wages, we may have estimated the 
return to height inefficiently. It may be possible to resolve this difficulty if we were able 
to estimate individual income through the estimation of a household farming production 
function. Research in this direction can be very promising. We could also examine the 
links between health status and productivity directly by estimating a household 
production function. 
In our research on the return to height, we assumed that the labour supply is fixed. The 
relationship between health status and labour supply has been ignored in the literature. 
With the present data set, it is possible to exploit the effect of health on labour supply and 
we intend to pursue this issue in the future. This research will enrich our understanding of 
health and labour market outcomes. 
We examined resource allocation within the family in the rural areas in China and found 
that calorie consumption elasticity with respect to own health endowment is larger for 
women than for men. Our explanation is that women are involved in more diversified 
activities during the transition period. The question of whether women ' s welfare has been 
improved or not needs further research. 
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We also extensively discussed risk sharing behaviour among households in this thesis. It 
may be possible in future to examine risk sharing behaviour at the individual level. We 
also may be able to decompose insured risk into different pa11s: within-family, within 
village (neighbourhood), within county and within province. This kind of research has 
two advantages. Firstly, we can test the hypothesis that the outcome of resource 
allocation within the family is Pareto optimal. If the family fails to share risk completely 
within the family, resource allocation cannot be Pareto optimal. Secondly, we have 
knowledge of how much risk is shared within the different scopes. This will assist policy 
makers to design policies that will improve the welfare of individuals. 
8.4 Conclusion 
This thesis confirms that health is rewarded in the rural labour market in China and that 
households take into account links between health and labour market productivity when 
food is allocated. The study also confirms that there is substantial inter-households risk 
sharing, pa11icularly within the villages or neighbourhoods. 
It is hoped that by contributing to our knowledge of household economic behaviour in 
China, this thesis will encourage fu11her research in this field and help policy makers to 
formulate more effective policies such as the reform of the medical insurance and 
pension systems. 
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